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ABSTRACT 
This thesi consist of l\\ o chapters. These chapter are pre ented as separate journal 
arti cles. although both chapters deal wi th doctorates in the labor market. Chapter I examines 
the supply and demand moti vations or agents in a labor market fo r Ph.D.s that is segmented 
by sector. Labor is heterogeneou · acros ectors in that indi,·iduals with the same skill s may 
earn different wages in different st:ctors. This can be attributed to ector differences in the 
organizational structure of work. and differences in the pricing of sector-speci fie output. 
cctor employers maximize profits by offering a prospective employee a wage equal 
to the employee· s estimated \'a Jue or marginal product in that sector. Prospective employee 
select employment in the sector that yields the highest degree of utility in employment. 
Employees ma, imize utility based on personal tastes (that are inherently identified by 
demographic characteristics) and on the wages offered to them by employers in different 
ectors. Wage offers are assumed to be determined independent o f employees ' supply 
dec isions (i.e. they are exogenous in the utili ty max imization problem). 
Chapter 2 presents an analysis of wage differences across gender and race categories. 
It performs vvage gap decompositions that determine the portions of the wage gap attributed 
to differences in the stock or human capi tal and di ffcrence in employer valuation of gender-
and race-speci fic human capital. Moreover, Chapter 1 examines sector diffe rences in these 
wage gap . It decomposes sector wage gap differentials into observed and unobserved human 
capital and pri ce effects. The ob erved human capital effect (also kno\J n as the observed X 
effect) evaluates sector differences in the relati ve human capi tal stock of gender and race 
categories. The observed price effect calculates the conlribution of seclor difference in the 
1:1. 
valuation of ma le human capila l to the sector wage gap differentia ls. The unobserved human 
capital. or gap effect. calculates Lhe conlribution of sec tor differences in the residual wage 
position of females in the male dislribution to the sector wage gap differentials. The 
unobserved price effect calculates the contribution of seclor differences in male residual 
wage dispersion to the sector wage gap differentials. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
A number of papers have investigated the labor market conditions fac ing doctorates 
in several fi elds of study. Freeman (1975) develops a recursive model of supply and demand 
fo r new lawyers in which production of new law graduates depends not on current market 
wage but on lagged wages. The lagged production nature of new graduates gives ri se to the 
recursive form of the supp ly-demand system of equations. Scott ( 1979) applies the same 
recurs ive structure into h is study of Ph.D. economists in the academic sector labor market. 
Huffman and Orazem ( 1985) develops a framework in which the supply of new Ph.D. 
agricultural economists depends on the present value of expected lifetime income plus the net 
income from graduate assistantship appointments discounted over the period of the Ph.D. 
program. Ehrenberg ( 1992) perfo rms a descriptive analysis on the supply of new doctorates 
by degree fie ld, sector of employment. gender, and race/ethnicity. 
The objective of Chapter 1 is to examine the supply and demand motivations of 
agents in a national labor market fo r doctorates that is segmented by sectors of the economy. 
Chapter 2 of the thesis addresses the issue of wage gaps across gender and race groups. and 
decomposes these gaps into portions caused by differences in stocks of productivity factors 
and portions attributed to differences in wage structure. It also compares the wage gaps in 
different sectors and decomposes sector wage gap differentials into observed and unobserved 
productivity and price effects. 
This thesis differs from the papers previously cited in that it examines post-graduation 
supply decisions instead of decisions at the production stage. In other words, it deals with 
current Ph.D. holders and does not attempt to model enrollment decisions of students imo 
undergraduate and subsequent graduate programs. 
Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapters 1 and 2. although labeled as such. are 
actually presented as two separate journal articles. Chapter 1 presents a mixed logistic 
estimation of sector employment choices of doctorates in di verse di sciplines. It is based on a 
theoretical framework in which employers express labor demand preferences by offering 
profit-maximizing wages to prospective employees. Employees determine their preferred 
sector of employment by selecting the sector that yields the highest level of utility in 
employment. These utility levels are determined by sector wage offers. degree field , and 
personal tastes. The latter is assumed to be inherently identified by demographic 
characteristics. 
The first section of Chapter I is the Introduction. It gives examples of similar studies 
of employment choices and explains how the thesis is different from these other studies. 
Then, the Theoretical Framework section specifies the economic theory underlying the 
model. This is followed by the Data Set section, which describes the nature and source of our 
data set. This section also clearl y identifies the different economic sectors of interest and 
presents some descriptive analysis of the data set and how it compares with the results from 
other studies. The Econometric Model section is an extension of the Theoretical Framework 
section. It develops an operational statistical model through reasonable assumptions of the 
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functional forms and stochastic distributions or economic behaYiors introduced by the theory. 
The Results section consists of two sub-sections. The first di scusses the results of the 
earnings function estimations. The reason for doing earnings function estimation is that it 
provides instrumental variables for cunent sector earnings which will be used as sector 
attributes in McFadden ·s multiple choice model. The second discusses the results of the 
multiple choice model estimation and the marginal effects calculated from the estimated 
coefficients. The Results section discusses the economic and social implications of the 
estimation results. The Conclusions section reiterates the main points of the chapter. 
Chapter 2 presents gender and racial wage gap decompositions for doctorates and 
compares the gender wage gaps in different sectors of the economy. Except for the human 
capital framework that determines the form of the wage equations. the analyti cal framework 
upon which the decompositions are based is mainly an algebraic development. Specificall y, it 
results from a re-parameterization of the log wage ratio equation. 
The first section of Chapter 2 is the Introduction. in which we state the issues we wish 
to address. and the inferences we can draw from the results of the decompositions. The 
Analytical Framework section provides a step-by-step derivation of the Oaxaca ( 1973) and 
the Juhn et al. (1991) frameworks that will be used for decompositions of wage gaps and gap 
differentials. respecti ve ly. This is followed by the Data and Descriptive Analysis section. It 
identifies the sample and compares the sample means of selected variables that will be used 
in the decomposit ions. These descriptive analyses are done for genders. sectors, and genders 
within sectors. The Results section consists of 4 sub-sections. The first discusses the results 
of the Oaxaca gender wage gap decomposition, the second discusses the gender wage gap by 
race. and the third discusses the decomposition of the racial wage gaps. The fourth sub-
-I 
section presems the results o f the Juhn et al. decomposition of sector gap differenti als. Lastly. 
the Conclusions section reiterates the main points of Chapter 2. 
Each chapter is fo llowed by an appendix. labe led Appendix I for Chapter 1 and 
Appendix 2 for Chapter 2. Appendices contain va riable definiti ons and very deta iled listings 
of estimation results. A list of foo tnotes concludes the chapters. Moreover. Chapter 2 is 
followed by a General Conclusion. which complements the General Introduction. This is 
fo llowed by the References section . which provides the complete I ist o f re ferences used in 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1. A MIXE.D LOGISTIC ESTIMATION OF SECTOR 
EMPLOYMENT FOR.DOCTORATE RECIPIENTS 
A paper to be submitted for publication in the National Science foundation's ·women. 
Minorities. and Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering: l 997' 
Yoon-Tien Yap1 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the determinants of sector choice of employment for Ph.D. 
holders. The sectors of interest are private firms. public institutions, nonprofit agencies. 
academia. and self-employment. Of particular interest is how sector wages. demographic 
attributes. and academic discipline affect sector employment probability. 
Most studies of employment choices have dealt with occupation choices rather than 
sector choices (see for exan1ple. Baskin 1974, Beller 1982. Schmidt and Strauss 1975. 
Polachek 1981 ). A common topic has been to examine whether women are segregated into 
low-paying occupations. Studies that address gender differences in sector employment 
generally focus on differences across broad sector classifications (see for example, Orazem 
and Mattila 1998) or on selection of a specific sector such as Blau· s (1987) study of self-
employment. Relatively few studies examine sector choices. 
This chapter presents a model of sector employment choice for Ph.D . recipients. The 
model is developed within the human capi tal framework. Employers in a particular sector 
express demand preferences by offering workers wages based upon various productivity and 
demographic factors. Workers treat the offered wages as given and select sector employment 
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by maximizing a random utility funcLion. The s ignificance of thi s study is that the supply and 
demand effects of gender. race. disability. and degree field in the sectoral labor markets can 
be examined. Even though \\1e do not deal with inter-peri od sector mobility, it will also be 
possible Lo compute the increase in wage offers necessary to attract workers from other 
sectors. 
The Theoretical Framework 
We assume that the market for Ph.D. labor is segmented into fi ve sector-specific 
marke ts. Labor is heterogeneous in the sense that identical skill s are valued differently in 
different sectors due to differences in prices o f goods and services produced in different 
sectors. Moreover, a worker's productivity may d iffer across sectors due to differences in tht! 
organ iL.ational s tructure of work. For example. the infonnal work environment in self-
employment may prove to be conducive towards greater productivity levels for disabled 
persons. 
We can characterize the demand motivations of sector employers by specifying the 
following syste m of sector earnings runctions. A balded symbo l indicates a vector of 
variables. 
where w ij 
H; 
X; 
T,J 
-
-
-
-
for j = I ..... J ( I ) 
individual i' s earnings in sector j 
column vector of human capi tal characteristics for individual i. 
except sector tenure 
column vector of demographic characteristics for individual i 
indiYidual i' s current tenure in sector j: TiJ = 0 if individual i is not 
currently employed in sector j 
7 
the Value of Marginal Product function for sector j labor 
Equation (I) reflects the usual profit maximizing input demand condition where the firm 
equates wages with the value of output produced by the last unit of labor hired . Worker 
productivity is a function of worker skill s and demographics. 
Individual i's utility from choosing a job in sector j is characterized by the random 
utility funct ion 
where Uu 
W ij 
zi 
Eij 
utility of employment in sector j for individual i 
individual i·s earnings in sector j , as formulated in (1) 
vector of individual characteri stics 
a random error term 
(2) 
The random error term may be taken as representing the idiosyncratic taste of individual i 
towards sector j employment. Worker i treats sector j wages as exogenous. Let Yi denote the 
discrete variable i_ndicating the sector choice made. Individual i selects Yi = J* ~ J such that 
It is important to note that the model is essentially one of revealed preference. Since 
utilities are unobservable, it is assumed that if Yi = J*. then UiJ• = Max(Ui1, Ui2, ... , UiJ). 
Moreover. it is necessary to treat lifetime as a single unit because ours is essentially a cross-
sectional study. Thus. we do not consider the possibility of choosing a d ifferent sector at 
some point in the future . 
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The Data Set 
The data set used in thi s study is derived from the NSF. s J 997 SES TAT data set, 
which is a multi-frame survey derived from 4 independent component surveys: the 1997 
National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG), the 1997 National Survey of Recent College 
Graduates (NSRCG), and the 1997 Nat ional Survey of Doctorate Recipients (NSDR). A 
fou rth component, the National Survey of Recent College Graduates: Follow-up Survey. was 
conducted independent of the NS RCG for the first time in 1997. Its purpose is to broaden the 
survey coverage of the NSRCG to include persons who received their Science and 
Engineering college degrees within 3 to 6 years prior to the reference date of the NSRCG. 
The 1997 Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT97) is the un ion 
of its 4 component surveys. It follows that the SESTAT97 sampling frame is the union of the 
sampling frames of its component surveys. The sampling frame for the NSCG is constructed 
from the 1990 Census Long Form sample. The NSRCG is a 2-stage design in which 
educational institut ions are first sampled from a frame based on the [ntegrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS), fo llowed by a clustered sampling of individuals within 
selected institutions. The frame fo r the SDR is constructed from a database derived from the 
Survey of Earned Doctorates. which is an ongoing survey of U.S. doctorate recipients 
conducted since 1942. 
A complication arises in that these frames are not mutuall y exclusive. In other words, 
it is possible for a person to be included in more than one component survey and thus appear 
more than once in SEST AT. A unique-l inkage rule is used so that each person is uniquely 
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linked to one and only one component survey. Thus. it is possible fo r some persons to be 
ass igned zero sampling weights by survey administrators. 
SES TA rs target population includes persons who. as of the survey reference period. 
are aged 75 or less, reside in the U.S .. non-institutionalized. and possess at least a bachelors 
degree in a Science and Engineering (S&E) field. or persons w.ith degrees in non-S&E fields 
but are cunently working in S&E occupations. Non-S&E fie lds and occupations include 
actuarial science. business/managerial economics. top- and mid-level management. computer 
programming, technologies, social work. education below post-secondary. and health care 
practitioners and professional s. Note that thi s includes fore ign-born ind ividuals and 
individuals who earned their degrees abroad. In particular. foreign-earned doctorates are 
found exclusively in the NSCG. which is based on data from the 1990 Census, while 
doctorates earned in the U. S. are found mostly in the SDR. Thus. any inferences drawn from 
EST AT regarding foreign-earned doctorates will not be applicable to recent foreign-earned 
doctorates. since the 1990 Census does not include fo reign doctorates earned after 1990. 
SESTAT97 has I 00.932 observations. Some data cleaning is perfo rmed before actual 
analysis is attempted. Data cleaning mostly invo lves exc lusion of observations that are 
deemed unusual. This usuall y implies observations that are lumped into a residual category 
for a characteristi c simply because they do not belong to any of the other categories. A good 
example is the category ' Other Race', which indicates that a person is not White, Black. 
Hispanic. Asian, or Nati ve American. Accurate inference cannot be made for such a vaguely 
defined category. 
Out of the 100.932 observations in SESTAT97. 33.590 are doctorates who are 
ass igned nonzero weights and are employed or actively seeking employment. and are not in 
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the ·other Race' category. Data cleaning further reduces the sample size to 30,'.232 
observations. The fo llowing is a li st of persons who are excluded following the data cleaning 
process: 
(a). Those who indicated 'Other Education Institution ' or ·other non-educat ional 
Government Institution· as their employer type. 
(b). Those who have a logical skip for their facu lty rank indicator and yet are employed in 2-
or 4-year co lleges and universities. A person should have a logical skip only if he or she 
is not employed in an academic institution. 
(c). Those who have a logicaJ skip for their tenure status indicator and yet are employed in 2-
or 4-year colleges and universities. The tenure status indicator is a multiple cho ice 
variable that accommodates persons working in co lleges that have no tenure systems. and 
persons working in non-tenure occupations. Thus. a logical skip is legitimate only for 
persons not employed in academic institutions. 
(d). Those who indicated that they do not know the educational atta inments of their parents. 
This exclusion is made because parents' education levels are variables that will be used in 
the analysis. 
(e). Those who indicated that thei r employers are operati ng in the vague category ·Other 
Industries·. 
(f). Those who indicated that their employers are situated abroad. We are onl y interested in 
doing analysis on a labor market based geographically in the U.S. 
Fina lly. we also exclude the unemployed from our analysis of sector employment 
probabilities2 . Moreover, those who earned non-S&E degrees are also excluded. This is a 
necessity because there are no non-S&E doctorates in 3 of the economic sectors defined for 
II 
thi s analysis. Inclusion of non- &E majors wil l ultimately resu lt in complications in the 
mixed Jogit estimation due to perfect collinearity in the random uti lity functions. The 
legi timacy of thi s exclusion can be further reinforced by the fact that there are onl y 11 non-
&E doctorates in our post-cleaning sample or 30.232 observations. We did not find it 
desirable to keep non-S&E majors while dropping the non- &E degree indicator from the 
regressions because we would then be imposing the assumption that the marginal effect of a 
non- &E degree is equi valent to the effect of the normalizing degree category. The sample 
used in this analysi s has 29.809 observations (post-cleaning sample minus unemployed and 
non- &E persons). 
This chapter presents a model of employment patterns for Ph.D. holders in five 
sectors: private fi rms. public institutions. nonpro fit organizations, se lf-employment. and 
academia. The private for-profit secto r includes pri vate firm s and corporations that distribute 
earnings to shareho lders and se lf-employed workers who have incorporated their businesses. 
The latter is included in accordance with current BLS policy, the reason being that 
incorporated self-employed workers draw a salary from their bus inesses and should therefore 
be counted as wage and salaT) workers. Private schools and universities are excluded from 
thi s sector. and are class ified as academic institutions. 
The public sector includes non-academic federal. state. and local governmen t 
institutions. Jt also includes employees in the mi li tary service and various other Federal 
agencies. 
The private non-profit sector includes charitable and religious organizations. A non-
profi t organization is one that does not distribute net earnings to organization members and 
admi ni strators. It also accepts tax-exempt donations from contributors. 
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The non-profit and academic sectors v;arrant further discuss ion because employers 
and (potential) employees or those sectors ma~ be moti\ated by demand and suppl) factors 
that are different from those motivating employers and employees in the private for-profit 
sector. The presumed presence of substantial non-pecuniary re\\'ards accruing to non-profit 
sector employees can be inferred from the fact that the proportion or employment in the non-
profit sector has been rising in spite or consistently belo\\' a\'erage \\'ages paid by the sector. 
evertheless. Tidcman ( 1977). using the larch 1970. 1972. and l 974 BL data. showed that 
the faster growth in non-profit employment (2. 7% versus I. 7% total employment growth) is 
correlated wi th faster growth in average non-profit earnings (7.5% versus 6.6% growth for all 
'AOrkers in the economy)3. Freeman ( 1975) also found a positive relationship between 
employment share and relative earnings in academia. 
An alternative explanation for high employment growth in the presence of low 
(ab olute) wages is that non-profit institutions face a residual labor supply stock. In other 
\\"Ords. worker who are unable to find work in the other high-paying sectors are dri ven by 
nece si ty Lo work in the non-profit secLOr. However. Mirvis and Hackett ( 1983) used the 
1977 Quality or Employment urvey to show that 28.3% of the non-profit sector workforce 
posses es post-graduate degrees. compared with 26.9% and 4.1 % of the public and private 
for-profit sectors. respectively. Moreover. the average non-profit sector employee is older 
(i.e. has greater work experience) and gives a higher rating of job mobility compared to 
employees in the other two sectors4. This suggests that the non-profit sector can compete 
against the higher paying sectors in the labor market. 
Mir\'i . and Hackett also showed that the non-profit sector offered non-pecuniary 
rewards in the fo rm of greater job autonomy. variety. cha I lenge. a perception of performing 
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tasks that are more meaningful, and an overall greater degree of job satisfaction relati ve to 
other sectors. These benefits may compensate nonprofit sec tor employees for their lower 
wages. 
The self-employment sector consists of unincorporated proprietary businesses. 
professional practices. and the agricultural self-employed. A cross-tabulation examination of 
CPS data by E. Becker (1984) showed that the self-employed are predominantly whi te males 
aged 45 and above working primari ly in service industries. ln the context of employment and 
earnings. D . Blau ( 1987) used aggregate time-series CPS data ( 1948-1982) for males to 
examine differences in employment and sa lary trends between se lf-employed and paid 
workers. He fou nd that higher levels of total factor producti vity anributed to self-employed 
labor inputs
5 
account for part of the cross-industry increase in the fraction of self-employed. 
Jn other words. industri es in which the self-employed are more productive tend to utilize a 
higher proportion of self-employed labor. Moreover, an increase in marginal tax rate for a 
typical high-income bracket increases the fraction of se lf-employed due to greater incentives 
to under-report income, which is presumably easier to do when one is self-employed. 
Needless to say, the same increase in marginal tax rate causes a fal l in reported se lf-
employment earnings. 
In any case, the accuracy of reported self-employment income poses a familiar 
problem to labor economists. The ideal measure is, of course, returns to owner's labor. 
Unf01tunate ly, net profit of the business. which includes returns to invested capital and 
returns to ovmer·s labor. i s often confused with self-employment earnings. Moreover. salary 
drawn by the owner from the business depends on the owner· s discretion, nor is it restricted 
to net profits. An owner may draw more than net profits. thus withdrawing invested capital 
I~ 
from the busi ncss. Therefore. even if reported earn ings cxcl udes returns to capital. we cannot 
be sure that the amount is represcntati\.e of returns to O\\"ner· labor. 
The annualized salaric for sel r-employed "'orl..ers reported b) E TAT are net 
profits. Whether survey respondents have any incent ive to understate these net profit figures 
when answering the NSF survey is unclear. since confidenti ality is assu red fo r respondent . 
In the absence of superior alternati\'es. the same salary \'ariable used fo r employees in the 
other sectors is also used for the sel f-cmployment sector. 
T he education sector consists of 4- and 2-ycar colleges and univers ities (both private 
and public). and medical schools. The variable that al lows us to identify medical school 
graduates was dropped from the 1997 sun ey. Academia is the largest ector in our sample 
(49.6% of sample). despite the fact that average predi cted wages in education rank fourth out 
of five sectors. Once again . it is c lear that sector choice is detern1 ined by more than just 
relati \'e wage ·. 
The Econometric Model 
The structure of our econometric model allow us to adopt a suppl y- ide 
interpretation for the estimated logistic marginal effects. Demand forces are already 
contro lled for in the earnings functions. The instrumentation of current earnings j usti fies our 
assumption that workers maximize utility while taking sec tor earn ings as given. This section 
develops an operational statisti ca l model based on the theoreti cal framework previous ly 
described. 
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The goal of profi t max imization implies that firm s hire inputs until the marginal cost 
of the last input equa ls the val ue of its marginal product. Equat ion (1) is essentially a reduced 
fo rm equation for the profit maximizing condition assuming that cap ital stock is fixed at the 
profit maximizing level. The simplifying assumption is that the measure of sector output 
prices. capital stock. and production technology enter implicitly through the coefficients. 
Following Mincer ( I 979), we ado pt a semilogarithmic specification fo r equation (1 ): 
ll ij denotes the stochastic component. Equation (3) can be estimated as a conventional 
earnings function . Moreover. sector wage is unobserved for those not currently employed in 
that sector. This is the classic case of a sample selection problem. We use the usual 
Heckman( 1979) selection model as a remedy. Thus. to obtain estimates of sector j current 
earnings. we end up estimating a system of 2 equations: 
where A.ii = 
$( ) = 
$ () 
Zij 
Wj = 
v·· IJ 
(TJ ij. Uij) 
inverse Mills' ratio. calculated as $(a.;'wi) I (1 - $(a./w i)) 
standard normal density 
standard normaJ p.d.f. 
(4) 
(5) 
a variable such that Wij is observed if zu > 0. In our case, it is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if indiv idual i is currently employed in sector j 
vector of regressors that affects the probability of sector j employment 
a heteroscedastic error term 
- Bivariate normal [O, 0. <>,u, I , Pj] 
We use a binary probit specifi cation for (5). and estimate the system us ing full max imwn 
likelihood. The vector wi contains variables such as age, disability indicator, degree year. 
gender, fami ly and marital status, race, broad classifications of degree fi eld , and a set of 
dummy variables indicating the educational attainment of parents . Note that there should be a 
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sufficiem number of regressors in wi that are not present in Hi and Xi to bring about 
identification of the earnings parameters and <Xj . Othe rwise. identification will onl y occur 
though nonlinearity of the Mills ' ratio. Tbe parameter ~i-.1 can be shown to be equa l to pp,l1. 
A Wald test of Ho: Pj = 0 is performed as an indicator of whether an absence of a selectivity 
correction would have made much difference in our infere nces regarding the labor market in 
secto r j. 
The human capi tal and demographic vari ables used in the earnings functions are as 
follows: 
Hi = (AGEj. AGESQR., COMSCI1. MATH" AG 11 BI01. ENVIRON1, CHEM1. 
EARTH., PHYSlCS1. OTHPHYS1, ECONi. POLSCI1. PSYCH1. SOCi. 
OTHSOC1. AEROj. CHEMEi, C IVILEi, EE1. IEi, M Ei. OTHEi. MNGTj. 
TEACH ., SALES1. ARTS1)' 
Xi = (MALE1. HISPANlCi. BLACK1. ASIAN1. DISABIL.)' . 
Equation ( 4) allows for concave age-earnings and tenure-ea rnings profi les. and allows sector 
wages to differ by Ph.D. major and demographic group. For each individual. an exogenous 
measure of cunent earnings in sector j is 
~ 
Loge( Wij) = Yi + YH/Hi + Y>../Xi + rr; T1j + rr;T\ 
(6) 
Ita licized symbo ls denote estimated coefficients . The /\ on log earnings denotes predicted log 
earnings. Note that the estimated coeffi cient of /1.1.1 is not used when calculating the estimates 
of current sector earnings. Note also that tenure is sector specific. It equals zero if the person 
is not currently employed in sector j. Regression results are in Table A 1-3. 
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There are two important things to note when using Table Al -3. First estimates of 
coefficients and standard errors of the estimates are design-based. That is. SEST Ar s 
inclusion probabilities (basically the inverse of the weights) are used in the calculations to 
produce correct estimates that take into account the designs of SESTA T's component 
surveys. Second. since the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of earnings. the 
coefficient of a continuous regressor multiplied by I 00 is equal to the percentage effect on 
earnings of a small change in the regressor. For example, Jet Logc(Y) = a + b1D + b2X. where 
D denotes the binary regressor and X denotes the continuous regressor. It fo llows that 
b2 =a Logc(Y) I a X = (8 Y I Y) I a X. Moreover, Halvorsen and Palmquist ( 1980) showed 
that the estimated coeffic ient of D. denoted b1 • is actually an estimate of Loge(l + g). where 
g = (Y10=1 - Y10=0) I Y10=0. Kennedy ( 1981) proposed a Jess biased estimate of g of the form 
g* = exp (b1-0.5(V(b1))) - 1 (7) 
where V(b1) denotes the estimated variance of b1. Table A 1-3 uses I OOg* to measure the 
percentage effects of binary regressors on wages. Moreover. we use the estimator 
8(Logc(Yj) I zJ > 0) I Oxk = J'Xii. to estimate the marginal effect of a continuous regressor Xk on 
Loge(Yj) in the population6. 
Equation (2) depicts the utili ty maximization behavior of labor. To derive an 
operational stati stical model of sector employment probabilities, we adopt a linear 
specification for the random utility function: 
~ 
Uij = a.I + Pw Loge(Wij) + P/ zi + E1j 
where a · = sector specific constant .I 
for j = 1 ..... J (8) 
Pw = marginal utility of income, measured as the change in Uu given a I 00% 
positive change in Wij 
Pj column vector of coeffic ients for the individual characteristics Zi 
Ei.1 the stochastic component 
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Note that the marginal utility o r income is sector-inva riant. Let cJ denote a random variable 
with sample space { EiJ- E:!J····· El':JJ. where denotes the number of individuals in the 
population. lcFadden ( 1974) showed that if the EJ · s arc independently identically distributed 
with the Weibull distri bution. then the probability of individual i selecting employment in 
sector j is 
Prob(Y1 = j) = Prob(U1J > U11. V k ;e j) (9) 
~ /"-.... ~ 
= exp(aJ+PwLoge(WiJ)+P/Zi) I (cxp(PwLogc(Wu))+L1 1J-I exp(aJ+PwLogc(W IJ)+P/Zi)) for 
j = 1. 2 ..... J-1. and 
/"-.... /"-.... ~ 
Prob(Y1 = J) = exp(PwLo&(WiJ)) I (exp(Pv.Loge(WiJ))+LJ:1J-iexp(aJ+ pwLo&(W,J)+p/Zi)) 
for j = J. As usual. the Theil nom1alization is imposed on aJ and P.1 to ensure that the 
predicted probabilities sum to one. 
A with most nonlinear models. the coefficients are not the marginal effects. Jn fact. 
there i no straightforn:ard economic interpretation for the coefficients in the mixed logistic 
model. Marginal effects for multinomial logistic estimates can be derived from a special case 
of equation (9) wi th Pw = 0. It can be shown that 
oProb(Y, = j) I oZj = Prob(Y, = j) [ Pj - p] for j = I. 2 ..... J (I 0) 
where P = LJ i1°1Pj Prob(Y, = j). For the conditional logistic specification, which is equation 
~ 
8Prob(Y, = j) I aLoge(W,k) = Prob(Y, = j) [ l(j = k) - Prob(Y, = k)] Pw (1 1) 
for j. k = I. 2 ..... J . where J( . ) is the indicator function. It is trivial to show that the marginal 
effects of Zi and W11. have the same formulations when the mixed logistic specification is 
used. 
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We report the m arginal effects of binary regressors using the discrete fom1 
Prob(Yi = j I x*= x. D* = I ) - Prob(Y1 = j Ix* = x, D* = 0) ( 12) 
where x* = x denotes all other continuous regressors held at means and all other binary 
regressors held at zero. D* denotes the binary regressor in quest ion. Note that expression ( 12) 
is constant across observations. We use equation (10) to calculate the effects of continuous 
regressors. and equation (I I) to calculate the own- and cross- probability effects of predicted 
sector earnings. Unlike expression ( 12). equations ( I 0) and ( 1 I) are not constant across 
observations. We use probabili ties averaged over observations to obtain overall measures of 
these marginal effects. We also report the elasticities of probabilities with respect to 
predicted sector earnings. D ivision of expression ( 11 ) by Prob(Y1 = j) will produce these 
elasticities. It follows that the e lasticity of sector k predicted earnings with respect to 
Prob(Y1 = j) is constant for all j :1; k. A lso note the symmetry of cross parti als which fo llows 
from our assumption of sector-invari ant margina l utility of income: 
8Prob(Y1 = j) I 8Loge(Wik) = 8Prob(Yi = k) I 8Loge(Wij). 
Standard errors of odds ratios and margi nal effects are bootstrapped using a bootstrap 
sample of s ize 100. which is generally a respectable size in the literature when it comes to 
est imating standard errors 7. 
The demographic variables used in the mixed legit are as fo llows: 
Zi = (GRADAGE" MALE1, HISPANICi, BLACK1. ASlANi, DISABIL1. MARRIED" 
LIFESCl j. PHYSCI1, SOCSCij. ENGINRG1. NONSE1)'. 
Results of the mixed logistic regression are reported in Table A 1-4. 
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Results 
Earnings Functions 
We estimate the sector earn ings functions to generate exogenous measures of sector 
earnings to be used a choice attri butes in the mixed Iogit. Although this is an intermediate 
step in the process of the mixed 1ogit estimation, the results are nevertheless useful since they 
provide information regarding the determinants of one of the main factors that determine 
sector employment choice. Moreover, the framework of this chapter imparts great theoretical 
content on these earnings functions. They serve as a model of the demand mechanism of 
sector employers in the labor market for doctorates. This sub-section discusses the estimated 
marginal effects of the regressors in the earnings functions. 
We estimated positive coefficients fo r tenure and negative coeffi cients fo r tenure 
squared in all the sectors. Concave tenure-earnings profil es are consistent with human capital 
theory. People time their investments in human capital to maximize their present values of 
lifetime earnings. Investments earlier in life are more benefici al in that the benefits of 
tra ining can be reaped through higher future earnings. Less investments occur later in life 
since the marginal cost of training increases substantially with age. and since the returns to 
train ing investments are forfe it in death . Figure 1-1 presents a plot of the tenure-earnings 
profiles. by sector. The backward bending portions of the profiles indicate the sections in 
which human capital depreciation caused by age along with reduction in human capital 
investments reduce an individual' s productivity and thus wages. The tenure profi le for the 
public sector looks linear , but the coeffici ents suggest that it is very slightly concave. Lack of 
curvature is due to the presence of fixed pay raises in the public sector. The nonprofit sector 
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profile is also almost linear, but in this case we can see it level off at about 8.55 log earnings. 
This suggests limited returns to sector-specific experience in the nonprofit sector. 
The tenure-earnings profile in self-employment is steep for the one to twenty fi e 
year tenure range. After that. it goes through a relatively steep decl ine. Even so. a person who 
has been self-employed for 39 years would have earnings that are relatively higher than a 
new entrant into the self-employment sector. holding all other factors (including age) 
constant. The profile for the private sector lies strict!_ above the profiles of all other sectors. 
Moreover, the private sector profile is very flat. suggesting small returns to sect.or-specific 
work experience. In fact. a private sector worker with 39 years of sector-speci fi c experience 
earn only very slightly above that of a new entrant, holding all other factors (including age) 
constant. 
In addition to tenure-earnings profiles, we also repo11 the (age + tenure)-eamings 
profiles in Figure 1-2. and the age-earnings profiles in Figure 1-3 . Note that Figure 1-2 is a 
vertical summation of Figures 1-1 and 1-3. The private sector age-earnings profile is 
certainly more concave than the private sector tenure-earnings profi le. The age profile peaks 
at 55 years of age. after which it curves downwards. At 74 years of age. downward slope of 
the profi le would have wiped out 50% of the wage gains that occur from ages 26 through 55. 
The self-employment profile surpasses the academic profi le at age 34. but drops below the 
academic profile at age 60. ln the public sector, the age-earnings profile is more concave than 
the tenure-earnings profile. The age profile for the nonpro fit sector dips below its initial mark 
on the vertical axis fo r ages greater than 72 years. Moreover, the nonprofit sector tenure and 
age profiles lie strictl y below the corresponding profiles of all other sectors. 
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Table A 1-3 in Appendix I presents the complete table of estimated marginal effects 
for the earnings functions. For the purpose of completeness. we also report the estimated 
coefficients of the prob it selection mechanism. We will not discuss the pro bit results because 
it is not a formal economic model in thi s paper. Its purpose is to correct for selection bias in 
the estimation of the earnings functions. 
We estimate that in the private sector, men earn 0.58% more than women. 
holding other characteristics constant. Men also earn 2.6% more than women in the public 
sector. Significant gender wage differentials occur in the remaining sectors. Men earn 17%. 
23%. and 19% more than women in the nonprofit, self-employment. and academic sectors. 
re spec ti vel y. 
In the private sector. Hispanics and Blacks in our sample earn about 19% more than 
Whites. On the other hand, Asians earn 17% less than Whites in the private sector. We 
obtained a 30% positive marginal effect for Native Americans in the private sector, but thi s 
estimate is not statistically precise. There are 47 private sector Native Americans in our 
sample. and they have an average (weighted) annual salary of about $97.000. 
None of the minority race indicators are statistically significant in the public sector 
earnings function. Moreover. the magnitudes of the estimated effects are relatively small . 
Hispanics earn 0.07% less than Whites in the public sector, holding other characteristics 
constant. Blacks earn 2% less and Asians earn 4% less than Whites. We estimate that Nati ve 
Americans earn 14% less in the government compared to Whites. 
The effects of race on nonprofit sector earnings also fail to be stati stically significant. 
We estimate a 6% increment in wages for Hispanics and a 6% reduction in wages for Blacks. 
Native Americans are estimated to earn 15% less than Whites in the nonprofit sector. The 
same Jack of stati stical signifi cance holds for se lf-employment. We find that Hispanic · and 
Blacks earn more than Whites while Asians and ati\'e Americans earn less. 
The rac ial wage differentials in academia are sign ificant both stati stically and in 
magnitude. Hispanics earn 10% less than Whites in academia. Blacks earn 12% less and 
Native Am ericans earn 19% less. We obtained a pos iti ve 2.4% effect for Asians. but the 
estimate is not statisticall y significant. 
Instead of using a single disability indicatar. we use four indicators that show whether 
disability occured at birth, at age under 30. at ages 30 to 65. or at age over 65. We do thi s to 
allow the presence of di sability to have different impacts on sector earnings depending on the 
age at which it occurred . In most cases. we fail to obtain statistica lly significan t estimates for 
these variables. There are exceptions. We obtain a posit ive 197% effect of disabi lity occuring 
when old on nonprofit sector earni ngs. T hi s estimate is based on information provided by 2 
observations and is thus more li ke ly an exception rather than a rule. We also obtain a 
negative 5% effect of disability occuring when middle aged on academic earnings. This 
estimate is significant at 5%. Moreover, the magnitudes and signs of the effects do not 
clearl, support the notion of an in erse relationship between age at disabili ty and the wage 
penalty of disability for doctorates. 
The set of degree field indicators is normalized with respect to a degree in li fe 
sciences. In the private sector. computer and mathematical sc ience majors earn 8% more than 
life sc ience majors. oc ial science majors earn 19% more than life sc ience majors. A point of 
curiosity is that an engineering major earns 26% less than a life science major. We w ill see in 
the next sub-section that an engineering major is 77% more likely than a life science major to 
be employed in the private sect0r. Physica l science majors are a lso estimated to earn 26% 
less Lhan Ii fe science majors in the pri vate sector. 
In Lhe public sector. all degree fi e ld majors earn more than life science majors. In 
particu lar, engineering majors earn 33% more than life science majors in the public sector. 
Computer a nd mathematical science majors earn 20% more while physical science majors 
earn 18% more. The earnings of soc ial science majors are comparable to those of life science 
majors. 
We estimate that computer and mathematica l sc ience majors earn the most in the 
nonprofit sector while social science majors earn the most in self-employment. Engineering 
majors earn the most in academia. Computer and mathematical science majors earn the least. 
The set of occupation indicators is normalized with respect to professional and 
sc i en ti fi e (P& ) occupations. One might suspect some degree of colli nearity between the 
engineering degree field and the engineering occupati on. However, we calculated a s imple 
corre lation of 0.74. suggesting that we should not be undul y worried about coll inearity in this 
case. 
The engineering profession seems to do best in self-employment. Self-employed 
engineers earn 26% more than self-employed P& occupations. compared to -6% in the 
private sector. -7% in the public sec tor, 9% in the nonprofit sector. and 8% in academia. 
Admin istrative occupations, mostly involving mid- and top-level management. generate at 
least 20% premiums over the salaries of P&S occupations in all sectors. Particularly large is 
its effect on academic sector earnings. We find that persons in administrati ve occupations at 
academic institutions earn 52% more than their counterparts in P&S occupations. There are 
l .068 persons in academic administration occupations in our sample. so it is obvious that the 
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estimate is not based on a thin sample. They also earn 32%. 20%. 41 %. and 50% premium 
over the salarie of P&S occupations in the priYate. public. nonprofit. and self-employment 
sectors, respecti vely. Health service providers and professional s al o enjoy higher pay 
regard I es of sector, a lthough in most ca es they are nothing near the premiums earned by 
administrative and manageri al occupations. with the exception of the self-employment and 
pri\'ate sect0rs. e lf-employed health care providers and practitioners earn 76% more than 
self-em ployed P& persons. Private sector health care practitioners ea rn 5 1 % more than their 
P& counterparts. 
Those working in services/arts/humaniti es occupations consistently earn lower than 
P& occupations regardless of sector. ales and technical ' technology occupations earn less 
than P& occupations in m ost cases. although we estimate that they earn 22% (not 
statistically significant at 5%) more than P& occupati ons in self-employment. 
We also included indicators of employer region and employer size to take into 
account the role of employer characteristics and cost of living in the determination of wages . 
Employer region is normal ized with respect to Pacific oast, whil e employer s ize is 
normalized with respect to the largest s ize category. We find that private sector firms situated 
in the Pacifi c coast of the . . pa) the most. Moreover. large firms have a tendency to pay 
more than sma ll firms. 
Mixed Logistic 
Regressors in the mixed logisti c include the ector specific constants. predicted 
current sector earnings. age. degree year. gender. race. a di sability indicator, a marita l status 
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indicator, and broad classifications of doctorate field . The estimated mixed logit has a pseudo 
R-square of 36.5%. 
The direct and cross probabilit) effects of predicted current earnings are shown in 
Table 1-1 . This includes measures or ela ticities (percentage change in employment 
probabi lity given a 1 % increment in current earnings) and marginal effects (change in 
employment probability gi\'en a I 00% positive change in current earnings). 
The elasticities reported in Table 1-1 ha\·e expected sign . O\rn-wage elasticities are 
positive wh ile cross-wage elasticities are negati ve. This is not surpris ing given that our 
estimated marginal utility of income is positive. Moreover, the estimated marginal effects are 
all at least twice their respective estimated standard errors. 
Several points are noteworthy from the information presented in Table 1-1 . First. 
sector employment probabilities arc sensitive with respect to changes in predicted private 
sector earnings. A I% increment in predicted private sector earnings induces a 1.5% 
reduction in the probabilities of employment in all o ther sectors. We can say that sector 
employment probabilities are elastic with respect to changes in predicted private sector 
earnings. The term ·elastic· means that a given percentage change in wages brings about an 
e\'en greater percentage change in employment probability. In the same sense. sector 
employment probabilities are even more elastic with respect to changes in predicted 
academic earnings in that a I% increment in academic earnings induces a 2.4% reduction in 
the probabilities of employment in all other sectors. The third point to note is that the own-
wage elastici ties are particularly large. These large sector elasticities are consistent with 
findings in occupational labor markets. Doctoral degree holders are quite sensitive to changes 
in relative sector wages when choosing their sector of employment. Jn particular. own-wage 
elastici ties for the nonprofit and self-employment sectors are the highest: a I% increase in 
predicted earnings induces a 4.6% increase in employment probability in these sectors. 
Moreover. even though changes in academic earnings have large impacts on the employment 
probabilities of the other sectors. the within-sector impact of academic wage is relatively 
small compared to those in the other sectors. Finally. the cross-sector impact of changes in 
public. nonprofit and self-employment wages are relatively small. Elasticities with respect to 
public sector earnings are equal to -0.5. whi le elasticities with respect to nonprofit and self-
employment earnings average about -0.2. 
The results in Table 1-1 can be interpreted as the sector choice response when there 
are no costs associated with mobility across sectors. We can also measure the necessary 
percentage increment in wages that would induce someone currently in Sector A to move to 
Sector B. Since the decision rule governing sector employment choice involves the complete 
et of random utility functi ons. and since the cross-wage elasticities are non-zero , we need to 
con ider the impact of an increase in Sector B wages on the complete set of sector 
employment probabilities. For simplicity. consider individual i who is faced wi th a choice or 
3 sectors: A. B. and C. Suppose individual i is currently in Sector A. Further suppose that an 
employer in Sector B wishes to attract individual i into workjng for his establishment. To do 
this. the employer needs to increase his current wage offer by a particular percentage. We 
denote this unknown percentage d(Wi8)!W/:l. Recall that individual i selects Yi= J* if 
U( = Max(Ut. Ui8 . Uic). which in our model implies P( = Max(Pt. Pi8 . Pie). The objective 
then is to set d(Wi8)/Wi8 so that it sati sfies the set of inequality conditions: 
(8Pi8/81nWi13)(dWj8/Wi8 ) + piB ~ (aPt 1a1nWi8)(dWj8/Wi8) + piA 
(8Pi8/a!nWi8 )(dWi8/Wi8 ) + Pi8 ~ (aPic;a1nwi8 )(dWi8/W,8 ) + P,c 
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The minimum necessary increment in ector B wage offer is thus 
d(W/3)!Wi9 = MaXj:tB((Pr1- P/3) I (8P1ulalnW18 - cP~/olnWj8 }) 
Table 1-2 reports I OO(dWi8/Wi8 ) using pred icted probabili ties averaged over all 
observations. 
( 13) 
We estimate a 20% minimum increment in the current private sector wage offer in 
order to attract a public sector employee. This may seem high. but remember that th is figure 
includes compensation fo r lost sector-specific experience. Remember a lso that the figure is a 
percentage of destination sector wage. and that we predicted the desti nation wage at zero 
tenure for persons not current ly in the destination sector. 
Table 1-2 also shows that the public sector needs an 80% increment in its current 
wage offer in order to attract a private sector employee. The academic sector needs only a 
J 6% increment to ach ieve this . To capture a public sector employee, the academic sector 
needs a 15% wage offer increment. The private sector needs a 32% increment in order to 
anract a nonpro fit sector employee. The public sector needs an 84% increment while 
academia requires a 24% increment. These figures are quite high considering that a nonprofit 
sector employee is working ' not- for-profit· . They either imply large returns to tenure in the 
nonprofit sector or greater cost of switching caused by some other facto rs. We estimate a 
33% minimum increment in private sector wage offer in order to attract a self-employed 
worker. The public and academic sectors require a 76% and a 17% increment to achieve this. 
respectively. l n parti cular, we note that the nonprofit sector and self-employment sectors 
usually need to almost triple their wage offers in order to attract workers fro m other sectors. 
Since a tripling of wage offer is unlikely to occur, we may take this as an indication that 
workers rare ly switch to the no nprofi t or self-employment sectors (i.e. workers currently in 
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nonprofit and self-employment sec tors are employed in these sectors from the start of their 
careers). 
The marginal effects of age on employment probabilities are fairl y small. We predict 
that for every year a person advances in age. hi s probability of employment in the private 
sector fa lls by 1.4 percentage points. while his probability of public sector cmploymelll ri ses 
by 0.6 percentage points. Likewise. probability of nonprofit sector employment rises by 0.2 
percentage points. We predict a mere 0.4 percentage point increase in self-employment 
probability due to annual age advancement. This is rather surpris ing given the reputation of 
self-employment as a partial retirement option. Age is statistical ly significant at 1 % in the 
private and public sector random utility (RU) functions. Significance is at 5% in the 
nonprofit sector RU function. 
The marginal effects of degree year are stati stically significant at 1 % for all sectors 
except self-employment. Even so. their magnitudes are fai rl y small. In essence. people are 
0.8 percentage points less likely to be employed in the private sector for every year 
graduation is de layed, holding age constant. The probabilities of employment in the public. 
nonprofit. and academic sectors increase with the year of graduation. 
Table 1-4 gives the marg inal effects of gender, race, marital status, and the presence 
of disabi lity on sector employment probabilities. We estimate that compared to women. men 
are 8. 7% and 4 .8% more likely to be employed in the private and public sectors, respecti vely. 
However. they are 1 1.6% less likely to be in academia. The gender differential in self-
employment probability is relatively small. Men are estimated as being 0.7% less likely to be 
self-employed compared to women. Moreover. men arc 1.2% less like ly than women to be 
employed in charitable institutions. 
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The e ffects of race on sector employment probab ilities are quite straightforward . In 
most cases we estimate higher employment probabil ities for minori ties in academia. while 
Whites seem to have highe r employment probabil ities in all other sec tors. For example. 
Hispanics are 3.4% less likely than Whites to be employed in the private sector. 2 .7% less 
likely to work for the government. 3% less likely to be in the nonpro fit sector. and 0.7% less 
likely to be self-employed. On the other hand. they are 10% more likely than Whites to be in 
academia. This pattern of sector employment like lihood is remarkab ly s imilar for Blacks and 
Native Ameri cans. In all cases. they are about 10% more likely to be in academia, and 2% to 
3% less like ly to be in the private. public. and nonprofit sectors. The race difference in self-
employment p robability is always less than I%. A break from this pattern of sec tor 
employment like lihood occurs in the case of Whites versus Asians. We estimate that Asian 
doctorates are I 0% less likely than White doctorates to be in academia. and 12% more like ly 
to be in the private sector. Employment probab ilities fo r Asians in the other sectors are 
comparable to the probabilities or Whites in that the marginal effects are a ll less than I %. 
The margina l e ffects of disabi lity on sector employment probabil iti es ranges fro m 
near zero fo r self-employment (0.08% to be exact) to 4.8% for academic employment. There 
is no evidence o f greater pre ference fo r self-employment among the disab led relati ve to those 
without di sabilities. Disab led persons are about 1.6% less likely than non-disabled persons to 
be employed in the private, public, or nonprofit sectors. 
The marginal effects of marital status on sector employment probabilities are 
extremely sma ll. We estimate that a married person will be 0.5% more likely than an 
unmarried person to be employed in the private sector and 0.3% less li kely to work fo r the 
government. Marital status has negati ve effects on employment probabi li ties in the nonprofit. 
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self-employment. and academic sectors. but the effects are all less than one-tenth of a 
percentage point. 
Table 1-5 gives the marginal effects or degree fi elds. As in the case of the earnings 
functions. we use broad classifications or degree fi e ld~ to avoid estimating coefficients based 
on thin samples. Degree fie lds arc classified into computer and mathematical sciences. life 
sciences. physical sciences. ocial sciences. and engineering. For a more detailed de cription 
of the kinds of degrees included in each categor). refer to the rnriable defin ition table in the 
appendix. 
Compared to life science majors. computer and mathematical science majors are 
6.2% more likely to be in academia. 4% les likely to work for the government. and 3° o le 
likely to work for charitable institutions. They are al so 0.4% Jess like ly to be in the pri,·ate 
sector and 0.9% more likely to be self-employed. Physical science majors arc 47% more 
likely to be in the private sector and 3% more likel) to be self-employed relative to life 
science major . On the other hand. they are 4 7% Jess likely to have careers in academia, 2% 
less likely to work for the go,·ernment, and I% Jess likely to be in the nonprofit sector. 
ocial science majors are 7% more likely to be self-employed. 3% more likely to 
\>,Ork for charitable institutions. and 2% more likely 10 be in the public sector relative to life 
science majors. They are also 9% less likely to be in academia and 3% less likely to be in the 
private sector. We discover that engineering majors have a particularly strong affinity 
towards private sector employment. Engineering has a 77% posit ive effect on private sector 
employment probability. This is more or less balanced out by a 73% negati ve effect on 
academic employment probability. Engineers are also 3% less likely to be in the public sector 
and I% less likel to be in the nonprofit sector relati ve to life science majors. Engineering 
majors are a lmost as likely as life sc ience majors to be sel f-employed. The effect in se lf-
employment probability is less than o ne-tenth o f a percentage point. 
Conclusions 
This chapter estimated sector wage equations that serve three purposes. First. they 
provide exogenous measures of current earnings that can be used in the mixed logistic 
regression. thus avoiding the loss in efficienc_ that w ill result if one simply used observed 
current earnings. econd. they prov ide estimates of expected sector earnings for persons who 
are not currently in the secto r and whose expected sector earnings are unobserved. Third. 
they provide theoretical consistency. In other words. they a llow us to interpret the mixed 
logistic estimation as an estimation of labor suppl y behavior. and the earnings function 
estimations as estimation of labor demands. This is also cons istent with the notion that 
employees make sector labor suppl y decisions by taking sector wages as g iven. 
We find concave tenure-earnings profi les for all sectors, a lthough fi xed pay rai ses in 
the public sector result in a nearly linear profile. Moreover, we find that the profile for the 
private sector is relatively s luggish. suggesting less-than-lucrative returns to tenure for 
doctorates in the private sector. However. the return to general work experience in the private 
sector is better in that the age profile achieves some large vertical gains before leveling off at 
55 years of age. The tenure and age profi les of the nonprofit sector lie below the profiles of 
all other sectors. 
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ln the mixed legit we find that men are more likely to be employed in the private and 
public sectors and less likely to be in the nonprofit and academic sectors compared to 
women. We al o find that minority doctorates are more attracted to academic employment 
compared to White doctorates. An exception applies in the case of Asians. who are more 
likely to be in the private sector and Jess likely to be in academia compared to Whi tes. The 
effects of disability on sector employment choice are relatively small. D isability affec ts 
private. public, nonprofit. and self-employment probabilities by less than 2 percentage points 
each. Disabled persons are 5 percentage points more likely to be in academia. 
The effects of marital status on sector employment probabilities are all less than one-
tenth of a percentage point. We find that computer and mathematical science majors are more 
likely to be in academja and to be self-employed relative to life sc ience majors. Physical 
science and engineering majors are much more likely to be in the private sector compared to 
li fe sc ience majors. 
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Table 1-1. Elasti cities and marginal effects of predicted earnings on probabilities of all 
choices in the modcla. 
Atlribute 
CPRJV ER 
CPUBERN 
C PRFERN 
CSELFER 
CEDUER 
P(private) 
3."35 
I 1.03 1] 
(0.254) 
-0505 
1-0. 156] 
(0 039) 
-0.233 
[-0.072] 
(0.0 18) 
-0.226 
f-0.070] 
{0.0 I 7) 
-2.375 
1-0.734] 
(0. 181) 
P(public) 
-1...197 
[-0. 156] 
(0.039) 
-1 .327 
[04511 
(0 111) 
-0 .230 
f-0 .024] 
(0.006) 
-0.230 
1-0 .024) 
(0.006) 
-2.3 70 
[-0.2-1 7] 
(0.06 1) 
P(nonprofit ) 
-1 .500 
[-0 .072] 
(0.018) 
-0.500 
(-0.02-t) 
(0.006) 
4.604 
[0.221] 
(0.055) 
-0.229 
[-0.01 11 
(0.003 ) 
-2.375 
[-0. 11-1] 
(0.028) 
P(self-emp.) 
-1.491 
l-0.070] 
(0.017) 
-0.511 
[-0.024] 
{0.006) 
-0.234 
[-0.0 I I J 
(0.003) 
-1 .600 
[0.2 16) 
(0.052) 
-2.36-1 
(-0. 111) 
(0.027) 
P(academia) 
- I 493 
l-0.734) 
(0. 18 1) 
-0.502 
l-0.2-17] 
(0 061) 
-0.232 
l -0. I 1-t J 
(0.028) 
-0.226 
[-0. 111) 
(0.027) 
2.453 
[ 1.206] 
(0.296) 
a Marginal effects arc in brackets. Bootstrap standard errors of marginal effects are in parenthe es. 
Elasticity= (?P P) (cW W): Marginal Effect = oP 1 (c W W): P denotes probabi lit~ , and W denotes 
predicted current annual earnings. (<'Pi P,) caw~ WL) ma) not equal (c Pl pl ) I (iJW, I W,) due to rounding. 
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Table 1-2. Min imum percentage increment in wage offered hy the destination sector 
necessary to induce a switch from Origin to Destinationa. 
Destina tion 
Private Public Nonprofit Self-emp. Academia 
Origin 
Private 79.80 186.04 I 96.04 16.01 
Public 20.19 152.:D 156.51 14.74 
Nonprofit 3 1.46 83 .59 175.74 23.95 
elf-emp. 32.88 75 .87 176.60 17.47 
Academia 22.85 74 .02 166.71 172.52 
• Figures in the table are as follows : A set of average predicted probabil ities i calcu lated for each of the five 
sample of individuals _Eredict~d to be in each sector. For example. in the sample of persons predicted to be 111 
sector I . we calculate P1 •...• P5. The minimum necessar~inc~ment in. sa). sector 5 wages in order to induce 
a move from sect0r I to sector 5 is d(W5)/W5 = Max1~ 1 ((P1 - P~) '(oP51?1nW5 - 8P/clnW5)). 
Table 1-3. Effects of age and year of graduati on on sector employment probabi litiesa. 
cc tor 
Private 
Public 
on profit 
elf-employment 
Academia 
Marginal Effect 
of Age 
-1.422(0.362) 
0.569(0.086) 
0.176(0.060) 
0.422(0.43..J) 
0.254(0.242) 
Margina l Effect 
of Degree year 
-0.822(0.164) 
0.321 (0.046) 
0.069(0.034) 
-0. 11 5(0 .064) 
0.548(0. 190) 
• Margina l effecc = I OO(oP!cX ). where X denotes a contin uous variable. Bootstrap standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. 
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Table 1-4 . Marg inal effects of gender. race, disabil ity. and marita l status on sector 
employment probabi litiesa. 
Varia ble Sector 
Priva te Public Nonprofi t elf-emp. Academia 
MALE 8.7 16 4.383 -1 .244 -0.700 -1 1.611 
( 1.526) ( 1.1 28) (0.885) ( 1.26 1) (2.525 ) 
HISPAN IC -3.744 -2.72 1 -3.049 -0.726 10.240 
( 1.394) (0.8'.DJ (0.908) ( 1.130) (2.067) 
BLACK -4 .086 -2.904 -1.959 -0.989 9.937 
( 1.595) (0.868) ( 1.384) (1.274) ('.U9 1) 
AS IA 12. 117 -0.482 -0.885 -0.455 - 10.295 
(2.562) (0.909) (0.879) (l.4 1-l) (3. 175) 
ATIVE -4 .394 -1 .505 -2.975 -0.282 9.1 -7 
( 1.959) (3.279 ) (2.702) (2.313) (6.051 ) 
DISABI L -1.759 - 1.524 -1.6 I 8 0.078 4.823 
( I. I 66) (0.687) ( 1.149) ( 1.437) (2.446) 
MARRIED 0.460 -0.279 -0.026 -0.080 -0.076 
(0.388) (0.353) (0.517) (0.3 I I) (0.852) 
Base Probabilitl: 4.790 4.921 4.477 1.034 84 .778 
a Marginal effect of D* = I OO(P(Y, = j I x* = x. D* = 1)- P(Y, = j Ix* = -:. D* = 0)) where x• = x denotes all 
other continuous( discrete) regressors held at means(zero). Bootstrap standard errors in parantheses. 
b Add the marginal effect of an att ribute to the base probabilit ies to get predicted probabil ities of sector 
employment for persons having that part icular attribute. 
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Table 1-5. Marginal effects of degree fields on sector employment probabilities". 
Variable Sector 
Private Public Nonprofit elf-emp. Academia 
COMMA TH -0.386 -4 .003 -2. 755 0.950 6.195 
( 1.27 1) ( I. 180) ( I. 154) (2.904) (3 .179) 
PHY SCI 47.042 - 1.695 -1.173 3.205 -47.379 
(8.290) (0.859) (1.157) (6. 126) (7. 780) 
OCSCI -2.593 1.660 3.157 7. 173 -9 .396 
( 1.676) {3.286) (3.9 14 ) (42. 114) (34.677) 
ENG i RG 77. 183 -3.047 -1.393 -0.047 -72.695 
{9.620) (0.858) ( 1.329) ( 1.5 85) (9.42 1) 
Base Probabilirl 4 .790 4.921 4.4 77 1.034 84 .778 
• Marginal effect of D* = I OO(P(Y , = j I x• - x. D• = I) - P(Y, - j I x• - x. o• = 0)) where x• = x denotes all 
other continuous(discrete) regressors held at means(zero). Bootstrap standard errors in parantheses. 
h Add the marginal e ffect of an attribute to the base probabilities 10 get predicted probabilities of sector 
employment for persons having that particular attribute. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A 1-1 . Variable definition. 
ariable 
Earnings: 
I. LSALARY I 
2. LSALARY2 
3. LSALARY3 
4. LSALARY4 
5. LSALARY5 
Sector: 
6. PRI VATE 
7. PUBLIC 
8. NOPROFT 
9. SELFEMP 
I 0. ACADEMIA 
De2ree Field Indicators: 
11. COMMATH 
12. LIFESCI 
13. PHY CI 
14. SOCSCI 
15. ENG INRG 
Occupation: 
16. PROSCIE 
17. E GINEER 
18. ADMI 
19. SERVICES 
20. SALETECH 
21. HL THSER V 
22. POSTDOC 
Job-De2ree Relationship: 
23. OCEDHIGH 
24. OCEDMED 
25. OCEDZERO 
Demographics: 
26. AGE 
27. GRADAGE 
28. MALE 
29. DISABIL 
30. DIFBIR 
31 . YDISABIL 
31. MDlSABIL 
33. OD ISABIL 
34. MARRIED 
35. MAR WHICH 
Definition 
Observed log annual earnings in the private sector 
Observed log annual earnings in the public sector 
Observed log annual earnings in the nonprofit sector 
Observed log annual earnings in self-employment 
Observed log annual earnings in academia 
Privare sector employment indicator 
Public sector employment indicator 
Nonprofit sector employment indicator 
Self-employment sector indicator 
Academic sector employment indicator 
Computer and Mathematical Sciences 
Agriculture, biology. biochemisrry, environmental sciences 
Physics and astronomy. chemistry. earth sciences. other physical sciences 
Economics, sociology. anthropology. psychology, poli tical science. other social 
sciences 
Mechanical, electrical. aerospace, civi l. industrial. computer. and other 
engineering lields 
Profess iona l and Scienti fi c 
Engineer 
Administration and management 
Services 
Sales and technical 
Health service provider and professional 
Post-doctorate (academic and non-academic) 
Job related to doctorate degree field 
Job somewhat related to doctorate degree field 
Job not re lated to doctorate degree fie ld 
Self explanatory 
Age at graduation from Ph.D. program 
Male indicator 
Disability indicator 
Disabi lir} occurred at birth 
Disability occurred at age E (0, 30) 
Disability occurred at age E [30. 65] 
Disabilny occurred at age E (65, 751 
Marital Status Indicator (married or single) 
Married, spouse present, living with at least one child aged under 18 
Table A 1- 1. (con tinued) 
Va riable 
36. HISPANIC 
37. WH ITE 
38. BLACK 
39. ASIAN 
40. NATIVE 
Work Experience: 
41 . TENU RJ:: 
42. OJT 
-B. WKBEFDEG 
44. PART 
Parents· Education: 
45. DADNOH 
46. DADl-IS 
47. DADCOUY 
48. DADCOL4Y 
49. DADGRAD 
50. MOMNO HS 
51. MOM HS 
52. MOMCOL2Y 
53. MOMCOL4Y 
54. MOMGRAD 
Emplover Ree.ion: 
55. PACIFIC 
56. NE GLA D 
57. MATLANT 
58. E CE TRL 
59. WNCENTRL 
60. SATLANT 
61 . ESCENTR.L 
62. WSCENTRL 
63. MOUNTA IN 
Employer Size: 
64 . EMSIZEI 
65. EMSIZE2 
66. EM IZEJ 
67. EMSIZE4 
68. EMS IZES 
69. EMSIZE6 
70. EMS IZE7 
Race indicator 
Race indicator 
Race indicator 
Race indicator 
Race indicator 
Definit.ion 
Years with current employer 
Received worl-..-related trai ning during the past year 
Working wi th cu rrent employer before obtaining doctorate degree 
Currently ~' orking pan time 
Father 's highest degree is lower than a high school diploma 
Father 's highest degree is a high school diploma 
Father 's highest degree is from a 2 year college 
Father·s highest degree is a Bachelor' s degree 
Father's highest degree is a graduate degree 
Mother's highest degree is lower than a high school diploma 
Mother's highest degree is a high school diploma 
Mother·s highest degree is from a 2 year college 
Mother' s highest degree is a Bachelor's degree 
Mother's highest degree is a graduate degree 
Employer region : Pacific coast 
Employer region : New England 
Emplo) er region: Middle Atlantic 
Employer region: East North Central 
Employer region: West North Central 
Employer region: outh Atlantic coast 
Employer region: East South Central 
Employer region: West South Central 
Employer region: Mountain 
Employer size: '- I 0 employee 
Employer size: I 0 to 24 employees 
Employer size: 25 to 99 employees 
Employer size: I 00 to 499 employees 
Employer size: 500 to 999 employees 
Employer size: I 000 to 4999 employees 
Employer size: ..,. 5000 employees 
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Table A 1-2. Descriptive statistics. by sector. 
Private Public Nonprofit 
(obs=8846) (obs=3 142) (obs= l410) 
ariable Mean td. De' . 1ean td. Dev. Mean td. De,·. 
LSALARY 11.205 1.059 11.045 0.617 10.971 0.801 
AGE 46.245 11.643 48.3 16 10.557 46.920 11 .050 
TENURE 8 . .231 9.588 10.629 10.389 8.722 10.068 
DGRYR 1981.481 12.031 1980.975 11.203 1982.374 1 1.353 
MALE 0.849 0.396 0.781 0.469 0.668 0.548 
WHrTE 0.763 0.510 0.857 0.391 0.864 0.392 
HISPAN IC 0.017 0. 132 0.019 0.123 0.0 19 0.126 
BLACK 0.014 0. 124 0.02..J 0.1-19 0.030 0.210 
ASIA 0.204 0.-188 0.096 0.34<1 0.086 0.320 
NATIVE 0.002 0.043 0.004 0.057 0.00 1 0.022 
OJT 0.618 0.608 0.660 0.596 0.623 0.588 
PART 0.068 0.320 0.036 0.232 0.09 1 0.336 
WKBEFDEG 0.064 0.292 0. 108 0.35 1 0.097 0.372 
DlSABlL 0.05-l 0.279 0.056 0.275 0.053 0.260 
MARRIED 0.826 0.460 0.779 0.524 0.772 0.511 
MARWTHCH 0.484 0.620 0.413 0.612 0.411 0.603 
COMMA TH 0.060 0.293 0.030 0.218 0.039 0.225 
LfFESC I 0.207 0.451 0.302 0.528 0.270 0.503 
PHYSCI 0.284 0.566 0.226 0.520 0. 129 0.385 
SOCSC I 0.159 0.488 0.306 0.6 13 0.474 0.6 18 
E GJNRG 0.29 1 0.572 0. 136 0.434 0.089 0.384 
OCEDHIGH 0.5 16 0.621 0.6-17 0.597 0.663 0.578 
OCEDMED 0.34- 0.591 0.292 0.571 0.280 0.552 
OCEDZERO 0.140 0.436 0.061 0.290 0.058 0.268 
PROSCIEN 0.-l 77 0.619 0.648 0.59 1 0.583 0.614 
ENGINEER 0.221 0.520 0. 106 0.379 0.060 0.320 
ADM!N 0.209 0.5 10 0.18 1 0.476 0.230 0.549 
SERVICES 0.02 1 0.188 0.032 0.132 0.048 0.274 
SALETECH 0.045 0.268 0.007 0. 102 0.009 0.112 
HLTHSERV 0.026 0. 177 0.026 0.163 0.070 0.274 
POSTDOC 0.009 0.112 0.057 0.257 0.055 0.249 
ENGLAND 0.080 0.335 0.036 0.230 0.10 1 0.413 
MATLANT 0.201 0.495 0.075 0.332 0. 176 0.459 
ENCENTRL 0.140 0.424 0.077 0.325 0.155 0.452 
WNCENT RL 0.053 0.267 0.036 0.255 0.056 0.287 
SATLANT 0. 147 0.44 3 0.404 0.612 0.182 0.476 
ESCENTRL 0.028 0.2 17 0.035 0.2 13 0.028 0. 182 
W CENTRL 0.077 0.338 0.052 0.270 0.044 0.246 
MOUNTA IN 0.0-7 0.289 0. 103 0.375 0.069 0.304 
PACIFIC 0.217 0.5 14 0. 182 0.488 0.188 0.464 
EMSIZE I 0.140 0.449 0.004 0.075 0.049 0.246 
EMSIZE2 0.052 0.271 0.00 1 0.033 0.056 0.277 
EMSIZE3 0.089 0.348 0.007 0.102 0. 122 0.420 
.. l) 
Table A 1-2. (continued) 
Private Public Nonprofit 
(obs=8846) (obs=3 142) (obs= 1410) 
Variable Mean td. Dev. Mean td. Dev. Mean td. Dev. 
EMSIZE4 0.120 0.403 0 .018 0.183 0.253 0.552 
EMS IZE5 0.042 0.238 0.008 0.102 0 .106 0.355 
EMS IZE6 0.181 0.488 0.181 0.481 0.153 0.435 
EMS IZE7 0.427 0.6 13 0.938 0.312 0 .143 0.431 
DADNO HS 0. 181 0.488 0. 181 0.481 0 .153 0.435 
DAD HS 0.223 0.522 0.230 0.527 0.236 0.544 
DADCOL2Y 0. 132 0.418 0.144 0.444 0 .128 0 .383 
DADCOL4Y 0.230 0.522 0.195 0.487 0.214 0 .507 
DADGRAD 0.234 0.514 0.250 0.540 0.269 0.542 
MOMNOHS 0 .192 0.498 0. 174 0.474 0.169 0.472 
MOMH 0.350 0 .597 0.350 0.595 0.311 0.570 
MOMCOL2Y 0.161 0.45 1 0. 184 0.494 0. 186 0.473 
MOMCOL4Y 0 .190 0.480 0.177 0.469 0.209 0.50 · 
MOMGRAD 0.108 0.366 0. 11 6 0.391 0.124 0.388 
DIFBI Rn 0.078 0.378 0.069 0.313 0.062 0.238 
YDlSAB IL" 0.282 0.515 0.334 0.608 0 .283 0.524 
MD ISA BIL" 0.601 0.583 0.574 0.626 0.632 0 .558 
ODISABIL" 0.039 0.204 0.023 0.184 0.023 0.145 
Self-emp. Academia 
(obs= l 123) (obs= 15288) 
Variable Mean td. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
L ALARY 10.795 1.221 10.858 0.728 
AGE 5 1.709 10.982 47.72 1 12.150 
TC URE 11 .066 9.296 12.292 12.725 
DGRYR 1978. 165 11.312 1980.881 12.709 
MALE 0.6 17 0.55 1 0.742 0.494 
WH ITE 0.933 0.250 0.836 0.434 
HISPAN IC 0.0 19 0.127 0.026 0. 173 
BLACK 0.0 12 0.101 0.028 0.17 1 
ASIAN 0.033 0.187 0.106 0.371 
NATIVE 0.004 0 .050 0.004 0.070 
OJT 0.669 0.549 0 .445 0.618 
PART 0.351 0.548 0.062 0.290 
WKBEFDEG 0.079 0.3 11 0. 121 0.422 
DI ABIL 0.068 0.322 0.067 0.3 12 
MARRIED 0.749 0.493 0.787 0.498 
MARWTHCH 0.389 0.573 0.401 0.611 
COMMA TH 0 .017 0.135 0.079 0.329 
LlFESCI 0. 138 0.338 0 .329 0.550 
PHY SCI 0.106 0.374 0.160 0 .452 
SOC Cl 0.669 0.530 0.319 0.608 
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Table A l -2. (continued) 
Self-emp. Academia 
(obs= l 123) (obs= l5288) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Id. Dev. 
ENG INRG 0.070 0.199 0. 111 0.434 
OCEOHIG H 0.686 0.540 0.836 0 .453 
OCEDMED 0.191 0.456 0. 140 0.426 
OCEDZERO 0.123 0 .386 0.023 0.179 
PROSC IEN 0.706 0 .523 0.720 0 .569 
ENGINEE R 0.044 0.226 0.094 0.398 
ADMIN 0.054 0.259 0.076 0.342 
SERVICES 0.088 0.329 0.051 0.295 
SALETECH 0.047 0.244 0.002 0 .055 
HLTH ERV 0.06 1 0.270 0.056 0 .239 
POSTDOC 0.007 0.091 0.075 0.283 
NENGLAND 0.072 0.28 1 0.086 0 .351 
MATLANT 0.192 0.469 0. 155 0.449 
ENCENTRL 0.092 0 .313 0.156 0.454 
WNCENTRL 0.047 0 .241 0.081 0.339 
SATLANT 0.153 0.419 0. 160 0.458 
ESCENTRL 0.026 0 . 187 0.059 0.290 
WSCENTRL 0.061 0.272 0.088 0.356 
MOUNTA IN 0.067 0 .272 0 067 0 .3 16 
PACIFI C 0.291 0.535 0 .148 0.440 
EMS IZE I 0 .945 0.285 0 .004 0.075 
EMS IZE2 0.027 0.216 0.005 0.085 
1:.MSIZE3 0.011 0.127 0 .01 2 0. 136 
EMS IZE4 0.005 0.082 0 .092 0.356 
EM IZE5 0.002 0.042 0.051 0.285 
EM IZE6 0.2 15 0.481 0. 192 0.498 
EMSIZE7 0.007 0.081 0.732 0 .552 
DADNOHS 0.2 15 0.481 0. 192 0 .500 
DAD HS 0.204 0.466 0.2 14 0.5 17 
DADCOL2Y 0.139 0.390 0.132 0.419 
DADCOL4Y 0.186 0.453 0.200 0.492 
DADGRAD 0.256 0.510 0.262 0.546 
MOMNOHS 0.177 0.449 0.176 0.480 
MOM HS 0.327 0.552 0 .3 16 0.582 
MOMCOL2Y 0.209 0.466 0 .188 0.486 
MOMCOL4Y 0. 166 0.412 0 .192 0.492 
MOMGRAD 0. 121 0.384 0. 128 0.404 
DI FB I Ra 0.031 0.166 0.040 0.201 
YDISAB IL" 0.3 15 0.645 0.294 0.552 
MDISAB IL" 0.650 0.647 0.652 0 .576 
ODISABIL" 0.004 0.038 0.014 0.137 
• These variables are averaged over the sample of disabled persons. 
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Table Al-3. Heckman selection model: Underlying wage regressions and Probit selection 
mechanism . 
Wage regression Coer. Marginal Prob it Coef. 
Coef. Std. Err. Effect Coefficient Std. Err. 
Private sector 
CONSTANT 10.002 0 .222 CONSTANT 38.654 4.-137 
Work Experience: AGE -0.022 0.002 
AGE 0.086 0 .009 8.635 DGRYR -0.019 0.002 
AGESQR -0.001 0.0001 -0.079 MALE 0.148 0.025 
TENURE 0.0 10 0.003 1.000 MARRJ ED 0.033 0 .024 
TENSQR -0.0002 0.000 1 -0.022 MARWTH CH 0.077 0.0 19 
WKBEFDEG -0.006 0.028 -0.658 DI SABIL -0.024 0 .041 
OJT 0.015 0.0 18 l .5 11 HI SPANIC -0.089 0.065 
PART -0.5 12 0 .075 -40.225 BLACK -0.155 0 .063 
Demographics: ASIAN 0.252 0 .026 
MALE 0.006 0.036 0.580 NATIVE -0. 162 0 .158 
HISPAN IC 0. 176 0.08 1 18.897 COMM A TH 0. 126 0.040 
BLACK 0.177 0.077 19.017 PHYSCI 0.462 0.027 
ASIAN -0.187 0.027 - 17.082 SOCS CI -0.114 0.03 1 
NATIVE 0.280 0.179 30.192 ENGTNRG 0.649 0.031 
DIFBIR 0.08 1 0.079 8. 146 DADNOHS -0.020 0.028 
YDlSAB IL 0.062 0.054 6.226 DADCOL2Y -0.002 0.030 
MDISA BIL 0.013 0.049 1.236 DADCO L4Y -0.010 0.026 
ODISABIL -0.320 0. 187 -28.681 DADGRAD -0.043 0.026 
Degree Field: MOMNOHS -0.057 0.025 
COM MA TH 0.074 0.044 7.567 MOMCOL2Y -0.057 0.023 
PHY SCI -0.296 0.055 -25 .74 1 MOMCOL4Y -0.050 0 .022 
SOCSC I 0.175 0.041 19.056 MOMGRAD -0.054 0 .026 
ENGlN RG -0.293 0 .066 -25 .580 rho -0.9 18 0.020 
Job-Degree Relat. : sigma(nu) 0 .954 0.095 
OCEDMED -0.03 1 0 .0 17 -3.076 coefficient of lambda -0.876 0. 106 
OCEDZERO -0.060 0 .03 1 -5 .908 Wald test(Ho:rho=O) 148.97 
Occupation: Prob>chi2 0.000 
ENGINEER -0.068 0.024 -6.629 
ADM IN 0.276 0.022 31.764 
SERVICES -0.228 0. 147 -2 1.274 
SALETECH -0.124 0.037 -11.709 
HLTHSERV 0.4 18 0.104 51.06 1 
POST DOC -0.425 0.073 -34.773 
Employer Region: 
NENGLAND -0 .020 0.032 -2.035 
MATLANT 0.026 0 .030 2.587 
ENCENTRL -0.086 0.028 -8.279 
WNCENTRL -0.164 0.038 - 15. 174 
SATLANT -0.020 0.034 -2.082 
ESCENTRL -0.111 0.051 -10.662 
WSCENTRL -0.103 0.033 -9.810 
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Table A 1-3. (continued) 
Wage r egressio n Coef. Ma rgina l Pro bit Coef. 
Coef. S td. E rr. Effec t Coefficient td. Err. 
EMSIZEI -0. 10 1 0.038 -9 .669 
EMSIZE2 -0.0-t 5 0.043 -4 .5 15 
EMSIZE3 -0.007 0.030 -0.7 13 
EMS IZE4 0.002 0.027 0.164 
EMSIZE5 0.054 0.04 3 5.458 
EMSIZE6 0.030 0.025 3.002 
Public sector 
CO 1STA T 9.073 0.260 CONSTANT -41.1 10 5. 152 
Work Experience : AGE 0.022 0.003 
AGE 0 .062 0.0 10 6.216 DGRYR 0.020 0.003 
AGESQR -0.001 0.000 1 -0.058 MALE 0 . 105 0.030 
TENURE 0.01 1 0.006 1.094 MARRIED -0.067 0.035 
TENSOR -0.00002 0.0002 -0.002 MARWTHCH 0.020 0.030 
WKBEFDEG -0.151 0.028 - 14.087 DISABI L -0.076 0.05 1 
OJT 0.023 0 .0 19 2.284 HISPA IC -0. 112 0.063 
PART -0.744 0 .091 -52.685 BLACK -0.036 0.067 
Demographics: AS IAN -0. 174 0.040 
MALE 0.026 0.024 2.614 NATIVE 0.045 0.164 
HISPAN IC 0.000 0.03 1 -0.065 COM MATH -0.441 0.067 
BLACK -0.022 0.043 -2.230 PHY Cl 0.035 0.033 
ASIA -0.036 0.027 -3.534 SOCSC I -0 .058 0.032 
NATfVE -0. 143 0.09 1 - 13.683 ENGINRG -0. 145 0.039 
DIFBIR 0 .024 0.053 2.281 DADNOH -0.0 ·7 0 .04 1 
YDlSA BI L -0.019 0.042 - 1.980 DADCOL2Y o.o::w 0.043 
MDISABIL -0.022 0.038 -2.26 1 DADCO L4Y -0.01 3 0.040 
ODISABIL 0. 139 0 .166 13.397 DADG RAD 0.018 0.042 
Degree Field : MOMNO HS -0.018 0.040 
COMMA TH 0. 183 0.042 19.958 MOMCOL2Y -0.029 0.037 
PHYSCI 0. 163 0.027 17.669 MOM COL4Y -0 .064 0.038 
SOCSCI 0.011 0.025 1.090 MOMGRAD -0.036 0.046 
E G I RG 0.289 0.049 33.4 15 rho 0.290 0.110 
Job-Degree Reial.: sigma( nu } 0.435 0.027 
OCEDMED -0.057 0 .022 -5 .59 1 coefficient of lam bda 0. 126 0.045 
OCEDZERO -0. 117 0 .038 -11.099 Wald test(Ho:rho=O) 6 .180 
Occupation: Prob>ch i2 0 .0 13 
ENG INEER -0.073 0.050 -7 .199 
ADMIN 0. 184 0.030 20.136 
SERVICES -0.069 0.053 -6.760 
ALETECH -0.072 0. 11 0 -7.507 
HLTHSERV 0.105 0.058 10.905 
POST DOC -0.345 0.030 -29. 199 
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Table A 1-3. (continued) 
Wage regression Coef. Marginal Prob it Coef. 
Coef. Std. Err. Effect Coefficient Std. Err. 
Employer Region : 
NENGLAND -0.149 0.085 - 14. 180 
MATLANT -0.031 0.036 -J . 126 
ENCENTRL -0.033 0.033 -3 .253 
WNCENTRL -0.184 0.057 -16.971 
SATLANT 0.070 0.027 7.183 
ESCENTRL -0.017 0.038 -1.741 
WSCENTRL -0.090 0.043 -8.64 7 
MOUNTAIN -0.042 0.037 -4 .157 
Employer Size: 
EMS IZEI -1.117 0 .348 -69. 193 
EMS IZE2 -0.263 0.273 -25 .925 
EMS IZE3 -0.155 0.082 -14 .652 
EMS IZE4 -0. 145 0.061 -13 .650 
EMS IZE5 -0.2 12 0 .066 -19.262 
EMS IZE6 -0.007 0 .077 -1 .002 
Nonprofit sector 
CONSTANT 8.155 0.412 CONSTANT -22.686 6.135 
Work Experience: AG E 0.005 0 .003 
AGE 0 .093 0.0 14 9.259 DGRYR 0.011 0.003 
AGESQR -0.001 0.0001 -0.094 MALE -0.089 0.036 
TENURE 0.0 16 0 .007 1.607 MARRJED 0.015 0.044 
TE QR -0.0002 0 .0002 -0.019 MARWTHCH -0.05 1 0.036 
WKBEFDEG -0.052 0 .045 -5.205 DISABIL -0.063 0 .068 
OJT -0.090 0.034 -8.668 HISPANIC -0.155 0 .083 
PART -0.086 0.077 -49.807 BLACK 0.005 0.095 
Demographics: ASIAN -0. 141 0.051 
MALE 0. 155 0 .039 16.63 1 NATIVE -0.455 0. 188 
HJ SPAN IC 0 .061 0.073 5.996 COMMA TH -0. 187 0.073 
BLACK -0.056 0 .074 -5.723 PHYSCI -0. 154 0.046 
AS IAN 0.009 0.050 0 .735 SOCSC I 0.240 0.038 
NATI VE -0. 143 0. 180 - 14.695 ENG INRG -0.235 0 .060 
DIFBIR -0.422 0.295 -37.246 DADNOHS -0. 149 0.054 
YDISAB IL -0.0 15 0.089 -1.839 DADCOL2Y -0.062 0.051 
MDISABIL -0.098 0.076 -9.554 DADCOL4Y 0.010 0.054 
OD! AB IL 1.120 0.246 197.385 DADGRAD -0.040 0.050 
Degree Field: MOMNOHS 0 .108 0.050 
COMMA TH 0.099 0.069 10.15 1 MOMCOL2Y -0.004 0.046 
PHYSCI 0.056 0.058 5.529 MOMCOL4Y 0.068 0 .048 
OCSCI 0.042 0.048 4.132 MOMGRAD -0.004 0 .055 
E GTNRG 0.006 0.069 0.320 rho 0.552 0.150 
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Table Al-3 . (continued) 
Wage regres io n Coef. Marginal Prob it Coef. 
Coef. S td. Err. Effect Coefficient td. Err. 
Job-Degree Re lat. : sigma(nu) 0.5-l5 0.058 
OCEDMED -0 .078 0 .034 -7.5 19 coefficient of lambda 0.30 1 0 . 111 
OCEDZERO -0 .343 0 .086 -29.305 Wald test(Ho:rho=O) 8.26 
Occupation : Prob>chi2 0.004 
ENG INEER 0.086 0 .063 8.757 
AD MIN 0.348 0 .048 41.43 1 
SERVICES -0.039 0 .084 -4 .175 
ALETECH -0.012 0 . 101 -1.71 3 
l-ILTH SERV 0. 178 0 .092 18.966 
POST DOC -0.4 76 0.075 -3 8.027 
Employer Region: 
ENGLAND -0.119 0.082 - 11.525 
MATLANT -0.007 0.042 -0.79 1 
ENCENTRL -0. 122 0.048 -11.618 
WNCE TRL -0.037 0.067 -3 .826 
SATLANT 0.066 0.045 6.726 
ESCENTRL -0.365 0 .099 -30.891 
WSCENTRL -0.094 0 .077 -9.283 
MOUNTA IN -0. 130 0.064 -1 2.338 
Employer Size: 
EMSIZE I -0.493 0.086 -39. 134 
EMSIZE2 -0.034 0.072 -3.609 
EM IZE3 -0. 182 0.062 -16.808 
EMSIZE4 -0.083 0.044 -8.074 
EM IZE5 -0.007 0.047 -0.811 
EMSIZE6 -0.046 0.038 -4 .522 
Self-em ployment 
CONSTANT 8.407 0.935 CONSTANT -1.241 6. 129 
Work Experience: AGE 0.026 0.003 
AGE 0 . 111 0.03 1 11 .066 DGRYR -0.001 0.003 
AGESQR -0 .001 0.0003 -0. 11 I MALE -0.278 0.040 
TENURE 0.038 0 .01 2 3.766 MAR.RlED -0.164 0.048 
T ENSQR -0.00 1 0 .0003 -0.072 MARWTH CH 0.194 0 .044 
WKBEFDEG 0.005 0.1 32 -0.3 75 DI SABIL -0.093 0 .077 
OJT -0. 162 0.078 - 15. 191 HI SPANIC -0. 136 0. 102 
PART -0 .6 14 0.073 -46.018 BLACK -0.5 13 0. 12 1 
Oemograph ics: ASIAN -0 .359 0.076 
MALE 0 .2 13 0.084 23 .3 11 NATIVE -0.055 0.178 
HISPANIC 0.057 0 . 111 5.2 16 COMMA TH -0. 188 0 .099 
BLACK 0. 196 0 .235 18.292 PHYSCI 0.061 0 .058 
ASIAN -0. 102 0. 172 -10.990 SOC SCI 0.695 0.041 
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Table A 1-3. (continued) 
Wage regression Coef. Marginal Prob it Coef. 
Coef. td. Err. Effect Coefficien I td. Err. 
ATIVE -0.152 0.162 - 15.193 E GI RG 0.049 0.065 
DIFBIR -0.391 0.33 1 -35 .977 DAD 011 0.041 0.0:7 
YDISABIL -0.192 0.103 -19.125 DADCOL2Y 0.041 0.060 
MD ISABIL -0.1 18 0.134 - I 1.949 DADCOL4Y 0.017 0.059 
ODISABIL 0.333 0.2 16 36.3 16 D/\DGRAD 0.081 0.059 
Degree Field: MOMNOHS 0.000 0.058 
COMMA TH -0 .122 0.262 -14 .5 18 MOMCOL2Y 0.022 0.051 
PHYSCI -0. 104 0.111 -10.451 MOMCOL-lY -0 063 0.0 -5 
OCSCI 0.090 0. 123 8.55 1 MOMGRAD 0.027 0.066 
E GI RG 0.035 0.205 1.3 8-l rho 0.131 0.158 
Job-Degree Reial. : sigma( nu) 0.945 0.07 1 
OCEDM ED -0. 191 0. 1 IJ - 17.900 coefficienl of lambda 0.124 0.150 
OCEDZERO -0.353 0.136 -30.4 12 Wald test(l lo:rho=O) 0.670 
Occupation: Prob '>chi2 0.412 
F GI 1EER 0.253 0.213 25 832 
ADMT 0.421 0 170 50. 105 
ER VICE -0.529 0. 178 -42 003 
ALETECH 0.210 0.167 21.666 
HLTHSERV 0.575 0. 11 9 76.474 
PO TDOC 0.274 0. 145 30. 196 
l:mp loyer Region: 
ENG LA D -0.093 0.143 -9.758 
MATLA T 0.049 0.105 4.434 
E CE TRL -0.046 0.131 -5.308 
WNCENTRL -0 .142 0. 146 -14. 162 
ATLA T 0.023 0. 103 1.837 
ESCENTRL 0. 152 0. 149 15.130 
WSCENTRL 0. 124 0. 108 12.495 
MOUNT Al -0.040 0. 13 1 -4.746 
Employer ize : 
EM IZEI -0.:9-l 0.217 -46.073 
EMSIZE2 -0.6 -9 0.265 -50.066 
EMS IZE3 -0.394 0.259 -34 .754 
EM IZE4 -0.092 0.342 -13.958 
EM SIZES -2. 184 1.255 -94 .875 
EMS IZE6 -0.277 0.304 -27.592 
Academia 
CONSTANT 9.668 0.118 CONSTANT 33.111 3.407 
Work Experience: AGE -0.011 0.002 
AGE 0.053 0.005 5.257 DGRYR -0.0 16 0.002 
AGESQR 0.000 0.0001 -0.049 MALE -0.110 0.021 
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Table AJ-3 . (continued) 
Wage regre ion Cocf. Ma rgtna l Probit Coef. 
Coef. Std. Err. Effect Coefficient td. Err. 
TE URE 0 .020 0 .002 2.032 MARRIED 0.072 0.020 
TE SQR -0.0003 0.0001 -0.033 1ARWTHCII -0.086 0.018 
WKBEFDEG -0.090 0.014 -8.655 DI ABIL 0.073 0.037 
OJT -0.011 0.009 -1.133 HISPAN IC o.n2 0 .048 
PART -0.605 0.038 -45.41 5 BLACK 0.3 15 0.055 
Demographics: A IA -0.084 0.028 
MALE 0. 175 0 .0 13 19.080 ATIVE 0.204 0. 124 
HI PA IC -0. 101 0 .025 -9.638 COMMA TH 0.062 0.037 
BLACK -0 .130 0 .04 1 -1 2.264 PHYSCI -0.476 0.026 
ASIAN 0.024 0.018 2.425 OCSC I -0. 129 0.023 
A T I VE -0.206 0 .065 -1 8.786 E G INRG -0.609 0.029 
DIFBIR -0 .079 0 .05 1 -7.75 1 DADNOI I 0.066 0.024 
YDISABIL -0.05 1 0 .042 -5 .035 DADCOL2Y 0.027 0.025 
MDI AB IL -0.055 0 .026 -5 .394 DADCOL4Y 0.023 0.023 
ODISAB IL -0 .242 0 .189 -22 .897 DADGRAD 0.052 0.024 
Degree Field: MOM O H 0.002 0.023 
COMMA TH -0.0 10 0 .02 1 -0 .993 MOMCOL2Y 0 .069 0.022 
PHYSCI 0.160 0.019 17.338 MOMCO L4Y 0 .057 0.023 
SOCSCI 0.0 12 0.0 15 1.181 MOMGRAD 0.088 0 .027 
ENG I NRG 0.326 0.033 38.42 1 rho -0.853 0 .022 
Job-Degree Relat. : sigma( nu) 0.649 0 .033 
OCEDMED -0.033 0.014 -3 .265 coefficient of lambda -0.5 - 3 0.041 
OCEDZERO -0.1 11 0.042 -10.599 Wald test(l lo :rho=O) 248.49 
Occupation: Prob>chi2 0.000 
E G I NEER 0.074 0.026 7.67 1 
ADMIN 0.420 0.020 52. 176 
SERVI CES -0.033 0 026 -3.265 
SALETECH -0. 193 0 .102 -1 7.989 
HLTHSERV 0.229 0.025 25.746 
PO TDOC -0.379 0.0 16 -3 1.539 
Employer Region: 
NE GLAND -0.0 15 0.0 19 - 1.485 
MATLANT 0 .004 0.0 18 0.428 
ENCENTRL -0 .054 0.01 7 -5.229 
w CENTRL -0. 107 0.018 - I 0.200 
ATLANT -0.064 0 .017 -6.22 1 
E CENTRL -0 . 141 0 .022 -13 .190 
W CE TRL -0. 101 0.019 -9.588 
MOUNT AI -0.068 0.023 -6.604 
Employer S ize: 
EM IZE I 0.204 0. 111 2 1.83 1 
EM IZE2 -0.058 0.054 -5.74 1 
EMSIZE3 -0.240 0 .042 -21.395 
EMSIZE4 -0.136 0 .017 -12.771 
Table A 1-3 . (continued) 
Wage regre s ion Cocf. Marginal 
EMSIZE5 
EMSIZE6 
Coef. Std. Err. Effect 
-0.057 
0.066 
0 .0:24 
0 .0 15 
-5 .599 
6.863 
5 I 
Prob it Coef. 
Coe fficient ' Id. Err. 
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Table A 1-4. Mixed logistic estimated coe ffi cients and marginal effects. 
Variable Co cf. Marginal Marginal eff. 
Coefficient "td. Err. P>z Effect td. Err. 
co STA T PV 70.022 1.679 0 .000 
CONSTANT_PB -40.536 2.083 0.000 
co STA T NPF -6 .051 2.856 0 .034 
co STANT SLF 63 .976 2.818 0 .000 
CSALARY 4.827 0.015 0 .000 (See Tab le 1- 1) (Sec Table 1- 1) 
AGE PV -0 .05 1 0.001 0.000 -1 .422 0.362 
AGE PB 0 .049 0 .00 1 0 .000 0.569 0.086 
AGE NPF 0 .032 0.001 0 .000 0. 176 0 .060 
AGE SLF 0 .085 0.001 0 .000 OA22 O.-G4 
AGE_ AC 0 .000 0.254 0.242 
DGRYR PV -0 .038 0.001 0 .000 -0.822 0. 164 
DGRYR PB 0 .020 0.001 0.000 0.32 I 0.046 
DGRYR NPF 0.003 0.001 0 .022 0 .069 0.034 
DGRYR SLf' -0.036 0.001 0 .000 -0. 115 0.064 
DG RYR_AC 0.000 0.548 0. 190 
MALE PV I . 184 0.0 10 0.000 8.7 16 1.526 
MALE PB 0.832 0.0 13 0.000 4.838 1. 128 
MALE NPF -0. I 78 0.0 16 0.000 -1.244 0.885 
MALE SLF -0.983 0.0 18 0.000 -0. 700 1.26 1 
MALE AC 0.000 -11.61 I 2.525 
HISPA IC PV - I .636 0.026 0.000 -3.744 1.394 
HISPANIC PB -0.919 0.037 0.000 -2.721 0.823 
HI SPAN IC NPF -1.257 0 .05 1 0.000 -J .049 0.908 
HISPANIC SLF -I .325 0 .056 0 .000 -0.726 1. 130 
HISPANIC AC 0.000 10.240 2 .067 
BLACK PY -2 .028 0 .028 0.000 -4.086 I .595 
BLACK PB -I .003 0 .034 0.000 -2 .904 0. 868 
BLACK - PF -0.686 0.04 3 0.000 - l.959 I .384 
BLACK SLF -3.250 0.069 0.000 -0.989 1.274 
BLACK_ AC 0.000 9.937 2.591 
AS IA PV l.391 0.0 11 0.000 12. I 17 1 .562 
ASLAN PB 0.026 0.018 0. 136 -0.482 0.909 
ASIAN NPF -0.09 1 0 .025 0.000 -0 .885 0.879 
ASIAN SLF -0 .45 1 0 .040 0.000 -0.455 1.-114 
ASIAN AC 0 .000 -10.295 3. 175 
NATIVE PV -2.596 0.074 0.000 -4 .394 1.959 
ATIVE PB -0.468 0.086 0.000 -1 .505 3.279 
ATIVE NPF -1.1 95 0. 183 0.000 -2.975 2.702 
NATIVE SLF -0.42 I 0. 11 4 0.000 -0.282 2.3 13 
ATIVE AC 0.000 9. 157 6.051 
DISABIL PV -0.5 I 3 0 .0 16 0 .000 - 1. 759 1. 166 
DISABIL PB -0.426 0 .023 0.000 -1.524 0.687 
DISABIL NPF -0 .504 0 .035 0.000 -1.6 I 8 1.149 
D! SA BIL SLF 0 .018 0.03 1 0.562 0.078 I .437 
DISAB IL AC 0 .000 4.823 2.-1-46 
MARRJED PV 0.093 0.0 10 0.000 0.460 0.388 
MARRJED PB -0.057 0.01 3 0.000 -0.279 0.353 
MARRIED NPF -0.005 0.017 0.778 -0.026 0.51 7 
MARRIED SLF -0.079 0.0 18 0.000 -0.080 0.3 I I 
MARRJED AC 0.000 -0.076 0 .852 
COMMATH PV -0. 155 0.016 0.000 -0.386 l.271 
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Table A 1-4. (con tinued) 
Var ia ble Co cf. Margi nal Ma rg inal eff. 
Coeffi cient td. Err . P>z Effect td. Err. 
COMMATH PB -1.749 0.029 0.000 -L003 1.180 
COMMATH NPF -1 .026 0.037 0.000 -2.755 1. 154 
COMMATH SLF 0.581 0.056 0.000 0 950 2.904 
COMMATH AC 0.000 6.195 3. 179 
PH YSCI PV 3.200 0.01 3 0.000 47.042 8.290 
PHYSCI PB 0.396 0.0 15 0.000 - 1.695 0.859 
PHYSCl NPF 0.5 15 0.024 0.000 - 1.173 1.157 
PHYSCI SLF 2.230 0.030 0.000 3.205 6. 126 
PHYSCI AC 0.000 -47.379 7.780 
socscr PV -0.662 0.0 11 0.000 -2.593 1.676 
SOCSCT PB 0.408 0.013 0.000 1.660 3.286 
SOCSCl NPF 0.651 0.017 0.000 3. 157 3.9 14 
SOCSCI_SLF 2. 189 0.022 0.000 7. 173 42. 11 4 
SOCSCJ AC 0.000 -9 .396 34.677 
ENG fNRG PV 4.788 0.0 16 0.000 77 .183 9.620 
ENGINRG_PB 0.983 0.017 0.000 -3.047 0.858 
ENGINRG_N PF 1.575 0.028 0.000 -1.393 1.329 
E GINRG_SLF 1.902 0.034 0.000 -0.047 1.585 
E GINRG_AC 0.000 -72.695 9.n1 
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Notes 
1 
Iowa State Universit) . ., 
- Given our sample. exclusion of the unemplo~ed \\ill not result in selecti\ it) bias because the sample of 
unemployed is so thin. A preliminaf) prob11 estimation of the probabilit) of be ing unemplo) ed never predicts 
that a Ph.D. recipient would be unemployed. 
3 
The Bureau or Labor Statistics does not explicitly report employment and earnings data for the private 
nonprofit sector. Tidernan ( 1977) used data for industries that arc 'predominantly charitable' (S. l.C. 806. 811. 
822. 823. 866, 867 . and 892) as a representative sample of private nonprofit institutions. Information from the 
American Hospital Association (A II A) is used to distribute wor!..ers bet\\'een charitable and proprietar: 
hospitals. for . I .C 806. 
-1 Sector differences in mobilit) rating become statistical!~ in ignificant when occupation is held constant. Thus. 
one ma) conclude that occupations that frequent!) appear in the nonprofit sector provide greater job mobilit~ on 
average compared to the ' typical' occupa11on in the other two sectors. but no differences can be seen within 
occupations across sectors. 
5 Thi s measure of total factor productivity is the weighted average ofTPFs across industries in which nonprofit 
organizations appear. The weights are the proportions of self-employed in the industries. 
6 
ore that if xl appears both in the underlying regression and the selection equation. then the marginal effect of 
xl on Log..(YJ) /11 the sample for ll'h1c/1 Log, ff1J 1s observed is 
c E[Log..(YJ) zl '> OJ ' 2xl = YXJl - a,l(OruP1 cruj)o, where o, = j,,p.,J., a/\\1A,,( I Ou)) 
7 
The bootstrap procedure is as follows: 
I 00 samples of size 29.809 (i.e. the size of the existing sample) are drawn with replacement from the existing 
sample. For each sampl e, the set of odds ratios and marginal effects are calculated and recorded. Then the 
bootstrap variance ofa statistic. say 01. is (~h 11<10 (01b - 8,' )~ ) I ( 100 I). where 8J' = (~b , "JO oJb) I 100. 
Bootstrapping of standard errors is made necessary due to the inabi lity of our analysis software to calculate 
correct design-based standard errors in a multiple choice logit setting. 
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CHAPTER 2. DECOMPOSITION OF GENDER WAGE GAP AND 
GAP DI FFERENTIAL ACROSS ECTOR FOR DOCTORATE 
RECIPIENT 
A paper to be submitted fo r publication in the National cience Foundation's ·women, 
Minorities. and Persons \Vi th Disabilities in cicnce and Engineering: 199T. 
Yoon-Tien Yap 1 
Introduction 
This chapter considers the decomposition of the gender wage gap into components 
attributed to ma le-female differences in the stock of productivi ty factors and components 
attributed to male-female differences in the returns to human capital. R eturns to human 
capital are measured by the set of factor loading coeffi cients translating ·units · of 
producti vi t) factors into monetary returns. 
T wo main issues are addressed in thi s chapter: the decomposition of the gap itself, 
and the differences in gender gaps across sectors o f the economy. Different methodologies 
have been fo rmulated to perform such decompositions. We ""ill use the Oaxaca ( 1973 ) 
method for the fo rmer. and the Juhn et al. ( 199 1) method fo r the latter. 
From the results of the Oaxaca decompos ition. we will be ab le to determine the 
portions of the gender wage gap caused by ma le-female difference in work experience. 
educational and trai ning attainments. occupations. sectors and industries. employer 
characteri tics. and demographic fac tors. Moreover. we can identi f) the portion of the gap 
caused by the different ways that employers evaluate gender-specific human capi tal. Oaxaca 
attributed thi s portio n of the gap to employer discrimination. 
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The Juhn et a l. method, on Lhe other hand, does not explicitly estimate separate wage 
coefficients for males and females . It assumes that changes in the wage structure (usuall y 
taken to be the wage coefficients of the majority category) affect persons with the same skills 
identically, regardless of gender. Thus, unlike the Oaxaca method in which male-female 
djfferences in returns to human capital constitute a di rect source of the gender gap. in the 
Juhn et al. method the increase in returns to human capital for males in sector A relati ve to 
sector B increases the pay gap in sector A by magnifying the existing male-female difference 
in human capital stock. The Juhn et al. decomposition will allow us to determine why the 
gender gap is larger in one sector relative to another. 
A nalytical Fra mework 
Gender Wage Gap: The Oaxaca (1973) Methodology 
The wage gap decomposition methodology of Oaxaca ( 1973) is one of the most 
widely used in the literature on labor market di scrimination. fts structure is deri ved from 
(semi-logarithmic) wage equations estimated separately for the sub-populations of interest. A 
re-parameterization of the resulting log wage ratio equation decomposes the wage gap into a 
portion caused by gender differences in the stock of skills and a portion due to gender 
differences in the prices attached to these ski lls. The portion that is not explained by 
differences in human capital stock is taken as an estimate of labor market discrimination. In 
practice. one must avoid attributing the ·unexplained gap' entirely to discrimination because 
no model is perfect. The gender differences in returns to human capital may very well be 
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caused by differences in some unobserved skill or skills that are not accounted fo r by the 
other regressors. 
In this chapter we will first examine the wage gap between male and female doctorate 
recipients. Suppose the male and female wage equations are given by 
Yr = ar + Xr' Pr + er 
( 1) 
(2) 
where Y 1 denotes the natural log of wages for gender i. a.1 denotes the estimated regression 
constant, Xi denotes the kx I data vector. p, denotes the kx l vector of estimated coefficients, 
and e, denotes the OLS residual. The methodology requires that X 111 and Xr contain the same 
set of k regressor variables. Taking means on both sides gives 
Y rn = O.m + Xm' Pm 
Yr = ar + Xr' Pr 
(3) 
(4) 
since OLS residuals average to zero. It follows that the wage differential, evaluated at means. 
is 
(Ym - Y r) = (am - ar) + Xm' Pm - Xr' Pr 
= /ia + X( tip + tiX' Pm 
OR 
= !ia + Xm' tip + tiX' Pr 
where tia = O.m - ar, tip = Pm - Pr, and tiX = Xm - Xr. 
(5) 
(6) 
The first two components represent the portion of the gap attributed to differences in 
returns to human capital facing males and females. The thi rd component represents the 
portion of the gap due to male-female differences in human capital endowments. Expression 
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(5) implies that in the absence of discrimination the male v.:age structure will prevail. while 
expression (6) uses the female wage structure as the nondiscrimination standard. Newmark 
( 1988) noted that the choice of specification wi 11 depend on the nature of discrimination. For 
example, if males earn the value of their marginal products but females with the same human 
capital stock earn less. then the elimination of discrimination wi ll not change the wages or 
males but will cause the wages of females to increase to the levels of their male counterparts. 
ln this case. specification (5) is appropriate. However. if females earn the value of their 
marginal products but males with the same human capital earn more. then the elimination of 
nepotism toward males will deflate male wages to the levels of their female counterparts. In 
this case, specification (6) is appropriate. 
The polar scenarios depicted by (5) (pure discrimination) and (6)(pure nepotisn1) 
represents one weakness of the Oaxaca methodology. The focus of Newmark 's paper is to 
develop a fran1ework that al lows for a mixture of the two. In the absence of this alternative. 
the general practice is to use the wage structure of the non-minority group as reference. This 
is probably because researchers are more willing to believe discrimination against females 
than favoriti sm cowards males. We feel that estimation using males as the reference group 
wi ll suffice for our purposes. 
Another weakness of the Oaxaca methodology occurs when there is more than one set 
of binary regressors in the wage equations. Oaxaca and Ransom ( 1999) showed that Lhe 
technique can only identify the effects of a binary regressor relative to the effects of the 
normalized category. ln essence, the portions of the unexplained gap attributed to the 
constants (Um - ar) and to the coefficients of binary regressors (X/ 6P) depend on the choices 
of reference groups. Fortunately. the sum of effec ts (am - ar) + (X/ 6P) are invariant to the 
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choices of reference groups. Therefore. Lh is problem becomes an issue only when we 
examine in deLail the separate contributions of bina0 regressors to the unexplained gap. 
Gap Differential across Sector: T he Juhn ct al. (1991) Methodology 
The Juhn et al. ( l 99 1) methodology allows an estimation of trends in the wage gap. 
Blau and Kahn have made extensive use of it to examine the change in gender wage gaps 
across time (Blau and KaJm 1997) and to compare the wage gaps of industrialized nations 
(Blau and Kahn 1992). We first specify a set of wage equations similar to the ones in (3) and 
(4 ): 
j 0 J , 
• Em - ( • ( CT m t) (7) 
Y ( = X(' p( + E~ , E( - (0, (cr( )2 ) (8) 
where Yri denotes the natural log of gender i wages in sector j . x; denotes the (k+ I )x I vector 
of k regres or plus a first element of ones to accommodate the constant, p; denotes the 
(k+ I )x I ' ector of k regression coefficients and the constant, and E~ denotes a zero-mean 
stochasLic component having constant vari ance (crh~. The technique does not require an 
assumption of normality fo r E( 
Let SmJ denote the standardized fo rm of EmJ· Then 
Ymj = x j, f.l. j + cr j e j m 1-'m m m 
= xt p( + X~' Pmj x~· Pmj + i::( 
= xt Pmj + x~· ( p~ - PmJ) + E~ 
= xt PmJ + ri ~ 
(9) 
( I 0) 
60 
where 11( = X/' (p(- Pmi) + EtJ no longer has /ero mean. The re-parameterization o f the 
fe male wage equation is so that the male wage structure can be used as the re ference. To use 
the female "'age structure as the reference. we s imply perfonn an analogous procedure on 
equation (7). 
= 
= 
ector j · s wage differentia l is therefore 
(xmJ - X J)' Am.I + J 8 J ,, j f I-' G m m - · 1f 
( l I ) 
"vhere 8( = 11 ( I G m-' · The difference in gender wage gap between sector A and sector B is 
( 12) 
'"'here (ti.XA- X 8 )' p,/ =the ·observed X effect·: represents the ponion of sector 
difference in wage gap due to sector difference in the gap between male and 
female stock of human capital. 
XH' (Pm"-Pm 8 ) = the ·observed price effect'; represents the impact of different returns 
to human capital faced by males in different sectors of the economy. 
(ti.OA-ti.8 13 ) GmA = the 'gap effect": represents the sector differences in the position of 
female res idual wages relati e to male residual wages. Residual wages arc those 
not based on the set of regressors in the model. They can be based on unmeasured 
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ski lls. productivity facto rs not accoumed for in the model. and employer 
discrimi nati on. 
Q13( a 111A -crm B) = the ·unobserved price effect·: represents the impact of sector difference 
in wage dispersion as measured by the standard deviation of male residual wages. 
I l ighcr degrees of wage dispers ion disadvantage females who are typically in the 
lower half of the residual wage distribution. 
The Juhn et al. technique requires estimation o f the wage equation for the reference 
group onl y. The technique requires two assumpt ions in order to be operati onal. First. it 
as umes that wages depend on skill s. and changes in the wage structure affects persons with 
the same skills (observed or otherw ise) in exactly the same way. regardless of gender. 
econd. it assumes that the residual wage di stribution of the reference group is independent 
of changes in the re lative res idual wage position o f the o ther groups. 
To estimate (12), we est imate sector A and B male wage equati ons and obta in 
estimated va lues for Pm A_ Pm0 • 8mA· Sm 13• crm'' and crm 13 . The female residual wage can then be 
calculated as 
( 13) 
Moreover, unlike the Oaxaca method. equation ( 12) allmvs examination of changes in the 
wage gap at different percenti les of the wage distribution. not j ust at the means. 
The identification problem that plagues the Oaxaca methodology is not present in the 
Juhn et al. method. All four components on the right hand side of equation ( 12) are invariant 
to the choice of dummy variable reference groups. Moreover. we have the alternative of 
using an overall wage distribution as the distribution of reference. That is. if we est imate a 
wage equation using the poo led male and female samples. we can replace PmJ with Bnj Co· for 
6?. 
overall ) and cr01J with cr0j in ( 12). The male and female residual "vages can then be calculated 
as (Y mJ - Xnt ~oJ )Jcrj and (Y ( - xt Bo') cr/ respec ti vely. 
Data and Descriptive Analysis 
In this chapter. we will util ize the fu ll sample of doctorate recipients pro\·ided b) the 
1997 E TAT data set. We exclude those who are unemployed. tho e who '' ork abnormall ) 
small number of ' eeks(< 17 weeks per year). tho e v. ho earn abnormally small sa laries 
( <15.000 per year). those assigned zero weights by survey administrators. and those who are 
in the vague category ·Other Races· with regards to their race/ethnicity. There is al o one 
caveat to be noted. One of our objectives is to examine the effect of quality of education on 
wage and on the gender gap. The cost of including variables of this sort (namely the 
arnegie classi fication of the schools award ing the Ph.D. and the pri ate/public school 
indicator) is that these variables have high missing-value rates. Missing values can mai nly be 
traced to data drawn from the NSCG. which is based on the 1990 Census and in which data 
such as school codes are confidential under Title 13 confidentiality rules. Moreover. school 
codes fo r per on who earned their doctorates abroad are also unavailable. La tly. there is a 
small number of . . earned doctorates in the DR fo r which data for Carnegie classification 
arc legitimately missing. 
It is necessary to drop observations with missing values if one seriously wishes to 
utilize these \'ariables. The consequences will be negligible (apart from lost degrees of 
freedom) if the occurrence of missing value is uncorrelated with the dependent vari able. 
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Unfonunately. in our case. it is more reasonable to expect some se lection bias in the 
estimated regression coefficients. Moreover. in fere nces drawn from such regressions are 
natura ll y inappl icable to certain doctora tes (for example. fore ign-earned doctorates. and 
doctorates who satisfy the se lection criteria of the NSCG and who are not in the frames of the 
other compone nt surveys). 
We will use the Carnegie va riable in the Oaxaca decomposjtion of the gender' age 
gap. On the other hand. the Juhn et al. decomposition requires estimation of wage equations 
by sector and by gender within sectors which naturally results in small samples within each 
sub-population o f interest. Therefore. we cannot afford to include quality of education 
variables. Moreover. the sets of regressors representing detailed degree fields and detailed 
employe r bus iness/industry also need to be dropped due to thin samples. The resulting vvage 
equati ons fo r the Juhn et al. decomposition are considerably more parsimonious than the ones 
used in the Oaxaca decomposition. 
This section will present descriptive stati stics for se lected variables used in the wage 
gap decompositions. The statistics for the complete list of variables can be found in Tables 
A2- I and A2-2 in Appendix 2. 
Table 2-1 presents the sample means of selected va riables. by gender. The symbol 
ti denotes the difference between the means of the male and female sub-samples. ote that 
the log m ale-female wage ratio (at means) b. = Loge(Wm/Wr) = 0.25 can be rewritten as 
Loge( J +(Wm- W r)/W r). Thus. (W m- W r)/W r = exp(0.25)-1 = 0.2840. We conclude that males 
earn a 28.4% premium over females. Table 2- l also shows that males have on average 2.3 
more years of tenure than females . On the other hand. ten percent more females have 
reported rece iving work-related training during the past year. Nine percent more males 
received an assistantship in the course of completing their Ph.D.s. \ -hile equal proportions of 
males and females received financial support in the form of research grants . Thirty five 
percent of males are in the private sector. compared 10 22° o of fe males. On the other hand. 
53% of females versus 46% of males arc in academia . l ligher proportions of females in 
academia are employed in two-year colleges and temporary non-tenure track teaching 
posi ti ons or as post-doctorates. 
Table 2-2 presents the sample means by sector and gender. At sample means. the log 
male-female wage ratio is highest in the nonprofit sector. where males earn a 39% premium 
over females. and lowest in the public sector. where males earn a 16.2% premium. Tenure 
difference is highest in academia. where males have 4.8 years more tenure than females. and 
lowest in self-employment. where males have 0.6 years more tenure. Females report higher 
incidences o f work-related training than males, particularly among self-employed workers. 
Female are al o more l ikely to be employed part time. 
Results 
Oaxaca Decompo ition: The Gender Wage Gap 
The regressors included in the Oaxaca wage regressions will a llow us to examine 
several interesting issues. First, we can examine wage differentials across occupations. 
holding sector of employment constant. We wi ll consider 8 occupational categories: 
professional and scientific, engineers. management and administration. 
services/arts/humanities (includes teachers in secondary schools or lower and post-secondary 
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teachers in non-science and engineering fields. soc ial workers. accounting clerks and 
bookkeepers). saJes/marketing and technical occupati ons. heallh and related occupations. 
academic post-doctorates. and non-academic post-doctoratcs2. 
' econd. we can examine whether the earnings effect of disability depends on the age 
at which disability occurs. ror thi s purpose we categorize the disabled into 4 mutually 
exclusive categories: those disabled at birth. those disahlcd at age 29 or younger. those 
disabled when they were middle-aged (30 through 65), and those disabled due to old age (66 
and o lder). 
Third. we can include measures of an individual" s innate ability. A good indicator 
would be a variable indicating \Vhethcr the person received an assistantship or work study 
program in the course of completing his or her Ph.D. An even better indicator will be 
financial assistance in the form of research grants. 
Fou11h. we can .include measures of the quality of Ph.D . earned. We include a 
variable indicating the private/public ownership status of schools awarding the degree. We 
also categorize the schools into 11 Carnegie classificati ons. They are as follows: 
Research University I = those offering a full range of undergraduate programs. focus on 
research. and receive $40 million or more in annual federal 
support. 
Research University II = similar to Research Uni versi ty I, except it receives $15.5 to 
$40 million in annual federal support. 
Doctoral Universi ty I= those with ex tensive doctorate programs. awarding at least 40 
doctorate degrees in 5 or more fields. 
Doctoral University II =similar to above. except it awa rds a smaller number o f Ph.D.s 
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Comprehensive University 1 = those committed to graduate education through the 
Master·s degree and award at least 40 degrees annually. 
Liberal Arts Colleges l = primarily undergraduate colleges. 
The remaining five classifications are Theological Seminaries and Bible Colleges. Medical 
Schools, Health Service Universities (awarding degrees in chiropractic. nursing. pharmacy. 
podiatry. etc.). Schools of Engineering and Technology. and Other Specialized Institutions. 
Fifth. we can examine the impact on earnings of employment in occupations that are 
not related to the degree fi eld. For thi s purpose. we control for categories in which 
respondents reported that their jobs are related. somewhat related. or not related to their 
Ph.D. fields. ln this way, we control for cases in which field specific human capital is lost 
due to poor match between the job and the field in which the worker is trained. 
Furthem1ore, we divided the academic sector into 3 categories: 4 year co lleges. 2 year 
colleges or lower, and a category comprising of academic post-doctorates, temporary 
teaching posts. and non-tenure track professors. 
Lastl y. we control for several employer characteristics. We include detailed 
categories of employer business/industry, the region of the U.S. in which the employer is 
situated (to control fo r cost of living), and the firm size measured in terms of number of 
employees. 
In our discussion of the wage equation. we maintain the use of the Kennedy ( 1981 ) 
transformation on the coefficients of binary regressors, given in equation (7) of Chapter I. 
This will not be necessary in the actual decomposition itself3 . Table 2-3 shows the marginal 
effects of selected regressors. See Table A2-3 in Appendix 2 for the complete list. 
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In assessing re lative pay. reca ll that all individuals in the sample have earned 
doctorates. The occupational reference group includes Ph.Os in professional and sc ientific 
(P&S) occupations. Relati e to that re fe rence group. male engineers earn a 3.6% premium 
while female engineers earn a 9 .7% premium. Employment in management and 
administration brings an approximately 33% premium over the earnings or P& pos itions for 
both males and f cmales. la le and female health ervice provider earn 3~ . 7% and 12.8% 
(respectively) more than their P&S counterparts. 
Post-doctorates earn much less re lative to the other occupation categori es. For males. 
non-academic post-doctorates earn slightly more than academic post-doctorates. The ranking 
is reversed for female post-doctorates. wi th those in academia earning about 5 percentage 
points more than those not in academia. Female post-doctorates fare better than males in 
academia in that female post-doctorates earn 18% less than the ir P&S counterparts. but male 
post-doctorates earn 25% less. 
one of the four disability categories are statisticall y sign ificant in either the male or 
female wage equatio ns. lt is interesting to note that the wage penalty of disability decreases 
as the age at which disability occurs increases . T hi s inverse relationship between the age of 
disabili t) and the wage penalty of disabilit) is clear for the male sub-sample. ln the female 
sub-sample. our estimation indicates that the wage penalty of disability caused by o ld age is 
higher than the wage penalty of di sability when young. For both genders. the penalties also 
are quite small numerically: ma les di sabled at birth earn 3% less while females disabled at 
bi rth earn 8% less than their counterparts without disabilities. 
The indicators of the types of financial assistance received in the course of 
completing the Ph.D. present mixed resul ts. Males who received assistantships or 
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participated in work study programs incur a statisti call y significant wage penalty of3.44% 
relative to males who had no financial assistance of this _ort. Females on assistantships also 
earned 2.3% less. but thee timate is not statistical ! ~ different from zero. Financial assistance 
in the form o r re earch grants has a pos iti,·e and statistically s ignificant effect in both the 
ma le and female wage equations. Males and females who received research grants earn 3.9% 
and 3.2% more. respective!) . 
The vari ab le indicating financial assistance from employers fa ils to show statistical 
significance in eithe r of the wage equations. On the other hand. the variable indicating that 
the person was working with the current employer prior to obtaining or completing his or her 
Ph.D is statisticall y and numeri cally significant in both the male and female sub-samples. 
Our estimation indicates that male who worked with thei r current employers pri or to 
obtaining their Ph.Os earned 6% less than males who a lread y possessed Ph.Os when they 
first started work. holding tenure constant. The corresponding wage penalty for females is 
10%. A lthough a simple correlation of 0.29 between EMPFI DG and WKBEFOEG does not 
suggest coll inearity. it may be that the negat ive coefficients for WKBEFDEG indicate that 
employers bore part of the investment for people who worked fo r their degrees while 
employed and that employers can receive a return in the fo rm of paying lower wages than for 
other Ph. Os. 
Results fo r the Carnegie class indicators suggest that degrees earned from a Research 
I University generate higher wages relative to most other types of institutions. although the 
distinction seem to be more pronounced for males than fo r females. Degrees earned from 
private schools produce wage premiums of 6.12% for males and 4 .44% for fe males relative 
to degrees from public schools. Thi s suggests that, within a g iven Carneg ie class ification. 
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private school grad uates are perce ived as be ing of higher producti vi ty on average than public 
school graduates. 
The categories for job-degree re lationship haYe coeffic ients \\"ith expected signs: the 
less the job and degree match. the larger the wage penalt). Again. the distinction is more 
pronounced fo r ma les than fo r females. 
In di scussing the actual decomposition itse lf. we \\"ill consider the aggregate effects of 
sets of regressors. One should keep in mind the absence of any unique estimates of the 
contributions of different sets of binary variables to the gap caused by the wage structure. 
Thus any di scussion on the magnitudes of wage structure effects of binary regressors will be 
subject to the caveat that these magnitudes are conditional upon the choice of normalizing 
categories. Having said this. let u examine the results in Table 2-4. We categorize the 
regressors into 6 ma in groups: education-/degree-related variables. experi ence variables, 
occupation. industry/sector variables. employer characteristi cs. and demographics. 
In Table 2-4. negati ve values indicate factors that decrease the wage gap between 
males and females while posi tive values indicate factors that rai se the gap. In the education 
category. the wage structure e ffec t has actuall y served to c lose the gender gap even though 
these effects are numerically quite small. The cumulative wage structure effect of all 
education-/deg ree-re lated variables is-0.0 19 1 log points. or - 7.8% of the actual wage gap 
(negative indicates that the effect has a sign opposi te the sign of the actual gap). o te that 
wage structure e ffec ts are negati ve onl y when Pm < p1• since economic variables in X are 
non-negative. We can think of' the Ps as the facto r loading coefficients that translate units of 
human capita l into monetary returns. In thi s sense. the returns to education for females have 
slightl y surpassed the returns to education for males. On the other hand. the endowment 
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effects have served to widen the wage gap. In particu lar. the higher concentration of males in 
higher-pa id technical fi elds accounts for 0.0306 log points. or 12.5% of the wage gap. 
Much of the gender wage gap stems from the asymmetric valuati on of male and 
female genera l work experience. In particular. the wage structure effect o f age is 0.6 18. 
making it by far the largest effect in the decomposition. This large effect is due to a positive 
male age coefficient that is significan tl y greater than the positive female age coeffi cient. 
It is interesting to note that if we re-estimate the model using a linear specification for 
age. the resulting wage structure effect of age fa lls from 0.6 180 to 0.2384, accompanied by 
an a lmost equidistant rise in the effect contributed by the constant, from -0.4479 to - 0.0586. 
The endowment effect of age is almost unchanged at 0.0 I 08. Likewise, the effects 
u ~ 
contributed by the other facto rs change very little . Herein lies another weakness of the 
Oaxaca methodology, briefly mentioned in Oaxaca and Ransom ( 1999): a lack of invariance 
exists with respect to wage structure effects of certa in affine transformations of continuous 
\'ari ables. 
Neverthe less. the linear age specification still produces a relatively large wage 
structure effect of age. It accounts for (0.1384 I 0.2453) 100 = 97.2% of the actual wage gap. 
This may be caused by a cohort effect w ithin the fe male sub-sample. That is to say, the 
earnings profile fo r older females is likely to be fl atter than the pro file for younger females 
because the older generation of females may have had more discontinuous tenures over their 
careers compared to their younger counterparts. In thi s case, analysis using a pooled sample 
of young and old generations will result in an overall fl at earnings pro fi le for females. Thus. 
the large wage structure effect may be due more to a cohort effect than to any asymmetri c 
valuation of male-female general experience. To further investigate thi s, we performed the 
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decomposition for younger cohorts (aged less rhan 45 years) of males and females to see if 
the large wage structure effect wi ll disappear. To do thi s, it is necessary to drop industry and 
Carnegie class variables and to replace the age-specific disability variables with a single 
disability indicator due to thin samples. Apart from small changes in the magnitudes of 
effects contributed by the other factors, the wage structure effect of age is estimated to be 
0.087 1 log points, with an endowment effect of 0.00 l 5. The effect contributed by the 
constant is -0.11 33 . The actual wage gap among younger cohorts is 0.2 177. Thus, the wage 
structure effect of age accounts for 40% of the actual wage gap among younger cohorts. We 
conclude that there is indeed a cohort effect present in our reported wage structure effect fo r 
age. 
The greater tendency of females to work part time results in a 0.0297 log point 
endowment effect, which accounts for about 12% of the gap. The occupation category has 
positive endowment and wage structure effects. This means that males are more concentrated 
in higher-paying occupations, and that fema les in a given occupation generally earn less than 
their male counterparts in the same occupation. 
In the industry category. 'Employer business' denotes detailed industries in which 
employers operate. The endowment effect is negative for employer business. The sign is 
reversed for employer sector. The former, although small in magnitude (-0.9% of the actual 
gap), may be due to the higher concentration of females in the medical industry, while the 
latter ( 11 % of the actual gap) may be due to the higher concentration of males in the private 
sector. For a clearer picture of this, Table 2-5 presents in detail the components that make up 
the endowment effects for the sets of employer business and sector dummy variables. No te 
that except for Finance, all other industries have lower pay relative to the medical industry. 
Moreover, females make up I 0% more o f the medica l industry workfo rce compared to 
males. Although there are higher proportions of females in three other ·tow-pay' industries 
(Education. Other Service industries. and Public Administration). the higher concentration or 
[e males in the high-pay medical industry is suffic ient to s lightly offset these positive 
endowment e ffects. The resulting aggregate endowment effect for industry variables is 
negative, indicating that it closes the wage gap. 
On the other hand. we find that males make up 13% more of the private sector 
workforce and 1 . .I % more of the public sector' orkforce re lative to fe males. and that 
workers in all other sectors receive lower pay relative to '"·orkers in the private sector, 
ho lding industry constant. Females constitute a larger proportion of the workforce in the 
nonprofit. self-employment. and academic sectors. This is a major reason why we have a 
positive aggregate endowment effect for sector variables. 
lt is a lso interesting to note the pos itive wage structure effect of marital status and 
fami ly variables. It accounts for 27.3% of the wage gap. In particular. it suggests that married 
males with a given number of chi ldren earn more than married females with the same 
num ber of children. 
The negligible wage structure effect of disabil ity on the wage gap reflects the small 
estimated effects of disability on earnings for both sexes. The zero endowment effect is due 
to equa l proportions of males and females who are disabled. 
Overall , the model is able to explain 54% of the actual gender wage gap. That is, 54% 
of the actual gap is due to male-female differences in human capita l stock and productivity 
facto rs that were controlled for by the model. The sum of wage structure effects . comm onl y 
known as the portion of the gap unexplained by the model. represents 46% of the actual gap. 
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Oaxaca Decomposition: The Gender Wage Gap, by Race 
Table 2-6 presents the results of gender wage gap decompositions by race. The actual 
gap is largest among Hispanics and smallest among Native Americans. The gender wage 
gaps among Whites and Asians are more or less simi lar. 
For Whites. the largest endowment effect stems from the greater tendency of females - -
to work part time. which results in a positive endowment effect that accounts fo r 12.8% of 
the actual gap. The second largest endowment effect stems from age. v hich accounts for 
9.9% of the actual gap. As in the case of the pooled sample. the asymmetric valuation of 
gender-speci fie general work experi ence is the source of the largest wage structure effect. l t 
accounts for 68.2% of the actual gap. On the other hand. the wage structure effect of tenure is 
negative , with a magnitude equiva lent to 28.1 % of the actual gap. Overall , the model is able 
to explain 55.2% of the wage gap between White males and White fema les. 
For Blacks. the largest source of endowment effect is the employer sector variables. 
The greater tendency of Black females to work in academia and the public sector results in an 
endowment effect that accounts for 22.5% of the actual gap. The second largest source o f 
endowment effect is the fam il y/marital status variables. Employer reg ion variables contri bute 
a large negati ve wage structure effect that surpasses the magnitude of the actual wage gap. 
Overall. the model is able to explain 72.9% of the wage gap between Black males and 
fe males. 
The largest source of endowment effect in the Hispanic sub-sample is a lso employer 
sector. which accounts for 17 .1 % of the actual gap. The endowment effect of age accounts 
for 14. 9% of the gap. The first and second largest sources of wage structure effects are age 
and tenure, respectively. Employer sector variables contri bute negatively to the wage 
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structure effects. Overa ll. the model is able to explain 66. 7° o of the wage gap between 
Hispanic males and females . 
For Asians. the primary source of endowment effect is the occupation variables. 
Degree fi eld variab les produce the second largest endowment effect. The primary. secondar). 
and tertiary sources of wage structure effects arc age, tenure. and famil y/marital status 
, ·ariables. respectively . Note that tenure has a negative wage structure effect. Overal l. the 
model is able t0 explain 78.3% of the wage gap between Asian males and fem ales. 
For Native Americans. the endowment effect of degree field variables accounts for 
41 .4% of the wage gap between Nati ve American males and fe males. Age has an endowment 
effect of about 36. 9% of the actual gap. As with most other race sub-samples. the wage 
struc ture effect of age is large. Fami ly/marita l status variables contribute a negati ve '"age 
tructure effect that is more than twice the magnitude of the actual wage gap. This large 
negative effect is offset by the positive wage structure effects of age and employer region. 
resulting in a relatively small cumulati ve wage structure effect of 0.0436 log points. 0 erall. 
the model is able Lo explain 67.3% of the wage gap between Native American males and 
female . 
Oaxaca Decomposition: The Racial Wage Gap 
In addition to decomposing the gender wage gap, we also examine the wage gaps of 
White doctorates versus minority doctorates. The minority ethnic groups considered here are 
Hispanics. Blacks, Asians, and Native Americans. The sizes of the race sub-samples are 
2 141 3. 1274. 1329. 4165. and 217 observations fo r Whites. Hispanics. Blacks. Asians. and 
alive Americans. respectively . The relatively small sample size for ative American and 
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the requirement that Xwhn.: and Xmuwii~ contain the same set of regressors necessitates the use 
of a parsimonious specification fo r the earnings functions. 
We decompose the racial wage gaps into portions accounted for by age. tenure. 
gender. employment with current employer before completion of Ph.D. program. incidence 
of work-related training during the pas t year. part time work. family/marital status, di sabili ty. 
Ph.D. field. degree-job relationship. occupation. employer sector. employer region. and 
employer size. Table 2-7 presents the results. 
The racial wage gaps for doctorates are actually quite small. The largest gap exists 
between Whites and Native Americans. with a mean log wage ratio of 0.1176. which is less 
than half the size of the gap that exists between males and females. The smallest gap. which 
amounts to 0.0448 log points, is calculated for Whites versus Asians. The wage gap between 
Whites and Blacks is 0.0893 log points. The gap between Whites and Hispanics is 0.0785 log 
points. 
Interestingly. the largest endowment effects are contributed by employer sector 
variables regardless of the minority race in question. It accounts for 4 7.8% of the actual 
White-Black wage gap. and is positive for Hispanics, Blacks. and Nati ve Americans. Jn the 
case of Whites versus Asians. the negative endowment effect for employer sector suggests 
that Asians are more concentrated in higher-paying sectors compared to Whites. Indeed. 
according to Table 2-8. the proportion of Asians in the (highest-paid) private sector is 48.3%. 
compared to 28.7% for Whites . Moreover, the proportion of Asians in the (lowest-paid) 
academic sector is 39.6%. compared to 50.1 % for Whites. 
In the case of Whites versus Asians and Whites versus Hispanics, the second largest 
endowment effects are contributed by occupation variables. Jn the former. the positive 
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endowment effect o f occupatio n nearly offsets the nega ti ve endowment effect of employer 
sector. In other words. although Asians are more concentrated in higher-paid ec tors. they are 
also more concentrated in lo\ver-paid jobs relative to Whites. holding sector conswnt. ln the 
latter. the endowment effect or occupation widens the wage gap between Whites and 
Hispanics. 
ln the case of Whites \'ersus Blacks. the second largest endowment effect is positi,·e 
and is contributed by tenure. For Whites versus ative Ameri cans. the effect is negative and 
is contributed by age. 
A in the gender wage gap. age appears to be the main contributing factor of wage 
structure effec ts (wi th the exception of effects contributed b) the constants). For Hispanics. 
Asians. and ative Americans. the wage structure effect of age is the largest compared to 
" age structure effects of the other fac tors. These effects are positive for Asians and Nati \'e 
Americans. and negati ve fo r Hispanic . 
Overall. the model is ab le to explain 90.7% of the actual wage gap between Whites 
and Blacks. The fraction of the gap expla ined by the model is 86.4% for Whites versus 
Hispanics, 35.5% for Whites versus Native Americans. and - 18.2% fo r Whites versus 
Asians. If we folio"' . the Oaxaca convention of interpreting '"'age structure effects as due to 
di scrimination. then the (small) negati ve cumulative endowment effect in the presence of a 
pos itive wage gap suggests that in th~ absence of discrimination. Asians will earn slightly 
more than Whites. In practice. the wage structure effects may also be due to racial 
differences in unmeasured and omitted ski ll s. 
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Juhn et a l. Decomposition : Gap Differentia ls ae ro s Sectors 
The Juhn et al. decomposition wi ll allow us to compare the gender \\•age gaps of 
different sectors of the economy. The sector ' age equations upon which the decomposition 
is based are similar to the ones estimated in Chapter I. except that we now estimate them for 
males w ithin sectors. For exposition purposes. \Ve also estimated female wage reg ressions. 
Table 2-9 hows the marginal effects on annual wage of selected regressors. 
The constant terms in the fe male wage equations are greater than those in the 
corresponding sector male wage equations. The shapes of age- and tenure-earnings profiles 
are conca\'e in all sectors except the public sector. where standardized raises produce nearly 
linear tenure-earni ngs profi les. The coefficients for the variable indicating that a person was 
working" ith the current employer prior to completing hi s or her Ph.D. arc negative for all 
sectors except se lf-employment. 
The work-re lated tra in ing ariable. which ind icates whether the person received 
' "ork-re lated traini ng during the past year. show mixed results. It is stat ist i cal l ~ le s than 
zero fo r females in the nonpro fit and self-employment sectors and for males in academia. It 
fa ils to be s ignifi cant e lsewhere. 
The part time work ind icator is negati ve and significant in all sector rega rdless of 
gender. The wage reduction attributable to part time employment ranges from 27.3% for 
females in academia to 44.9% fo r e lf-employed females. Wage reductions for males who 
work part time are of similar magnitude. Persons who arc employed as post-doctorates have 
lower earnings in every sector except elf-employment. Overa ll , ma le post-doctorates in the 
nonprofit sector suffer the greatest wage penalty relati\'e to thei r P&. counterparts. Lastly. 
the wage penalty of being employed in occupations that are ·somewhat ' related rather than 
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closely re lated to the Ph.D. field averages 5.J% for ma les and 4.3% for females. The penalt) 
on abso lute ly no match between degree fi eld and occupation is about 15% on average for 
males and 9.5% on average for females. 
Table 1-1 0 shows the dccomposilion of seclor diffe rences in the gender wage gap. If 
the actual sector difference in gender gap is positive. lhcn negati ve values indicate factors 
thal decrease the sector di ffe rence. If the acwal sector diffe rence is negati ve (thi s is true for 
the public sector versus the private sector). then negative values indicate facto rs lhat increase 
the sector difference. For convenience. we a lso repon the effects of ind ividual and emplo)er 
characteristics on the sector gap differences as a percentage of the actual d ifference. Thus. a 
positi e percentage indicates a characlerislic thal increases a sector wage gap difference 
while a negali ve percentage closes the difference in wage gaps. These percentages are 
reported in parentheses. 
The observed price e ffect represents the portion o f the sector gap difference caused 
by secwr difference in the price of observed skills for males. It is calculated as 
ilXB' <PmA-Pm'\ A positive observed price e ffect (i .e. a price effecl that increases the gap in 
sector A relati,·e to the gap in sector 8 ) can occur for two reasons. It can occur if females 
have higher relati ve le, ·els of human capital in sector B (i.e. LlX8 < 0) and the price of male 
human capital is higher in sector B relative to sector A (i.e. PmA-PmB < 0). That is, if females 
are more skilled in sector B and the re lalive skill pos ition of women in sector A is held equa l 
to the skill position of women in s~c tor B. then a lower price of skill s in sector A will 
penalize females more than males. ll can also occur if females have lower relati ve levels of 
human capita l in sector B ( i.e. L\X13 > 0) and the price of male human capital is lower in 
sec tor B relati ve to sector A (i.e. PmA-Pm8 > 0). That is. if females are less skilled in sector B 
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and the re lative sk ill position of women in sector A is set equal to the ski ll position of women 
in sector B. then a higher price of sk ills in sector A wil l penal ize females more than males. 
A slightl y d ifferent interpretation is needed fo r the unobserved price effect. 
l'.l88(crmA-crm1\ In this case. the ·unobserved prices· are the standard deviations of male 
residua l wages. They represent the degree of male residual wage inequality in diffe rent 
sectors. The male-female gap in unobserved/ unmeasured skil ls and the effects of employer 
discrimination are measured using the male-female d ifference in mean residua l wages. A 
positive unobserved price effect occurs if females have lower relative levels o f unmeasured 
or omi tted ski lls in sector B (i .e. 68B > 0) and the degree of male residua l wage dispersion is 
lower in secto r B relative to sector A (i.e. cr01A-crmB > 0). The second scenario in which 
68B < 0 and cr0/ ' -cr111° < 0 easil y fo llows. ln essence. all this means that positions that are 
below average deteriorate even more when the distri butions undergo a wider dispersion. 
The interpretations of the observed X effect and the gap effect are as fo llows. 
Assuming that Xis a skill that increases producti vity (i.e. its ea rnings coefficient is positive). 
a positive observed X effect (6XA-6X3)' p1/ can occur if females are less skilled than males 
in sector A relati ve to sector B. assuming that males in both secters are absolutely more 
ski lled than fe males (i.e. 6XA > 6Xn where 6XA > 0 and 6X0 > 0). Here we see the difficulty 
involved in mak ing specific statements abom the abso lute stocks of m ale and female skills 
from a given value of observed X effect. A positi ve e ffect can occur in three situations 
(assuming that Pm A > 0): 
(a). ~A > 6XB \,\/here l'.lXA > 0 and l'.lXB > 0 
(b). l'.lXA > 0 and ~B < 0, regardless of magnitudes 
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(c). J.t.X"J < J.t.X13J where .t.XA < 0 and .t.XA < 0 
If the sign of PmA is not restricted to be positi \·e. then we ha\'e six scenarios in which the 
observed X effec t i positive. For the sake of simplici ty, we will assume in our discussions 
that males always have higher absolute stocks of human capi ta l relative to females. That is. 
we assume that .t.X > 0 for all sectors. This is not an unreasonable assumption given the 
figures in Tables 2-1 and 2-2 . The same applies to the gap effect. 
From Table 2-10. the actual gap is smallest in the public sector (0.0769 log points 
smaller than the private sector gap) and largest in the nonprofit sector (0.0946 log points 
larger than the private sector gap). According to the last row of Table 2-1 0. 
I (w' nonprofl I \\ 1 nonproft) > I (\\ , ~c l fcmp I H J scllcmp) > I (n / academia / W academia) > Oge m vv I oge YI Ill YI r oge YI m f 
indicate that the re lati ve human capi tal levels of females are highest for those self-employed 
and lowest for those in the nonprofit sector. 
The urns of observed price effects are all positive. This means that prices of skills in 
current sectors are ·unfavorab le· towards females relative to the private sector. Of course, 
whether ·unfavorable· implies higher or lower prices depends on the relati ve stock of female 
human capi ta l in the reference sector. A deta iled examination o f the components of the gap 
wi ll be necessary. 
We decompose the secLOr di ffcrences in the gender gap into portions due to 
education. work experience. occupati on. employer characteristics. and demographics. We 
will first discuss the observed X effects. Female education attainments are more s imi lar to 
male education attainments in the public, self-employment. and academic sectors compared 
to the private sector. With regards to degree field, ·s imilar ' means a more equal di stribution 
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of males and females across high and low paying field . . Ir the sector differences in male-
female educational anainments are evaluated at current sector prices. then the more equitable 
possession o f education between male. and females in se lf-employment is accountable for a 
3.3% convergence in the private and self-employment sector gender gaps. On the other hand. 
educati on is accountab le fo r a 14% di vergence between the private and public sector gender 
gaps . ector difference in m ale-female educational attainment accounts for a 129% 
convergence in academic and private sector gende r gap differential. 
Likev;ise, males and females have more equal stocks of wo rk experience in the public 
and academic sectors relative to the private sector. and less equal stocks in the nonprofi t and 
self-employment sectors. Indeed. 'vVOrk experi ence accounts fo r 2) % of the difference 
between the public and private sector gaps. Experience accounts fo r J 7% and 8% of the 
amount by which the nonprofit and self-employment sector gaps exceed the pri vate sector 
gap. respective ly. On the other hand. work experi ence accounts for a 45% convergence in 
private and academic sector gender gaps. 
The distributions of males and females among occupations with different relati ve pay 
are more equal in the nonprofit. self-employment. and academic sectors relative to the private 
sector. The occupational distribution in the public sector is roughly similar to that in the 
private sector (that is, occupation seems to be accountab le for a very small percentage of the 
gap differential between private and pub li c sectors). Occupational related factors account fo r 
a 12.5% convergence in gender gaps between the private and nonprofit sectors. They account 
for a 11 5% and an 80% convergence for the se lf-employment and academic sectors relati e 
to the pri ate sec tor. 
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The sums of observed X effects indicate that O\erall. the higher degree of gender 
difference in obser\'ed skills resu lts in a higher gender wage gap in the pri\'ate sector rclati \ c 
to self-employment. academia. and the public sector. On the other hand. a higher degree of 
gender difference in observed skills results in a higher gender wage gap in nonprofit 
institutions re lative to private firms. although th is difference is actually qui te smal l (7% of 
the actual pri\'ate-nonprofit wage gap different ial). 
We now discuss the observed price effects. The price effects attributed to education 
are positi ve in all cases (i.e. they decrease the gap differential between the private and public 
sectors, and increase the diffe renti als between the private sector and all o ther sectors) . ector 
difference in returns to education for males is responsible for a 6 1 % convergence in the 
gender gaps of the private and public sectors. It is responsible for a 28% and a 22 1% 
divergence in the nonprofit and academic sector wage gaps relative to the private sector wage 
gap. respecti vely. 
Likewise. we see that the price effects are also positive and large for work experience 
and occupation rela ted variables. eclor difference in returns to experie nce fo r males is 
respons ible for a 34% convergence in the public and pri vate sector gender gaps. It accounts 
fo r a 26% divergence in the nonprofit and pri vate sector gender gaps. and a 60% di ergence 
in the self-employment and private sector gaps. Sector difference in returns to experience 
accounts for a 260% divergence in academic-private sector gender gaps. This means that 
even though females in academia have comparable working experience relative to their male 
counterparts, higher returns to experience in academia greatly magnifies the existing female 
experience deficit in academia. The same explanation holds fo r the case of occupation related 
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facto rs. which have negative observed X effects but positive (or near zero) observed price 
effects. 
In discussing the gap and unobserved price effects. it is useful to examine the mean 
of the female residual wage derived from the male wage regression. and the standard error of 
the male residual wage indicating the degree of residual wage inequality among males. Table 
2-11 reports these values. 
The gap effect is essential ly the sector difference between the mean female residual 
wages. This is because the gap effect [(801A-et)-(81}-8r
13)lcrrn" reduces to (Sl- SrA)crrnA since 
the standardized male residual wages have zero means. Thus, (8/3 - 8r'") determines the sign 
of the gap effect. 
The large negative mean female residual wages in the private sector and in academia 
suggest that in these sectors females face a significant disadvantage with regards to the stock 
of unobserved or unmeasured skills or to any productivity factor not accounted fo r by the 
other explanatory variables. It may also mean that females are unduly disc riminated against 
in these sectors. The gap effect reports the monetary value of gender differences in 
unobserved/unmeasured ski lls and differential employer treatment by evaluating these 
differences at the ·unobserved price' cr n,A. The gap effects are negative when evaluated for 
the public, nonprofit, and self-employment sectors relative to the private sector. This means 
that in the public. nonprofit. and se lf-employment sec tors, females are situated higher in the 
male residual wage distributions compared to females in the private sector. The opposite is 
true for academia, which has a positive gap effect. The magnitudes of these effects depend on 
the magnitudes of male-female differences in unobserved productivity factors and on the 
unobserved prices attached to these factors. 
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The unobserved price effects show the impact or increasing male residual vvage 
inequality on the wage gap. assuming that female in both sectors hold the ame percentile 
rankings in the male residual wage distri butions. We note from Table 2-1 I that the largest 
di spersion or residual wages occurs in the se lf-employment sector. Recall that the 
unobser\'ed pri ce effect is (-0/1)(cr 111A-a 111
1
\ Note also that in most if not all cases the female 
residual wage from the male '"'age regression ,,·ill have mean less than zero. so the term 
(-8rB) is positive. Think of sector 13 a the normalizing. cctor. In this way. we can see that an 
increase in sector A male residual wage dispersion will increase the gender gap in sec tor A 
relative to sector B. The rationale is that an increased dispersion of vrnge increases the 
penalty of being below average in the distribution and increases the rewards of being abo,·e 
average. We therefore observe positive unobserved price effects fo r public, nonprofit. and 
self-employment sectors relative to the private sector because they all have larger standard 
errors of 0111A compared to the private sector. The negati ve unobserved price effect fo r 
academia relati ve to the pri vate sector fo llo,,·s from the same reasoning. 
Conclusions 
This chapter performs wage gap and gap differential decompositions into productivity 
facto r components and wage structure components. In the Oaxaca decomposi tion of the 
gender wage gap among doctorates. we found much of the actual gap to be attributed to an 
asymmetric valuation of gender specific general work experience. although the magnitude of 
thjs portion is highly dependent on whether age squared is included in the model. The 
invariance of wage structure effect o f certain transformations of continuous variab les 
represents one weakness of the Oaxaca method. lorco\'cr. \\'ith the linear age specification. 
we found evidence of a cohort effect in the female sub- ample that accounts for a significant 
portion of the gender wage gap. For the pooled sample of young and old cohorts, the wage 
structure effect o r age accounts for 97% of the actual gap. Restricting the sample to younger 
cohorts reduce this portion to -+o0 o. 
From the Juhn et al. decomposition of gap di fferentials across sec tors. we fo und the 
gender wage gap to be highest in the nonprofit sector and lowest in the publ ic sector. 
Moreover. the residual wages or fe males in the private and academic sector (which were 
deri ved from the residual wage distributions of their male counterparts) have large negati\'e 
means indicating much lower stocks of unobserved productivity factors relative to the ir male 
counterparts. ince private sec tor females are significantly below average in the male 
residual \'\'age distribution compared to females in the public, nonprofit, and self-employment 
sectors, it is not surprising that the gap effects in these sectors relati e to the private sector 
are all negati ve . Finally, we fo und pos iti ve unobserved price effects for the public. nonprofit. 
and self-employment sectors. and negati ve price effects for academia. relative to the private 
sector. ince females in the private sector ha\·e mean residua l wages that are far below the 
mean residual wages of females in all other sectors except academia. higher degrees of male 
residual wage dispers ions in the public. nonprofit. and self-employment sectors should 
indeed serve to increase the wage gap in these sectors relati ve to the gap in the private sector. 
Equivalentl y. the lower degree of male residual wage dispersion in academia en·es to 
lower the academic sector wage gap relati ve to the gap in the private sector. 
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Table 2- 1. ample means. by gender. 
a ri a hie Male Fema le 
,, 
ariablc Ma le Fema le 11• 
LSALARY l 1.18 10.93 0.25** PUBLIC 0 . 12 O.l I 0 .01 
AGE q8.30 46.80 1.5** NONP ROFl 0 .04 0.06 -0.02** 
MARRIED 0.85 0.68 0.17** SELFEMP 0.0-1 0 .08 -0.04** 
TENURE 11 .80 9.50 2.3** COLLt.JYR 0.38 0.39 -0.0 1 
OJT 0 .54 0.64 -0.10** C2YRHSCH 0.02 0.0-1 -0.02** 
FINAS T 0.80 0.7 1 0.09** EDU RES 0 .06 0.1 0 -0.04** 
Fl NG RANT 0 .46 0.46 0.00 PO TDOC 0 .01 0.02 -0.01** 
EMP FINDG 0 .007 0.005 0 .002" 
PART 0 .03 0. 11 -0.08** 
PRI VATE 0 .35 0.22 0 . 13** 
" ~denotes male-female difference in means. Significance is determined by a two-sample t tesr '"' ith 
unequal variances. ** denotes significance at l 0 o: • deno1es significance at 5°'o. 
Table 2-2. Sample means. by sector and gender. 
Va ria ble Pri vate o.• Public tlJ Nonprofit ~~ Sel f-emplo~ed ,\ ' Academia tll 
M F M F M F M F M F 
LSALARY 11.32 11 .09 0.23'* .. II II 10.96 0.15* * 11.1-1 10.8 1 0 33 '** 11.14 10.87 0.27** 10.98 10.7'-I 0.2-1•· 
AGE 46.50 43.30 3.20•• 48.80 -16 .00 2.80 ~ • 47.60 44 .80 :! .80** 52.90 -18.80 -1 .1ou 48.50 -14 80 3.70** 
TENURE 8.50 6.80 I 70** 11 .40 8.00 3.40*1' 9.90 6.50 3.4o·· 11.30 10.70 0 60 13 70 8.90 4.80** 
OJT 0.6 1 0.72 -0 1 IH 0.64 0.75 -0. 11 *• 0.58 0.69 -0 11 •. 0.60 0.82 -0 22 ..... 0.42 0.55 -Q. l] H 
PART 0.0-1 0.14 -0. IOH 0 02 0.06 -0 04"" 0.0-l 0.15 -0 11 .... 0 26 0.42 -0.16*• 003 0 07 -0.0-l *. 
DISABIL 0 06 0.0-l 0.0'.2* 0 06 0.06 0 00 0 05 0.06 -0 01 0.07 0.05 0 02 0 07 0 06 0.01 
POST DOC 0 01 0.01 0 00 0 05 0.08 -0 03 ... 0.05 0.06 -0 01 0.0 1 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.10 -0.03 n 
Sample s ize 6882 15-19 2253 80-l 855 -199 602 387 9910 -1657 
00 
"~ denotes ma le-female difference in meons. Significance is Jeterrnined by a two-somplc 1 test wi th unequal varinnces. """denotes significance nt 1°0; • -...J 
denotes s igndicnnce at 5° o. 
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Table 2-3. Marginal effects o r se lected regressors from the Oaxaca gender wage 
. a equations . 
ariable Ma le Female Variable Male Female 
Occugations: 
PRO CIEN normb normh 
Carnegie Class: 
RESC ll UI normb normh 
ENG IN EER 3.57* 9.74* RESC HU2 -5.49"'* -6.77** 
ADMIN 33.50** 34 .30** PHDUI -5.90** -1.00 
SERVICES -8.54* -6.6 1"' PHDU2 -5.40"'* -0.92 
SALETEC H 1.44 0.66 COM PREU -6.57 -0.83 
llLTHSERV 32. 70*"' 12.80** LA UI 5. 16 -6.98 
ACPDOC -24 .60** -17.80** RELIGU -29.70* -8.27 
NACPDOC -23 .10"'* -22.40** MEDIC ALU -0.68 6.62 
Disabili t~ : HLTHU 7.07 -9.39 
DIFBIR -3.03 -8.09 ENG i u - 1.88 8.01 
YDISABIL -1.1 4 -3.24 OTHERU -1 2.50* -1 2.50 
MDISABIL - 1.03 -0.58 Priv/Pub School: 
001 AB IL 0.03 -4 .49 PRIVEDUC 6.12"'* 4.44"'* 
PhD Fin. Asst: Job/Degree Reface: 
FIN ASST -3.44** -2.32 OCEDHIGH normb norm" 
FING RANT 3.92"'* J. 16"' OCEDM ED -3.12** -2.47 
EMPFINDG -3.19 0.57 OCEDZERO -8.14** -4.44 
Work before deg: 
WKBEFDEG -6.04** -10.10** 
a Marginal effects are I OOg* = I OO(( WI()> 1 - WJ0 0) I WID 0), where W denotes annual salary and D denotes the 
binary regressor. ** denotes significance at I%: *denotes significance at 5%. 
b ·norm ' denotes the nonnalizing category. 
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Table 2-4. Decomposition of the gender wage gapa. 
Variable Ca tego ry 
Educat ion/Degree Related : 
PhD financial assistance 
Work-related training 
Degree fi eld 
Carnegie class I Private school 
Work Experience: 
Age ( includes age squared) 
Tenure (includes tenure squared) 
Working pan time 
Occupation Related: 
Degree - job relationship 
Occupation 
Industry: 
Sector 
Employer business 
Employer Characteristics: 
Employer region 
Employer size 
Demoe.raphics: 
Race I ethnici ty 
Family I marital stanis 
Disabil ity 
Cons tant: 
One 
um of Effects: 
Act ual Log Wage Ratio: 
Endowments ( X' Pml 
-0.0034 
0 .00 15 
0 .0306 
0.0005 
0.0133 
0.01 19 
0.0297 
-0.0025 
0.0047 
0.0281 
-0.0022 
-0.0032 
0.0097 
-0.00 12 
0 .01 47 
0 .0000 
0.1322 
0.2453 
Wage Stru cture ( Xr' .1P) 
-0.00 I 0 
-0.0045 
-0 .0 125 
-0.0011 
0.6 180 
-0.0654 
0.0011 
-0.0037 
0.0085 
0.0358 
-0.071 1 
-0.0228 
0 .01 46 
-0.0028 
0.0669 
0.0007 
-0.4479 
0 .11 28 
• Effects may not sum due to round ing error. For a very detailed listing of the component effects of the 
Oaxaca gender wage gap decomposition , see Table A2-S in Appendix 2. 
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Table 2-5. Detailed listing of endov ment effect components for employer business and 
employer sector variables. 
Variable ( X"' - Xr) P"' 
Emglover Business 
MEDIC -0.1018 norm'' 
AG RI 0.0101 -0. 1660 
BlOTECH 0.0021 -0.0423 
co MrNE 0.0059 -0.1123 
EDUC -0.0645 -0.1670 
Fl A CE 0.0054 0.086 7 
TNFOTECH 0.0320 -0 .0692 
OTHSERV -0.0113 -0.0779 
MANUFACT 0.0636 -0.1226 
PUBADM IN -0.0046 -0.0773 
RESEARCH 0.05 10 -0.0221 
TRAN UTIL 0.0109 -0.0495 
TRA DE 0.0013 -0.4194 
ector 
PRIVATE 0.1295 norm• 
PUBLIC 0.0 106 -0.2740 
ON PRO FT -0.0208 -0.2 169 
SELFEMP -0.0-172 -0.0067 
COLL4YR -0.0024 -0.2289 
C2YRH SCH -0.0251 -0.3812 
EDU RE -0.0446 -0.3608 
• ·norm · denotes the normalizing category. 
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Table 2-6. Decomposition of the gender wage gap. by race . 
Variable Catego r) EndO\\ men1s (j X' P111) Wage lructurc ( x,· Pl 
Whites 
Cduca1ion'Degree Related: 
Work-related training 0.0027 0.000-1 
Degree field o.o:w2 0.0035 
Working before degree 0.001-1 0.004 2 
Work ExQericncc: 
Age (linear specification) 0.0273 0. 1887 
Tenure (includes tenure squared) 0.0207 -0.0778 
Working part time 0.0354 -0.0040 
OccuQation Related: 
Degree - job relationship -0.0032 -0.0038 
Occupation 0.0073 0.0065 
EmQloyer Characteristics: 
Employer region -0.0043 -0.0297 
Employer size 0.0087 0.0027 
Employer sector 0.0243 0.0219 
DemograQh 1cs: 
Family ' mar11al status 0.0125 0.0443 
Disabili ry -0.0004 -0.0009 
Constant: 
One -0.0320 
um of Effect s: 0. 1526 0.124 1 
Actual Log Wage Ratio: 0.2767 
Blacks 
Education Degree Related: 
Work-related training 0.0009 -0.0309 
Degree field 0.0179 0.0240 
Working before degree 0.0015 -0.0090 
Work Exgerience: 
Age ( linear specification) 0.0295 0. 133 1 
Tenure (includes tenure squared) 0.01 77 0.0-97 
Worl-.ing pan time 0.0050 -0.0086 
OccuQat ion Related: 
Degree - job relationship -0.0039 -0.0 168 
Occupation -0.0190 0.0623 
EmQIO):'.er Characteristics: 
Employer region -0.0056 -0.1656 
Employer size 0.0065 -0 .0047 
Employer sector 0.0360 -0.0077 
Demogragh ics: 
Family marital stalUs 0.0298 0.04 72 
Disabilit) 0.0007 -0.0079 
Constant: 
One -0.0320 
um of Effects: 0.1168 0.0433 
Actual Log Wage Ratio: 0. 1602 
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Table 2-6. (continued) 
Va ria ble Ca tegory Endowments(,.', X' Pm) Wage tructure ( x,· p) 
Hispanics 
Education/Degree Related: 
Work-related Lrainmg -0.0031 0.0508 
Degree field 0.0204 0.0501 
Working before degree -0 .0005 -0.0050 
Work Exgerience: 
Age (linear specification} 0.0482 0.3423 
Tenure (includes tenure squared) 0.0365 0.0900 
Working pan time 0.0188 -0.0098 
Occugation Related: 
Degree - job relationshi p -0.0032 0.0494 
Occupation 0.0277 -0.0305 
Emgloyer Characteristics: 
Employer region 0.0051 -0.0067 
Employer size -0.0099 0.0083 
Employer sector 0.055 1 -0.0784 
Demograghics: 
Family 1 marital status 0.020 1 0.0548 
Disabilit) I 33 16E-05 -0.00 I 0 
Constant: 
One -0.4064 
Sum of Effects : 0.2 152 0.1076 
Actua l Log Wage Ratio: 0.3228 
Asian 
EducationfDegree Related: 
Work-related training 0.0005 -0.0372 
Degree field 0.0437 0.027 1 
Working before degree 0.0006 0.0052 
Work Exgerience: 
Age ( linear specification) 0.0197 0. 181 3 
Tenure (i ncludes tenure squared) 0.02 19 -0.079 1 
Working pan Lime 0.0 151 -0.0143 
Occugation Related : 
Degree - job relationsh ip -0.0002 -0.0097 
Occupation 0.0675 0.0 154 
Emglover Characteristics: 
Employer region -0.0034 0.0024 
Employer s ize -0.0002 0.0244 
Employer sector 0.0416 0.0371 
Demograghics: 
Family marital status 0.0064 0.0543 
Disability -0.0002 0.0026 
Constant: 
One -0.1506 
Sum of Effects: 0.21 32 0.0590 
Actua l Log Wage Ratio: 0.2722 
Table 2-6. (continued) 
Variable C atcgo r) 
Nati\•e America ns 
Educat ion/Degree Related: 
Work-related rraining 
Degree field 
Working before degree 
Work Experience: 
Age (linear specification) 
Tenure ( includes tenure squared) 
Working part time 
Occupation Related: 
Degree - job relationship 
Occupation 
Emplover Characteristics: 
Employer region 
Employer size 
Employer sector 
Demoe.raphics: 
Family marital status 
Disability 
Constant: 
One 
Sum of Effects: 
Actual Log Wage Ratio: 
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Endowments 0 x· Pml Wage tructure ( Xr' ~p) 
-0.00 19 -0.0636 
0.0553 -0.0366 
0.0077 0.0208 
0.0492 0.8894 
-0.0111 -0.1 35 1 
0.0030 0.0201 
-0.020 I -0.0 167 
0.0069 0.0033 
-0.0257 0.1890 
0.0372 -0.0244 
0.0310 -0.1825 
-0.0380 -0.2291 
-0.0047 0.0751 
-0.466 1 
0.0898 0.0436 
0.1335 
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Table 2-7. Decomposition of the racial wage gaps. 
Whites versus: Blacks Hi panics Asians Native 
Americans 
Endowments (( X .. 1o ... -Xr111nnn1y)' P .. 11110) 
Gender: 
Male 0.0148 0.0067 -0.0058 0.0064 
Education/Degree Related: 
Working before degree 0.0013 0.0017 -0.0033 0.0061 
Work-related training 0.0038 0.0014 0.0001 0.0053 
Degree tield 0.0063 1.904E-05 -0.0170 0.0 105 
Work Experience: 
Age (linear specification) 0.0055 0.0185 0.0359 -0.02 l l 
Tenure (includes tenure squared) 0.0197 0.0157 0.0324 -0.0100 
Working part time -0.0045 -0.0064 -0.0 134 -0.0058 
Occupation Related : 
Degree-job relationsh ip -0.0008 -0.002-1 0.0025 -0.0014 
Occupation -0.0066 0.0198 0.0437 -0.0 l 09 
Employer Characteristics: 
Sector 0.0427 0.0223 -0.0497 0.0320 
Employer region -0.0025 -0.0040 -0.0068 0.0184 
Employer size -0.0054 -0.0057 -0.0076 0.003 1 
Demograph ics: 
Family I marital status 0.0071 0.0006 -0.008 I 0.0055 
Disabi lity -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0035 
Wage tructure (X' minomy(f3,.1111e-Pm111on1>)) 
Gender: 
Male 0.0413 0.00 1 I 0.0449 0.0310 
Education/Degree Related: 
Working before degree 0.0046 0.0078 -0.0008 -0.02 I 4 
Work-related training -0.02 I 9 -0.02 15 -0.0 I 05 -0.0616 
Degree field -0.0343 -0.0 136 -0 .0056 0.1089 
Work Experience: 
Age (linear specification) -0.0283 -0.1229 0. 1105 0. 1832 
Tenure (includes tenure squared) -0.0281 -0.0322 -0.0085 0. 1085 
Working part time -0.0 102 -0.0056 -0.0065 -0.0082 
Occupation Related: 
Degree-job relat ionship 0.0072 -0.0043 -0.0004 -0.0 143 
Occupation -0.0 I 57 0.0256 0.0005 0.0270 
Ernplo:ter Characteristics: 
Sector 0.0809 0.0444 -0.0313 0.0870 
Employer region 0.0049 -0.0870 -0.0 163 -0. I 272 
Employer size 0.0022 0.0022 0.0030 -0.0354 
Demographics: 
Family I marital status 0.0106 -0.0029 0.0367 0.0412 
Disability -0.001 2 -0.0006 -0.00 17 0.0238 
Constant: 
One -0.0038 0.220 1 -0.06 10 -0.2666 
Sum of Endowment 0.08 10 0.0679 -0.0081 0.0416 
Sum of Wage Structure 0.0082 0.0106 0.0530 0.0759 
Actual Log Wage Ratio 0.0893 0.0785 0.0448 0. 11 76 
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Table 2-8. Means of variables used in rac ia l wage gap decompositions. by race. 
Variable White Black Hispa nic Asian Native Amer. 
LSALARY 11 .07 10.98 10.99 11 .02 10.95 
AGE 47.95 47.25 45.56 43.32 50.68 
TENURE 11 .30 8.86 9.41 7.64 12.89 
MALE 0 77 0.65 0.72 0.82 0.72 
WKBEFDG 010 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.17 
OJT 0.54 0.70 0.60 0.54 0.76 
PART 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 
MARRIED 0.79 0.65 0 75 0.86 0.71 
MARWTHCH 0 41 0.41 0.45 0.56 0.36 
DISABIL 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.17 
COMMA TH 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.02 
LIFESCI norm a 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.27 
PHYSCI 0.20 0.12 0.18 0.22 0.16 
SOCSCI 0.31 0.47 0.35 0.10 0.47 
ENGi NRG 0.14 0.11 0 14 0.37 0.07 
OCEDHIGH norm a 0.71 0.73 0.76 0 65 0.77 
OCEDMED 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.15 
OCEDZERO 0.07 0.06 0 05 0.08 0.07 
PROSCIEN norm a 0.64 0.61 0.67 0.56 0.65 
ENGINEER 0.11 0.08 0 12 0.27 0.07 
ADMIN 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.16 
SERVICES 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 
SALETECH 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
HLTHSERV 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 
POSTDOC 0.04 0.05 0 07 0.11 0.02 
PRIVATE norm0 0.29 0.19 0.24 0.48 0.19 
PUBLIC 0 11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.13 
NONPROFT 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 
SELFEMP 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.06 
ACADEMIA 0 50 0.61 0 58 0.40 0.60 
PACIFIC norm0 0.17 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.16 
NENGLAND 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.02 
MATLANT 0.16 0.18 015 0.19 0.08 
ENCENTRL 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13 
WNCENTRL 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 
SATLANT 0.19 0.30 0.18 0.15 0.12 
ESCENTRL 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.10 
WSCENTRL 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0 17 
MOUNTAIN 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.16 
EMSIZE1 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.10 
EMSIZE2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 
EMSIZE3 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 
EMSIZE4 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 
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Table 2-8. (continued) 
Variable White Black Hispa nic Asian Native Amer. 
EMSIZE5 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 
EMSIZE6 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.04 
EM SIZE? norm a 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.67 
• ·norm ' denote the normalizing categories for sets o f binary regressors in the decomposition. 
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Table 2-9. Marginal effects of selected regressors for the Juhn et al. wage equations. by 
sector and gendern. 
Variable Pr ivate Public Nonproft elf-emp. Academia 
M F M F M F M F M F 
CONSTANT 9.2** 9.8** 9 6** 9.8** 8.9** 9.4** 8.8** 9.5** 9.7** 9.7** 
AGE 7.8** 5.6** 5.3** 3.7 ... 8.5"* 6.0"* 9.4** 6.3 4.0** 3.9** 
AGESQR -0.1 ... -0 .1 ** -0.04 ... -0 03* -0.1 •• -0.1 ** -0.1 ** -0.1 -0 03** -0.04** 
TENURE 7.3** 1.4* 0.3 1.3 1.3 3.1 •• 3.6** 3.0*'" 1.6** 2.4** 
TENSOR -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.0 -0.01 -0.1 * -0.1 0.0 -0 .03** -0.03* 
WKBEFDEG -4 .0* -8.5 -11 .8** -8.2 -7.0 -15.0** 13.1 -14.0 -8.7 .. -12.3** 
OJT 2.0 4.8 0.1 -2 .0 -4.4 -10.1 * -10.7 -27.5** -4.3** -1 .2 
PART -31 .9** -33.4 "* -39.3*" -36.9** -37.1° -34.9** -36.7** -44.9** -31 .7** -27.3** 
POSTDOC -34.2** -40.9** -28.0** -30.0** -41 .1** -33.5** -15.7 22.7 -32.9** -29.5** 
OCEDHIGH norm0 norm0 normb norm0 norm0 norm0 norm0 norm0 normb norm0 
OCEDMED -3.0* -0.1 ** -5.7'"' -0.3 -8.2* -8.4 -6.6 -9.2 -2.9* -3.8* 
OCEDZERO -6.2** 0.6 -14.8** -0.5 -19.0* -21 .7* -28.9** -19.4 -6.3 -5.4 
4 Effect of a continuous regressor is I OO(ol og.,( W) t 8X). Effect of a binary regressor is I OOg* = 
I OO((Wl0 1 - WID 0) J Wl0 0), where W denotes annual salary. ** denotes significance at I 0 o: * denotes 
significance at 5%. 
b ·norm ' denotes the normalizing category. 
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Table 2-10. Decomposition 0f sector differences in the gender wage gap". 
o publir _o pmal< o nonprOfl-opri\ Ale 0 ••lf•m11_ 0 I" ''air o •<>dtm1• - o '"" ... 
Actual Gap: -0.0769 0.0946 0.039 1 0.0094 
Observed X Effect b: 
Education: -0.0104( 14°0) 0.0006( 1%) -0.001 3(-3%) -0 .012 1(-129° 0) 
Degree fie ld -0.0 108 0.0008 -0.0078 -0.0151 
Working before degree 0.0004 -0.000 I -0.0053 0.002 1 
Work-related tra in ing 0.0000 -0 .000 I 0.0 I I 8 0.0009 
Work Exgerience: -0.0 I 62(2 l 0 o) 0.0158( I 7%) 0.0030(8°0) -0.00-12(-45°0) 
Age -0.00-17 -0.0058 -0.0 13 1 0.0036 
Tenure 0.0148 0.0180 -0.0 181 0.01 77 
Working part time -0.0263 0.0036 0.0282 -0. 0255 
Occugarion Related : 0.0070(-9%) -0.0 118(- 13%) -0.04-l9(- I I 5%) -0 .007 5(-80°/o) 
Degree - job relationship 0.0075 0.0 10 1 -0.0264 0.0034 
Occupation -0.0005 -0.02 19 -0.0 185 -0.0 I 09 
Emglover Characteristics: -0.0002( I%) 0.0052(6%) 0 .0007(2~0) -0.0053(- -6~0} 
Employer region -0.0002 0.0052 0.0007 -0.0053 
Demogragh ics: 0.0060(-8° o) -0.0033(-4%) -0 .009 I (-23%) 0.0031 (33° o) 
Race ethnicity 0.0028 -0.00 17 o.oo::n 0.0009 
Fami ly 1 marital status 0.002 1 0.0001 -0.0 I 08 0.0019 
Disabili ty 0.00 1 I -0.00 17 -0.00 I 0 0.0003 
Observed Price Effects': 
Education: 0.0469(-61 %) 0.0262(28° 0) 0.0064( 16%) 0.0208(22 I 0 o} 
Degree fi eld 0.0451 0.0192 -0.0087 0.0 138 
Working before degree -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0002 
Work-related training 0.002 1 0.007 1 0.014 5 0.0072 
Work Exgerience: 0.0265(-34%) 0.0242(26%) 0.0234(60%) 0.0244(260%) 
Age 0.0098 0.0071 -0.0069 0.0 185 
Tenure 0.0055 0.0093 0.023 1 0.0059 
Working part time 0.0112 0.0078 0.0072 0.0000 
Occugation Related : 0.0022(-3%) 0.0212(22%) 0.0537( 137%) 0.0141 ( 150%) 
Degree - job relationship -0.0036 -0.0059 -0.0083 0.0000 
Occupation 0.0058 0.0271 0.0620 0.0 141 
Emgloyer Characteristics: 0.0003(-0.4%) -0.0022(-2%) 0.00 12(3%) 0.0013( 14%) 
Employer region 0.0003 -0.0022 0.00 12 0.001 3 
Demograghics: -0.0086( 1 1 % ) -0.0042(-4%) 0.0071 ( 18°0) -0.0020(-2 1 %) 
Race 1 ethnicity 0.0000 0.0040 -0.0030 0.0016 
Family t marital status -0.0081 -0.0094 0.0 11 8 -0.0032 
Disability -0.0005 0.001 2 -0.00 I 7 -0.0004 
Gap Effectd: -0. 1403( 182%) -0.2 I 00(-222%) -0.4820(-1 233%) 0.0268(285%) 
Unobserved Price Effectc: 0.0091(- 12%) 0.2326(246%) 0.4870( I 246%) -0.0500(-532%) 
Sum of Observed X: -0.0 138 0.0065 -0.0516 -0.0260 
Table 2- 10. (continued) 
um of Observed Price: 
Actu a l Gap: 
0.0673 
-0.0769 
QC) 
0 0652 
0 .09-16 
0.0918 
0.0391 
• For a very detailed li sting of the componcn1 effects of the Juhn ct al. decomposition. see Table A2-7 in 
Appendix 2. Effects as percentages of the actual gaps arc in paren1heses. A negati ve percentage denotes a 
factor that causes a convergence between the private sector and sector ·A· gender gaps. A positi\ e 
percentage denotes a factor that widens the difference between pri,ate sector and sector 'A · gender gaps. 
b Observed X effect - (..lXA-..lXP"'-." )' Pm' \\ here \X°' = Xm' - X1 ' 
' Observed pnce effect = (..lXP"'"' )' (p111·'-P1/"'""l 
J Gap effect (j0 ' - E1P"' 0" ) crm., ''here 0' - Om' - 9r' 
< Unobsen ed price effect = jSP"' 31°(crm "-crn.r'""") 
Table 2- 11. tati stics for male a nd female residual wages, bv secto r. , 
Private Public Nonprofit Self-emp. 
Mean female 
residual wage 
from male wag~ 
regression (9r) -21 .33 - 1.7 1 -9.43 -5.02 
Standard error 
of male residua l 
wage (crm) 0.0067 0.007~ 0.0 176 0.0296 
Academia 
-27.45 
0 .0044 
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APPE DIX 2 
Table A2-I. De finitions and de criptivc statistics o f variables used in the Oaxaca 
decompositiona. 
ariable 
L /\LARY 
AGE 
fENUR -
WKBEFDEG 
EMPFINDG 
Fl A T 
Fl GRA 1 
OJT 
PAR r 
WHITC 
HI PA IC 
BLACK 
A IA 
J\TIVE 
MARR IED 
MARWTl lCH 
DIFBIR 
YD IS/\BIL 
MD I AB IL 
ODISAB IL 
CO M Cl 
MATll 
AG 
BIO 
E VIRO 
Cll [M 
CARTll 
PllY IC 
OTHPH Y 
cco 
POL Cl 
P YCll 
oc 
0 rll oc 
AERO 
Cll EME 
CIVIL!: 
EE 
IE 
MC 
OTHI:. 
RE CHUI 
RESCHU2 
Definition 
Log annual salary 
Age 
Tenure 
Worked with current emplo) er prior 10 completing Ph.D 
Employer helped finance Ph.D studies 
Recei ed assistantship during Ph.D 
Received research grant during Ph.D 
Received work related training during the past year 
Currently working part time 
Race indicator 
Race indicator 
Race indicator 
Race indicator 
Race indicator: ative Americans 
Marital status indicator 
Married. spouse present. with at least one child <- 18 years old 
Disabled at birth 
Disability occurred at age 29 or younger 
Disability occurred al age 30 through 65 
Disability occurred at age 66 or older 
Degree field for Ph .D: Computer and information sciences 
Degree field for Ph .D: Mathematical !)Ciences 
Degree field for Ph.D: Agricultural and food sc iences 
Degree field for Ph.D: Biological sciences. including biochem. 
Degree field for Ph .D: Environmental sciences 
Degree field for Ph.D. Chemistry. excl uding biochemist!) 
Degree field for Ph.D Earth science. geolog). oceanograph~ 
Degree fi eld for Ph .D. Physics and astronomy 
Degree field for Ph.D: Other physical sciences 
Degree field for Ph.D. Economics 
Degree field for Ph.D. Political science 
Degree field for Ph.D: Psycholog) 
Degree field for Ph.D: ociology 
Degree fi eld for Ph.D: Other social sciences 
Degree field for Ph.D: Aerospace engineering. 
Degree field for Ph.D: Chemica l engineering 
Degree field for Ph.D: Civil engineering 
Degree field for Ph.D: Electrica l engineering 
Degree field for Ph.D: Industrial engineering 
Degree field for Ph.D: Mechanical engineering 
Degree field for Ph.D: Other engineering fields 
Carnegie class of school : Research Univcrsit) I 
Carnegie class of school: Research Universi ty II 
Mea n 
M 
11.17 
-l8.35 
11.76 
0.09 
0.01 
0 .80 
0.46 
0.5-1 
0.03 
0.8-1 
0.02 
0.02 
0.12 
0 .003 
0 .85 
0.50 
0 .06b 
0 .28b 
0.66b 
O.Ol h 
0.01 
0.06 
0.04 
0.21 
0.0 1 
0.11 
0.03 
0.08 
0.003 
0.04 
0.03 
0.12 
0.03 
0 .02 
0 .0 1 
0.03 
0.02 
0.05 
0.01 
0.02 
0.06 
0.76 
0.12 
• 'M' denotes statistics for the male sub-sample: · F. denotes statistics for the female sub-sample. 
h These are averages over the disabled sub-sample. 
Mean 
F 
10.93 
46.79 
9.-16 
0.09 
0.01 
0.71 
0 -16 
0.6-1 
0 12 
0.86 
0.03 
0.03 
0.08 
0.00..J 
0.68 
0.40 
0.061J 
0.28b 
0.64h 
O.Ol h 
0.0 1 
0.03 
0.02 
0 .32 
0 .003 
0 .07 
0.01 
0 02 
0.003 
0.03 
0.03 
0.30 
0.08 
0.04 
0.00 1 
0.004 
0 .002 
0 .0 1 
0 004 
0 .003 
0.02 
0.76 
0 10 
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Table A2- I . {continued) 
ariab le 
PHO 1 
PHOU:; 
COMPREU 
LASUI 
RELIGU 
MEDICALU 
HLTH U 
E GfNU 
OTHERU 
PRJVEDUC 
OCEDHIGII 
OCEDMED 
OCEDZERO 
PROSCIEN 
ENG i EER 
ADM! 
ER VICES 
ALETECH 
HLTH ERV 
ACPDOC 
NACPDOC 
PR IVATE 
PUBLIC 
0 PROFT 
ELFEMP 
COLL-lYR 
C2YRHSCH 
EDU RE 
MEDIC 
AGRI 
BIOTECH 
CON MIN E 
EDUC 
Fl A CE 
I FOTECII 
OTHSERV 
MANUFACT 
PUBADMIN 
RESEARCH 
TRANUTIL 
TRADE 
PACIFIC 
NE GLA D 
MATLA T 
E CE TRL 
W CE TRL 
SATLA T 
ESCENTRL 
WSCENTRL 
Definition Mean 
M 
Carnegie class of school. Doctoral Uni\ersit~ I 0.07 
Carnegie class of school Doctoral Unin~rsll) I I 0.0-t 
Carnegie class of school : Comprehensive Universit) I 0.003 
Carnegie class of school : Liberal ans colleges I 0.002 
Carnegie class of school: Theologica l sl.!minary, bible co llege 0.00 I 
Carnegie class of school : Medical schools 0.0 I 
Carnegie class of school : I lea Ith service universities 0.00 I 
Carnegie class of school : chools of engineering. technolog) 0.002 
Carnegie class of school : Other specialized technical instiwtes 0.003 
Private Public school 111d1cator 0.32 
Relationship between Ph.D field and job: related 0.69 
Relationsh ip between Ph.D field and job: somewhat related 0.24 
Relationship between Ph.D field and job: not related 0.07 
Occupation: Professional and scientific 0.60 
Occuparion: Engineer 0.15 
Occupation: Management and administration 0.16 
Occupation: Services 0.03 
Occupation: Sales. marketing. technolog). and technical 0.02 
Occupation: Health services 0.03 
Occupation: Academic post-doctorate 0.0 I 
Occupation: Non-academic post-docorate 0.003 
Employer sector: Private for pro lit sector 0.35 
Employer sector: Public sector, government 0. 12 
Employer sector: Private not-for-profit sector 0.04 
Employer sector: elf-employment 0.04 
Employer sector· Four~ ear colleges 0.38 
Emplo) er sector: T\\ o } ear colleges or IO\\ er 0.02 
Employer sector: Temporal) teaching. non-tenure track. 
post-doctorates 0.06 
lndusrry: Medical 0.1 O 
Industry: Agriculture. fishing and forestry 0.02 
Industry: Biotechnology 0.03 
Industry: Construc1ion and mining 0.0 I 
lndustl) : Educa1ion 0.42 
Industry: Finance 0.0 I 
Industry: Information technolog) 
Industry: Other service indus1ries 
Industry: Manufacturing 
Industry: Public administration 
Industry: Research companies 
Industry: Transportation and ut ilities 
Industry: Retail and wholesale trade 
Employer region: Pacific coast 
Emplo) er region: e" England 
Emplo)er region: Middle Atlantic 
Employer region: East onh Central 
Employer region: West onh Central 
Employer region: South Atlantic coast 
Employer region: East South Central 
Employer region: West South Central 
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0.0004 
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0.00001 
0.0003 
0.01 
0.35 
0. 7-t 
0.21 
0.06 
0.66 
0.03 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.08 
0.02 
0.01 
0.32 
0.11 
0.06 
0.08 
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0.04 
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0.20 
0.007 
0.02 
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0.-19 
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Table A2-1 . (continued) 
ariable Definition Mean Mean 
M F 
MOUNT Al Employer region: Mountain 0.07 0.06 
EMSIZE I Employer size: • I 0 emplo) ces 0.08 0.13 
EM IZE2 1::.mployer size: I 0 to 24 employees 0.02 0.02 
EMS IZE3 Emp loyer size: 25 to 99 employee~ 0.04 0.04 
EMSIZE4 Employer size: I 00 to 499 employees 0.09 0.10 
EM SIZES Employer size: 500 to 999 employees 0.04 0.05 
EMSIZE6 Employer size: I 000 to 4999 employees 0.11 0.10 
EM IZE7 Employer size: > 5000 employees 0.62 0.56 
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Table A2-2. Means of variables used in the Juhn et al. decomposi tion. by secLOr and 
gender3 . 
a riable Private Public Non pro ft clfemp Academia 
M F M F M F M F M F 
L ALARY 11 .32 11.09 I I. I I 10 .96 I I. 14 10.81 11.14 10.87 10.98 10.74 
AGE 46.53 43.34 48.82 45.99 47.57 44 .83 52 .92 48 .76 48.51 44 .82 
TENURE 8.50 6.84 11 .44 7 .96 9 .94 6.49 11.26 10.7 1 13.67 8.92 
WKBEFDEG 0 .07 0.06 0. 11 0 . 11 0 . 10 0 . 10 0. 10 0 . 10 0 . 12 0. 14 
OJT 0 .6 1 0.72 0.64 0 .75 0 .58 0.69 0.60 0.82 0.42 0.55 
PART 0.04 0.14 0.02 0 .06 0 .04 0 . 15 0.26 0.42 0.04 0.07 
WHITI:. 0.76 0.78 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.88 0.93 0.94 0 .84 0.83 
111 PA IC 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 .02 0.03 
BLACK 0.01 0 .02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 
A IA 0.21 0.18 0.10 0.09 (). I 0 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.09 
ATIVE 0 .002 0.003 0.002 0.01 0.00 I 0.002 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.003 
MARR IED 0 .85 0.71 0.82 0.64 0.82 0.67 0.80 0.67 0 .83 0 .66 
MARWTHCH 0.50 0.42 0.43 0.36 0.44 0.36 0 .39 0.41 0.42 0.35 
DISABIL 0.06 0 .04 0 .06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0 .06 
CO MMA T H 0.06 0.05 0 .03 0.02 o.o- 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.09 0 .05 
LIFE C l 0 . 19 0.28 0 .28 0.37 0.26 0.30 0. 16 0.09 0.30 0 .41 
PHY SC I 0 .30 0.2 1 0.27 O.OQ 0. 17 0.04 0. 15 0.02 0. 19 0.08 
SOCSC I 0 . 12 0.36 0.26 0.48 0.40 0.63 0 .58 0.87 0.28 0.44 
E G INRG 0 .33 0. 10 0. 16 0.04 0 .13 0.02 0 . 10 0.01 0. 14 0 .03 
OCEDl-llG H 0 .5 1 0.57 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.63 0 .83 0.85 0 .82 
OCED MED 0 .35 0.31 0.30 0.27 0 .30 0.26 0.22 0. 12 0. 13 0 . 16 
OCEDZERO 0 . 14 0. 11 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.07 0 . 15 0.06 0.02 0.02 
PRO CIEN 0.44 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.52 0.55 0 .64 0.83 0.65 0 .62 
ENG INEER 0 .25 0 09 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.0 1 0.12 0.02 
ADMIN 0 .22 0. 18 0. 18 0. 18 0.25 0.21 0 .07 0.02 0.08 0.07 
ER V ICES 0 .02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0 .08 0.06 0.04 0 .07 
SA LETECH 0 .05 0.02 0.01 0 .01 0.01 0.01 0 .05 0.03 0.002 0 .001 
HLTH ERV 0 .02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0. JO 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.11 
POST DOC 0 .01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.11 
PACIFIC 0 .22 0.22 0. 18 0.20 0.20 0. 17 0.29 0.30 0. 14 0 .16 
E GLA D 0 .08 0 .08 0.03 0.05 0. 10 0. 11 0 .07 0.07 0.09 0 .09 
MATLANT 0 .20 0.21 0.08 0.08 0. 17 0. 19 0 .20 0. 19 0. 15 0 . 18 
ENCENTRL 0 . 14 0. 14 0.08 0.07 0. 16 0. 16 0.09 0.08 0. 16 0.16 
WNCE TRL 0 .05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.09 0 .07 
SATLANT 0 . 15 0 . 17 0.40 0.44 0. 19 0. 16 0 . 15 0. 16 0. 16 0. 17 
ESCENTRL 0 .03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0 .03 0.02 0 .06 0 .05 
W CENTRL 0 .08 0.07 0 .06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0 .09 0 .07 
MOUNTA IN 0 .06 0 .04 0 . 11 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 
"'M ' denotes s tat is tics for the male sub-sample: ·F' denotes stat ist ics for the female sub-sample. 
I 0-t 
Table A2-3. Wage regress ions used in the Oaxaca gender wage gap decompo itiona. 
ariable p td. Er.(p) t-. tat P > !ti I 95% Conf. Interva l! 
Male sub-sam11Je 
AGE 0 077 0 006 12.201 0.000 0065 0 090 
AGESQR -0 001 0 000 -11 026 0 000 -0 .001 -0 001 
TENURE 0.007 0.002 3.833 0.000 0.003 0.010 
TENSOR 0.000 0.000 -0.968 0.333 0.000 0 000 
WKBEFDEG -0.062 0.013 -4 .627 0.000 -0.089 -0.036 
EMPFINDG -0.032 0 032 -0 999 0 318 -0 095 0.031 
FINASST -0.035 0 011 -3.238 0.001 -0 056 -0 014 
FIN GRANT 0.038 0 009 4.458 0 000 0.022 0.055 
OJT -0.015 0.008 -1 .783 0.075 -0.031 0.001 
PART -0.367 0 041 -9 059 0.000 -0 447 -0 288 
HISPANIC 0 026 0 028 0 938 0.348 -0.029 0.081 
BLACK -0.028 0 027 -1.037 0.300 -0 080 0.025 
ASIAN -0 035 0.013 -2.770 0.006 -0.059 -0 010 
NATIVE -0.034 0.047 -0.71 8 0.473 -0.126 0 058 
MARRIED 0.085 0 013 6 565 0.000 0 059 0 110 
MARWTHCH 0 006 0 010 0 572 0.568 -0.01 4 0 025 
DIFBIR -0.030 0 042 -0 713 0 476 -0 112 0 052 
YDISABIL -0.011 0.033 -0.335 0 738 -0.075 0.053 
MDISABIL -0.010 0.019 -0.542 0.588 -0.047 0.027 
ODISABIL 0.014 0.163 0.083 0 934 -0.305 0 332 
COM SCI 0.198 0 031 6 406 0 000 0.138 0 259 
MATH 0 017 0 017 1 003 0 316 -0 016 0 051 
AG -0.012 0 020 -0 611 0.541 -0 050 0.026 
ENVIRON -0.071 0.023 -3 071 0 002 -0 117 -0 026 
CHEM 0.032 0 015 2.174 0 030 0.003 0.061 
EARTH 0.007 0.023 0 279 0 780 -0 039 0 052 
PHYSICS 0.050 0 016 3.092 0.002 0.018 0.081 
OTHPHYS -0.101 0.054 -1 .864 0.062 -0.206 0.005 
ECON 0 139 0.025 5.628 0 000 0.090 0 187 
POLSCI -0.029 0.030 -0 966 0 334 -0 087 0.030 
PSYCH -0.006 0.017 -0.351 0 726 -0.040 0.028 
soc -0.129 0.022 -5.967 0 000 -0.171 -0.087 
OTHSOC -0.021 0 035 -0.612 0 541 -0 090 0.047 
AERO 0.091 0.048 1 886 0 059 -0.004 0 185 
CHEME 0.138 0.046 3.01 1 0 003 0.048 0.228 
CIVILE 0.070 0.027 2.601 0.009 0.017 0 123 
EE 0.143 0.024 6.017 0.000 0.096 0.189 
IE 0.11 2 0.054 2.083 0 037 0.007 0 217 
ME 0 077 0 027 2 866 0 004 0.024 0 130 
OTHE 0.060 0.024 2 545 0 011 0.014 0.107 
RESCHU2 -0 .056 0.012 -4.609 0 000 -0.080 -0.032 
PHDU1 -0.061 0.016 -3.765 0.000 -0.092 -0.029 
PHDU2 -0.055 0.020 -2.818 0.005 -0.094 -0.017 
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Table A2-3. (continued) 
Variable 13 Std . Er .((3) t- tat P > ltl I 95% Conf. ln ten•a ll 
COMPREU -0.067 0.044 -1 .533 0.125 -0.153 0.019 
LASU1 0.052 0.062 0.846 0.397 -0.069 0.173 
RELIGU -0.339 0.166 -2.042 0.041 -0.664 -0.014 
MEDICALU -0.006 0.032 -0.201 0.841 -0.068 0.055 
HLTHU 0.070 0.055 1.268 0.205 -0.038 0.178 
ENG I NU -0.017 0.058 -0.298 0.765 -0.131 0.096 
OTHERU -0.132 0.064 -2.071 0.038 -0.257 -0.007 
PRIVEDUC 0.059 0.009 6.459 0.000 0.041 0.078 
OCEDMED -0.032 0.011 -2.963 0.003 -0.053 -0.011 
OCEDZERO -0.085 0.020 -4 .209 0.000 -0.124 -0.045 
ENGINEER 0.035 0.017 2.017 0.044 0.001 0.069 
ADMIN 0.289 0.013 22.208 0.000 0.264 0 315 
SERVICES -0.089 0.039 -2.245 0.025 -0 .166 -0.011 
SALETECH 0.015 0.036 0.410 0.682 -0.056 0 086 
HLTHSERV 0.284 0.031 9.268 0.000 0.224 0.344 
ACPDOC -0.281 0.040 -7.070 0.000 -0.359 -0.203 
NACPDOC -0.261 0.059 -4.447 0.000 -0.377 -0 146 
PUBLIC -0.274 0.016 -17.665 0.000 -0.304 -0.244 
NONPROFT -0.217 0.025 -8.750 0.000 -0.265 -0.168 
SELFEMP -0.007 0.048 -0 . 139 0.890 -0.101 0.088 
COLL4YR -0.229 0.030 -7.650 0.000 -0.288 -0.170 
C2YRHSCH -0.381 0.046 -8.303 0.000 -0.471 -0.291 
EDU RES -0 .361 0.034 -10. 769 0.000 -0.426 -0.295 
AGRI -0.166 0.039 -4 .236 0.000 -0.243 -0.089 
BIOTECH -0.042 0.029 -1.459 0. 145 -0.099 0.015 
CONMINE -0.112 0.057 -1 .982 0.047 -0.223 -0 001 
EDUC -0.167 0.029 -5.804 0.000 -0.223 -0.111 
FINANCE 0.087 0.077 1.123 0.261 -0.065 0.238 
INFOTECH -0.069 0 027 -2.529 0.011 -0.123 -0.016 
OTHSERV -0.078 0.035 -2.201 0.028 -0 147 -0 009 
MANUFACT -0.123 0.025 -4.867 0.000 -0.172 -0 073 
PUBADMIN -0.077 0.026 -2.976 0.003 -0.128 -0.026 
RESEARCH -0.022 0.019 -1.139 0.255 -0.060 0.016 
TRANUTIL -0.049 0.040 -1.251 0.211 -0.127 0.028 
TRADE -0.41 9 0.056 -7 .513 0.000 -0.529 -0.310 
NENGLAND -0.019 0.01 7 -1.135 0.256 -0.053 0.014 
MATLANT -0.022 0.014 -1.556 0.120 -0.050 0.006 
ENCENTRL -0.065 0.013 -4 .844 0.000 -0.092 -0.039 
WNCENTRL -0.100 0.018 -5.637 0.000 -0.135 -0.065 
SATLANT -0.032 0.01 4 -2 .332 0.020 -0.059 -0.005 
ESCENTRL -0.095 0.019 -4 .905 0.000 -0.133 -0 .057 
WSCENTRL -0.098 0.017 -5 .958 0.000 -0.131 -0.066 
MOUNTAIN -0.062 0.016 -3.917 0.000 -0.093 -0.031 
EMSIZE1 -0.150 0.032 -4.627 0.000 -0.214 -0.087 
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Table A2-3. (continued) 
Variable I} Std. Er.(!}) t- tat P > Jtl I 95% Conf. Interval! 
EMSIZE2 -0.121 0.038 -3.170 0.002 -0.196 -0.046 
EMSIZE3 -0.058 0.024 -2.461 0.014 -0.105 -0.012 
EMSIZE4 -0.098 0.013 -7.314 0.000 -0.124 -0.071 
EMSIZE5 0.010 0.020 0.532 0.594 -0.028 0.049 
EMSIZE6 0.032 0.013 2.493 0.013 0.007 0.058 
CONSTANT 9.341 0.148 63.099 0.000 9.051 9.631 
Female sub-sarngle: 
AGE 0.055 0.009 6.224 0.000 0.038 0.073 
AGESQR -0.001 0 000 -5.980 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
TENURE 0.015 0 003 4.858 0.000 0.009 0.021 
TENSOR 0.000 0.000 -1 .188 0.235 0.000 0.000 
WKBEFDEG -0.106 0.027 -3.913 0.000 -0.159 -0.053 
EMPFINDG 0.008 0.063 0.121 0.904 -0.116 0 132 
FINASST -0.023 0.016 -1 433 0.152 -0.055 0.009 
FINGRANT 0.031 0.014 2.280 0.023 0.004 0.058 
OJT -0.008 0.015 -0.533 0.594 -0.037 0.021 
PART -0.377 0.031 -12.086 0.000 -0.438 -0.316 
HISPANIC -0.054 0.025 -2.162 0.031 -0 .104 -0.005 
BLACK 0.012 0.031 0.376 0.707 -0.049 0.072 
ASIAN 0.012 0.022 0.553 0.580 -0.031 0.056 
NATIVE -0.042 0.088 -0.483 0.629 -0.214 0.129 
MARRIED -0.003 0.016 -0.200 0.841 -0 .035 0.029 
MARWTHCH -0.012 0.016 -0.751 0.453 -0.043 0.019 
DIFBIR -0.082 0.069 -1. 181 0.238 -0.218 0.054 
YDISABIL -0.032 0.041 -0.779 0.436 -0.113 0.049 
MDISABIL -0.005 0.030 -0.179 0.858 -0.064 0.053 
ODISABIL -0.032 0.164 -0.197 0.844 -0.355 0.290 
COMSCI 0.154 0.040 3.818 0.000 0.075 0.234 
MATH 0.061 0.032 1.912 0.056 -0.002 0.123 
AG -0.075 0.037 -2.008 0.045 -0.148 -0.002 
ENVIRON -0.033 0.068 -0.479 0.632 -0.166 0.101 
CHEM 0.002 0.025 0.059 0.953 -0.048 0.051 
EARTH 0.004 0.046 0.086 0.931 -0.087 0.095 
PHYSICS 0.056 0.036 1.537 0.124 -0.015 0.127 
OTHPHYS 0.085 0.132 0.645 0.519 -0.173 0.343 
ECON 0.165 0.035 4.744 0.000 0.097 0.233 
POLSCI 0.049 0.041 1.209 0.227 -0.030 0.128 
PSYCH 0.006 0.019 0.337 0.736 -0 .031 0.044 
soc -0.024 0.024 -0.988 0.323 -0.072 0.024 
OTHSOC -0.004 0.036 -0.109 0.913 -0.074 0.066 
AERO 0.162 0.058 2.795 0.005 0.048 0.276 
CHEME 0.076 0.086 0.890 0.374 -0.092 0.244 
CIVILE 0.013 0.088 0.151 0.880 -0.159 0.186 
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Table A2-3 . (continued) 
ariable p td. Er.(IJ) t - tat P >Ill I 95% Conf. ln te rva lj 
EE 0.117 0.055 2.134 0.033 0.010 0.225 
IE 0.049 0.130 0.377 0.706 -0.207 0.305 
ME -0.097 0.186 -0.520 0.603 -0.461 0.268 
OTHE 0.030 0.062 0.490 0.624 -0.091 0.151 
RESCHU2 -0.070 0.021 -3.379 0.001 -0.110 -0.029 
PHDU1 -0.010 0.027 -0.358 0.720 -0.062 0.043 
PHDU2 -0.008 0 047 -0.170 0.865 -0 .101 0.085 
COM PR EU -0.004 0.095 -0 041 0.968 -0.190 0.182 
LASU1 -0.069 0.079 -0.871 0.384 -0.225 0.087 
RELIGU -0.063 0.216 -0.293 0 770 -0.486 0.360 
MEDICALU 0.065 0.042 1.542 0.123 -0.018 0.148 
HLTHU -0.096 0.068 -1 .409 0.159 -0.230 0.038 
ENGINU 0.086 0.133 0.647 0.517 -0.174 0.346 
OTHERU -0.130 0.087 -1.486 0.137 -0.301 0.041 
PRIVEDUC 0.044 0.015 2.968 0.003 0.015 0.072 
OCEDMED -0.025 0.018 -1 .350 0.177 -0.061 0.011 
OCEDZERO -0.045 0.041 -1.100 0.271 -0.124 0.035 
ENGINEER 0.094 0.042 2.243 0.025 0.012 0.176 
ADMIN 0.295 0.023 12.967 0.000 0.250 0.340 
SERVICES -0.068 0.034 -1 .977 0.048 -0.135 -0.001 
SALETECH 0.011 0.093 0.118 0.906 -0.171 0.193 
HLTHSERV 0.120 0.026 4.615 0.000 0.069 0 172 
ACPDOC -0.195 0.053 -3.663 0.000 -0.299 -0.091 
NACPDOC -0.250 0.082 -3.060 0.002 -0 410 -0.090 
PUBLIC -0.280 0.031 -9.133 0.000 -0.340 -0.220 
NONPROFT -0.243 0.035 -7.041 0.000 -0.311 -0.176 
SELFEMP 0.023 0.056 0.406 0.685 -0.087 0.132 
COLL4YR -0.308 0 036 -8.565 0 000 -0.378 -0.237 
C2YRHSCH -0.377 0.049 -7.688 0.000 -0.474 -0.281 
EDU RES -0.417 0.040 -10.358 0.000 -0.496 -0.338 
AGRI -0.156 0 096 -1 .630 0.103 -0.343 0.032 
BIOTECH 0.100 0.045 2.222 0.026 0.012 0.188 
CONMINE -0.175 0 100 -1 .742 0.082 -0.371 0.022 
EDUC -0.070 0.030 -2.309 0.021 -0.130 -0.011 
FINANCE 0.046 0.082 0.562 0.574 -0.115 0.208 
INFOTECH 0.029 0.050 0.572 0.567 -0.070 0.127 
OTHSERV -0.053 0.045 -1 .171 0.242 -0.142 0.036 
MANUFACT -0.079 0.044 -1 .791 0.073 -0 166 0.007 
PUBADMIN 0.071 0.038 1.879 0.060 -0.003 0.145 
RESEARCH 0.049 0.027 1.831 0.067 -0.003 0.102 
TRANUTIL 0.039 0.061 0.643 0.520 -0.081 0.159 
TRADE -0.176 0.188 -0.936 0.349 -0.545 0.193 
NENGLAND -0.042 0.027 -1.550 0.121 -0.094 0.011 
MATLANT 0.042 0.022 1.863 0 063 -0.002 0.086 
108 
Table A2-3. (continued) 
Variable J3 td. Er. (J3) t- tat p > iti I 95°/,, Conf. Interval! 
ENCENTRL -0.048 0.024 -1 .982 0.048 -0.095 -0.001 
WNCENTRL -0.079 0.026 -2.995 0.003 -0.131 -0 .027 
SATLANT -0.008 0.021 -0.384 0.701 -0.050 0.034 
ESCENTRL -0.083 0.033 -2.553 0.011 -0.147 -0.019 
WSCENTRL -0.034 0.030 -1.128 0.259 -0.093 0.025 
MOUNTAIN -0.061 0.030 -2.010 0.045 -0.121 -0.001 
EMSIZE1 -0.196 0.046 -4.233 0.000 -0.287 -0.105 
EMSIZE2 -0.129 0.073 -1 .767 0.077 -0.271 0.014 
EMSIZE3 -0.083 0.037 -2.232 0.026 -0.156 -0.010 
EMSIZE4 -0.110 0.021 -5.198 0.000 -0.151 -0.068 
EMSIZE5 -0.045 0.029 -1.566 0.117 -0.102 0.011 
EMSIZE6 -0.004 0.019 -0.193 0.847 -0.041 0.034 
CONSTANT 9.789 0.212 46.089 0.000 9.372 10.205 
Model Diagnostics 
Male wage eguation Female wage eguation 
Number of obs. : 13,690.00 4.636.00 
Population size: 253.46 I .25 71.2 1 1.27 
Test stat. for global F test: 54 .84 I 04.38 
R-squared: 0.34 0.32 
• The normalizing categories for ets of binary regressors are as fo llows: 
Race I Ethnicity: WHITE 
Detailed degree field: BIO 
Carnegie class of school: RESCHU I 
Degree-job relationship: OCEDHIGH 
Occupation: PRO CIEN 
ector: PRIVATE 
Industry: MEDIC 
Employer region: PACIFIC 
Employer size: EMSIZE7 
Most of these categories are selected because they represent the largest categories in their respective sets. 
This ensures proper identification of coefficients. 
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Table A2-4. Wage regressions used in the .luhn et al. decomposition3 . 
Variab le p td. Er.(B) t- tat p > ltl I 95% Conf. In terval! 
Private sector male wage regression: 
AGE 0.078 0.008 9.779 0.000 0.062 0.093 
AGESQR -0.001 0.000 -8 755 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
TENURE 0.007 0.003 2.595 0.009 0.002 0.013 
TENSOR 0.000 0.000 -1 .217 0.224 0.000 0.000 
WKBEFDEG -0.041 0.020 -2.076 0.038 -0.079 -0 .002 
OJT 0.020 0.01 4 1.474 0.141 -0.007 0.047 
PART -0.382 0.077 -4.957 0.000 -0.533 -0.231 
HISPANIC 0.033 0.078 0.427 0.669 -0.119 0.185 
BLACK -0.017 0.051 -0.340 0.734 -0.117 0.082 
ASIAN -0.072 0.015 -4.749 0.000 -0 .102 -0.042 
NATIVE 0.056 0.136 0.410 0.682 -0.211 0.323 
MARRIED 0.099 0.023 4.283 0.000 0.054 0.145 
MARWTHCH -0.006 0.017 -0.365 0.715 -0 .039 0.027 
DISABIL -0.015 0.029 -0.519 0.604 -0.073 0.042 
COMMA TH 0.171 0.025 6.765 0.000 0.122 0.221 
PHYSCI 0.059 0.018 3.252 0.001 0.023 0.095 
SOCS Cl 0.079 0.033 2.426 0.015 0.015 0.143 
ENGi NRG 0.133 0.026 5.205 0.000 0.083 0.183 
OCEDMED -0.030 0.014 -2.129 0.033 -0.058 -0.002 
OCEDZERO -0.063 0.023 -2.720 0.007 -0.109 -0.018 
ENGINEER -0.023 0.018 -1 .277 0.202 -0.059 0.012 
ADMIN 0.258 0.019 13.384 0.000 0.220 0.296 
SERVICES -0.248 0.140 -1 . 773 0.076 -0.523 0.026 
SALETECH -0.119 0.034 -3.522 0.000 -0.185 -0.053 
HLTHSERV 0 413 0.056 7.364 0.000 0.303 0.523 
POST DOC -0.41 7 0.063 -6.585 0.000 -0.541 -0.293 
NENGLAND -0.010 0.027 -0.384 0 701 -0.062 0.042 
MATLANT 0.009 0.021 0.405 0.685 -0.033 0.050 
ENCENTRL -0.098 0.021 -4 .654 0.000 -0.139 -0.057 
WNCENTRL -0.165 0.035 -4 .765 0.000 -0.233 -0.097 
SATLANT -0.065 0.025 -2 .566 0.010 -0.115 -0.015 
ESCENTRL -0.122 0.044 -2.737 0.006 -0.209 -0.035 
WSCENTRL -0.140 0.029 -4 .828 0.000 -0.197 -0.083 
MOUNTAIN -0 135 0.027 -5.018 0.000 -0.187 -0.082 
CONSTANT 9.236 0.176 52.592 0.000 8.892 9.580 
Public sector male wage regression: 
AGE 0.051 0.007 6.845 0.000 0.037 0.066 
AGESQR 0.000 0.000 -5.759 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
TENURE 0.003 0.004 0.673 0.501 -0.006 0.011 
TENSOR 0.000 0.000 1.179 0.238 0.000 0.000 
WKBEFDE -0.125 0.020 -6.354 0.000 -0.164 -0.087 
OJT 0.001 0.015 0.064 0.949 -0.029 0.031 
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Table A 2-4. (continued) 
Variable 13 Std. Er.(p) t-Stat P > jt j I 95% Conf. In terval! 
PART -0.496 0.078 -6.358 0.000 -0.649 -0.343 
HISPANIC -0.006 0.033 -0.184 0.854 -0.071 0.059 
BLACK -0.029 0.042 -0.685 0.494 -0.11 0 0.053 
ASIAN -0.068 0.025 -2.769 0.006 -0.116 -0.020 
NATIVE -0.094 0.068 -1 .378 0.168 -0.229 0.040 
MARRIED 0.050 0.020 2.444 0.015 0.010 0.090 
MARWTHCH -0.023 0.018 -1 .282 0.200 -0.059 0.012 
DISABIL -0.046 0.028 -1 .688 0.092 -0.100 0.008 
COMMA TH 0.200 0.038 5.203 0.000 0.125 0.276 
PHYSCI 0.139 0.021 6.691 0 000 0.098 0.180 
SOCSCI -0.010 0.022 -0.443 0.658 -0.052 0.033 
ENGi NRG 0.208 0.027 7.828 0.000 0.156 0.260 
OCEDMED -0.058 0.016 -3.637 0.000 -0.090 -0.027 
OCEDZERO -0.160 0.036 -4.381 0.000 -0.231 -0.088 
ENGINEER 0.002 0.026 0.079 0.937 -0.049 0.053 
ADMIN 0.203 0.025 8.290 0.000 0.155 0.252 
SERVICES -0.145 0.060 -2.420 0.016 -0.263 -0.028 
SALETECH -0.011 0.100 -0.108 0.914 -0.206 0.185 
HLTHSERV 0.208 0.052 3.976 0.000 0.105 0.310 
POST DOC -0.328 0.026 -12.666 0.000 -0.379 -0.277 
NENGLAND -0.072 0.040 -1 .785 0.074 -0.151 0.007 
MATLANT -0.066 0.031 -2.131 0.033 -0.127 -0.005 
ENCENTRL -0.057 0.032 -1 .810 0 070 -0.119 0.005 
WNCENTRL -0 .166 0.047 -3.523 0.000 -0.259 -0 .074 
SATLANT 0.045 0.022 2.072 0.038 0.002 0.088 
ESCENTRL -0.027 0.037 -0.723 0.470 -0 .100 0.046 
WSCENTRL -0.110 0.040 -2.748 0.006 -0.189 -0.032 
MOUNTAIN -0.002 0.028 -0.076 0.939 -0.057 0.053 
CONSTANT 9.581 0.173 55.416 0.000 9.242 9.920 
on12ro fit seccor male wage regression: 
AGE 0.082 0.016 5.021 0.000 0.050 0.114 
AGESQR -0.001 0.000 -4.594 0.000 -0 .001 0.000 
TENURE 0.013 0.008 1.565 0.118 -0.003 0.029 
TENSQR 0.000 0.000 -0.461 0.645 -0.001 0.000 
WKBEFDEG -0.071 0.050 -1.434 0.152 -0.169 0.026 
OJT -0.044 0.037 -1 .191 0.234 -0.117 0.028 
PART -0.461 0.071 -6.467 0.000 -0.601 -0.321 
HISPANIC 0.062 0.071 0.874 0.382 -0.077 0.200 
BLACK -0.169 0.115 -1.477 0.140 -0.394 0.056 
ASIAN 0.016 0.043 0.364 0.716 -0.068 0.100 
NATIVE -0.193 0.208 -0.926 0.355 -0.602 0.216 
MARRIED 0.001 0.069 0.008 0 994 -0.134 0.135 
MARWTHCH 0.046 0.036 1.264 0.207 -0.025 0.116 
DISABIL 0.066 0.051 1.301 0.194 -0.034 0.166 
l l l 
Table A2-4. (continued) 
Variable p Std. Er.(p) t- tat p > ltl I 95% Conf. Interval! 
COMMA TH 0.131 0.080 1.628 0.104 -0 .027 0.288 
PHY SCI 0.124 0.044 2.789 0.005 0.037 0.211 
SOC SCI -0.059 0.044 -1 .325 0.186 -0. 146 0.028 
ENGi NRG 0.052 0.072 0.719 0.472 -0.089 0.193 
OCEDMED -0.085 0.039 -2.157 0.031 -0.162 -0.008 
OCEDZERO -0.207 0.086 -2 .393 0.017 -0.376 -0.037 
ENGINEER 0.096 0.069 1.390 0.165 -0.040 0.231 
ADMIN 0.317 0.060 5.296 0.000 0.200 0.435 
SERVICES -0.110 0.088 -1.258 0.209 -0.282 0.062 
SALETECH 0.121 0.093 1.298 0.195 -0.062 0.303 
HLTHSERV 0.346 0.102 3.390 0.001 0.145 0.546 
POSTDOC -0.527 0.057 -9.308 0.000 -0.638 -0 416 
NENGLAND 0.081 0.106 0.758 0.449 -0.128 0.289 
MATLANT 0.018 0.050 0.355 0.723 -0.081 0.116 
ENCENTRL -0.076 0.052 -1.458 0.145 -0.178 0.026 
WNCENTRL -0.002 0.075 -0.030 0.976 -0.150 0.145 
SATLANT 0.073 0.051 1.429 0.153 -0.027 0.174 
ESCENTRL -0.317 0.088 -3.597 0.000 -0.489 -0 .144 
WSCENTRL -0.086 0.094 -0.919 0.358 -0.271 0.098 
MOUNTAIN -0.098 0.050 -1 .948 0.052 -0.197 0.001 
CONSTANT 8.944 0.347 25.770 0.000 8.263 9.626 
elf-emglovment sector male wage regression: 
AGE 0.090 0.027 3.377 0.001 0.038 0.143 
AGESQR -0.001 0.000 -3.581 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
TENURE 0.036 0.013 2.709 0.007 0.010 0.061 
TENSOR -0.001 0.000 -1 .612 0.107 -0.001 0.000 
WKBEFDEG 0.129 0.107 1.205 0.229 -0.081 0.339 
OJT -0.111 0.070 -1 .583 0.11 4 -0.248 0.027 
PART -0.455 0.072 -6.331 0.000 -0.596 -0.314 
HISPANIC -0.129 0.148 -0.870 0.385 -0.421 0.162 
BLACK 0.224 0.360 0.623 0.533 -0.482 0.931 
ASIAN -0.120 0.158 -0.759 0.448 -0.430 0.190 
NATIVE -0.150 0.233 -0.646 0.518 -0.607 0.306 
MARRIED 0.122 0.088 1.388 0.166 -0.051 0.295 
MARWTHCH 0.106 0.073 1.453 0.147 -0.037 0.249 
DISABIL -0.129 0.135 -0.953 0.341 -0.395 0.137 
COMMA TH -0.127 0.192 -0.660 0.509 -0 505 0.251 
PHYSCI -0.084 0.094 -0.896 0.371 -0.269 0 100 
SOCSCI -0.037 0.088 -0.416 0.677 -0.210 0.137 
ENGi NRG 0.048 0.21 4 0.224 0.823 -0.372 0.468 
OCEDMED -0.065 0.086 -0.749 0.454 -0.234 0.105 
OCEDZERO -0.333 0.120 -2. 771 0.006 -0.569 -0.097 
ENGINEER 0.278 0.202 1.373 0.170 -0.120 0.675 
ADMIN 0.394 0 155 2.543 0.011 0.090 0.698 
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Table A2-4. (continued) 
Variable B td. Er.(p) t- tat P > it! I 95% Conf. Interva l! 
SERVICES -0.390 0.162 -2.404 0.017 -0.709 -0.071 
SALETECH 0.276 0.168 1.642 0.101 -0.054 0.606 
HLTHSERV 0.564 0.117 4 826 0 000 0.334 0.793 
POSTDOC -0.153 0.188 -0.811 0.418 -0.522 0.217 
NENGLAND -0.108 0.133 -0 .812 0.417 -0.369 0.153 
MATLANT -0.037 0.091 -0.408 0.683 -0.216 0.142 
ENCENTRL -0 .050 0.098 -0.509 0.611 -0.242 0.142 
WNCENTRL -0.122 0.142 -0 865 0 387 -0.401 0.156 
SATLANT -0.041 0.096 -0.433 0.666 -0.230 0.147 
ESCENTRL -0.033 0.180 -0.184 0.854 -0.387 0.321 
WSCENTRL -0.071 0.106 -0.668 0.504 -0.279 0 137 
MOUNTAIN -0.098 0 111 -0.886 0 376 -0.316 0.119 
CONSTANT 8.807 0.671 13.122 0.000 7.489 10 125 
Academic sector male wage regression : 
AGE 0.039 0.005 7.264 0.000 0.028 0.049 
AGESQR 0.000 0.000 -5.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TENURE 0.016 0.002 7 069 0.000 0.01 1 0.020 
TENSOR 0.000 0.000 -4.348 0.000 0.000 0.000 
WKBEFDEG -0.091 0.013 -6.875 0.000 -0.117 -0.065 
OJT -0.044 0.009 -4.864 0.000 -0.062 -0.026 
PART -0.381 0.035 -10.755 0.000 -0.451 -0.312 
HISPANIC -0.030 0.021 -1.460 0.144 -0.071 0.010 
BLACK -0.037 0.022 -1.654 0.098 -0.080 0.007 
ASIAN -0.033 0.014 -2.269 0 023 -0.061 -0.004 
NATIVE -0.151 0.047 -3.226 0.001 -0.242 -0.059 
MARRIED 0.062 0.014 4.504 0.000 0.035 0.090 
MARWTHCH 0.018 0.011 1.644 0.100 -0.003 0.039 
DISABIL -0.044 0.019 -2.264 0 024 -0.082 -0.006 
COMMA TH -0.003 0.016 -0.157 0.876 -0.034 0.029 
PHYSCI -0.012 0.013 -0.866 0.387 -0.038 0.015 
SOCSCI -0.044 0.013 -3 490 0.000 -0.069 -0.019 
ENGi NRG 0.103 0.025 4.105 0.000 0.054 0.153 
OCEDMED -0.029 0 015 -1 .998 0.046 -0.058 -0.001 
OCEDZERO -0.065 0.036 -1.780 0.075 -0.136 0.007 
ENGINEER 0.062 0.025 2.469 0.014 0.013 0 111 
ADMIN 0.384 0.019 19.960 0.000 0.346 0.421 
SERVICES -0.028 0.030 -0.930 0.352 -0.085 0.030 
SALETECH -0.242 0.099 -2.450 0.014 -0.436 -0.048 
HLTHSERV 0.256 0.032 7.900 0.000 0.192 0.320 
POSTDOC -0.398 0.015 -26.412 0.000 -0.428 -0.369 
NENGLAND -0.021 0.020 -1 .094 0.274 -0.060 0.017 
MATLANT -0.001 0.017 -0.034 0.973 -0.034 0.033 
ENCENTRL -0.055 0.017 -3.177 0.001 -0.088 -0.021 
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Table A2-4. (continued) 
Variable p Std. Er.(p) I-Sta t p > lt l I 95% Conf. Interva l! 
WNCENTRL -0.123 0 .020 -6.311 0.000 -0.162 -0.085 
SATLANT -0.052 0 .017 -3.044 0.002 -0.085 -0.018 
ESCENTRL -0.139 0.020 -6.823 0.000 -0 .178 -0.099 
WSCENTRL -0.094 0.021 -4.588 0.000 -0 .134 -0.054 
MOUNTAIN -0.069 0.022 -3.159 0.002 -0.113 -0.026 
CONSTANT 9.703 0.121 80.325 0.000 9.466 9.940 
Model Diagnostics 
Sector: Private Public Nonproft Self-emp. Academia 
Number of obs.: 6,882.00 2.253.00 855.00 602.00 9.910.00 
Population size: 121,962.67 38,667.53 I 5. 154.37 12.647.58 170.717.94 
F-statistic: 41.14 47.72 26.64 6.56 184.78 
R-squared: 0.23 0.40 0.40 0.29 0.37 
" The normalizing categories for sets of binary regressors are as follows: 
Race I Ethnicity: WHITE 
Broad classification of degree fie ld: LI FESCI 
Degree-job relationship: OCED HIGH 
Occupation: PROSClEN 
Employer regio n: PACIFIC 
Most of these categories are selected because they represent the largest categories in their respective sets. 
This ensures proper identification of coefficients. 
I 1-l 
Table A2-5. Detai led listing o f component e ffects in the Oaxaca decomposition of the 
gender wage gapa. 
Va r iab le Xm Xr Pm Pr W!_ge St ru cture Endo~me!!J 
=X,{f3m - f3r) =f3m(X .. - Xr) 
AGE 48.348 46.787 0.077 0.055 1 0257 0.1204 
AGESQR 2393.949 2247.438 -0.001 -0.001 -0.4077 -0.1071 
TENURE 11 .762 9.457 0.007 0.015 -0.0747 0.0158 
TENSOR 209.000 136.518 0.000 0.000 0.0093 -0.0039 
WKBEFDEG 0.093 0.092 -0.062 -0.106 0.0041 0.0000 
EMPFINDG 0.007 0.005 -0.032 0.008 -0 .0002 -0.0001 
FINASST 0.801 0.711 -0.035 -0.023 -0 0083 -0.0032 
FIN GRANT 0.459 0.463 0.038 0.031 0.0034 -0.0001 
OJT 0.536 0.636 -0.015 -0.008 -0.0045 0.0015 
PART 0.033 0.114 -0.367 -0.377 0.0011 0.0297 
HISPANIC 0.022 0.025 0.026 -0.054 0.0020 -0.0001 
BLACK 0.019 0.031 -0.028 0.012 -0.0012 0.0003 
ASIAN 0.120 0.078 -0.035 0.012 -0.0036 -0 0015 
NATIVE 0.003 0.004 -0 .034 -0 .042 0.0000 0.0000 
MARRIED 0.850 0.683 0.085 -0 .003 0.0599 0.0142 
MARWTHCH 0.496 0.398 0.006 -0.012 0.0070 0.0006 
DIFBIR 0.009 0.009 -0 .030 -0.082 0.0005 0.0000 
YDISABIL 0.018 0.017 -0 011 -0.032 0.0004 0.0000 
MDISABIL 0.041 0.039 -0.010 -0.005 -0.0002 0.0000 
ODISABIL 0.000 0.001 0.014 -0.032 0.0000 0.0000 
COM SCI 0.014 0.009 0.198 0.154 0.0004 0.0010 
MATH 0.055 0.028 0.017 0 061 -0.0012 0.0005 
AG 0.036 0.020 -0.012 -0.075 0.0013 -0.0002 
ENVIRON 0.011 0.003 -0.071 -0.033 -0.0001 -0.0006 
CHEM 0.113 0.067 0.032 0.002 0.0020 0.0014 
EARTH 0.030 0.013 0.007 0.004 0.0000 0.0001 
PHYSICS 0.082 0.019 0.050 0.056 -0 .0001 0.0031 
OTHPHYS 0.003 0.003 -0.101 0.085 -0.0006 0.0000 
ECON 0.043 0.028 0.139 0.165 -0.0007 0.0020 
POLSCI 0.029 0.029 -0.029 0.049 -0 .0023 0.0000 
PSYCH 0.120 0.303 -0.006 0.006 -0 .0038 0.0011 
soc 0.034 0.080 -0.129 -0.024 -0.0083 0.0059 
OTHSOC 0.022 0.044 -0.021 -0.004 -0.0008 0.0005 
AERO 0.009 0.001 0.091 0.162 0.0000 0.0007 
CHEME 0.027 0.004 0.138 0.076 0.0003 0.0031 
CIVILE 0.018 0.002 0.070 0.013 0.0001 0.0011 
EE 0.050 0.007 0.143 0.11 7 0.0002 0.0062 
IE 0.005 0.004 0.112 0.049 0.0002 0.0002 
ME 0.023 0.003 0.077 -0.097 0.0005 0.0016 
OTHE 0.062 0.015 0.060 0.030 0.0004 0.0028 
RESCHU2 0.119 0.104 -0.056 -0.070 0.0014 -0.0008 
PHDU1 0.066 0.099 -0.061 -0.010 -0.0050 0.0020 
PHDU2 0.035 0.031 -0.055 -0.008 -0.0015 -0.0002 
COM PR EU 0.003 0.003 -0.067 -0.004 -0.0002 0.0000 
LASU1 0.002 0.004 0.052 -0.069 0.0004 -0.0001 
RELIGU 0.001 0.000 -0.339 -0.063 -0.0001 -0.0001 
MEDICALU 0.011 0.022 -0.006 0.065 -0.0016 0.0001 
HLTHU 0.001 0.000 0.070 -0.096 0.0000 0.0000 
ENG I NU 0.002 0.000 -0.017 0.086 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table A2-5. (continued) 
Va ria ble Xm Xr J3m Pr WJ!ge tructu re Endo~me.!!.t 
=Xi(~ "' - J3r) =J3m(Xm - Xr) 
OTHERU 0.003 0.01 3 -0 .132 -0.130 0.0000 0.001 3 
PRIVEDUC 0.320 0.348 0.059 0.044 0.0056 -0.0017 
OCEDMED 0.238 0.205 -0 .032 -0.025 -0.0014 -0.0010 
OCEDZERO 0.074 0.056 -0.085 -0.045 -0.0023 -0.0015 
ENGINEER 0.150 0.032 0.035 0.094 -0.0019 0.0041 
ADMIN 0.161 0.129 0.289 0.295 -0.0007 0.0093 
SERVICES 0.033 0.062 -0 .089 -0.068 -0.0013 0.0026 
SALETECH 0.018 0.009 0.015 0.011 0.0000 0.0001 
HLTHSERV 0.033 0.084 0.284 0.120 0.0137 -0.0145 
ACPDOC 0.007 0.015 -0 .281 -0.195 -0 .0013 0.0021 
NACPDOC 0.003 0.006 -0 .261 -0.250 -0.0001 0.0009 
PUBLIC 0.11 7 0.107 -0.274 -0.280 0.0006 -0.0029 
NONPROFT 0.043 0.064 -0.217 -0.243 0.0017 0.0045 
SELFEMP 0.035 0.083 -0.007 0.023 -0 .0024 0.0003 
COLL4YR 0.384 0.386 -0.229 -0.308 0.0305 0.0005 
C2YRHSCH 0.019 0.044 -0 .381 -0.377 -0 .0002 0.0096 
EDU RES 0.055 0.100 -0 .361 -0.417 0.0056 0.0161 
AGRI 0.017 0.007 -0 .166 -0.156 -0.0001 -0.001 7 
BIOTECH 0.026 0.024 -0.042 0.100 -0.0034 -0.0001 
CONMINE 0.006 0.000 -0.112 -0.175 0.0000 -0.0007 
EDUC 0.422 0.486 -0 .167 -0.070 -0.0470 0.0108 
FINANCE 0.013 0.007 0.087 0.046 0.0003 0.0005 
INFOTECH 0.053 0.021 -0.069 0.029 -0.0020 -0.0022 
OTHSERV 0.037 0.048 -0.078 -0.053 -0.0012 0.0009 
MANUFACT 0.102 0.039 -0 .123 -0.079 -0.0017 -0.0078 
PUBADMIN 0.038 0.042 -0.077 0.071 -0.0063 0.0004 
RESEARCH 0.164 0.113 -0.022 0.049 -0.0080 -0.0011 
TRANUTIL 0.017 0.006 -0.049 0.039 -0.0005 -0.0005 
TRADE 0.006 0.005 -0.419 -0.176 -0.0012 -0.0005 
NENGLAND 0.074 0.079 -0.019 -0.042 0.0017 0.0001 
MATLANT 0.161 0.177 -0.022 0.042 -0.0113 0.0003 
ENCENTRL 0.142 0.131 -0.065 -0.048 -0.0023 -0.0008 
WNCENTRL 0.067 0.062 -0.100 -0.079 -0.001 3 -0.0006 
SATLANT 0.181 0.196 -0.032 -0.008 -0.0047 0.0005 
ESCENTRL 0.046 0.038 -0.095 -0.083 -0.0005 -0.0007 
WSCENTRL 0.081 0.070 -0.098 -0.034 -0.0045 -0.0011 
MOUNTAIN 0.073 0.058 -0.062 -0.061 0.0000 -0.0009 
EMSIZE1 0.079 0.132 -0.150 -0.196 0.0061 0.0080 
EMSIZE2 0.020 0.022 -0.121 -0.129 0.0002 0.0002 
EMSIZE3 0.039 0.039 -0.058 -0.083 0.0010 0.0000 
EMSIZE4 0.092 0.104 -0.098 -0 .110 0.0013 0.0012 
EMSIZE5 0.043 0.047 0.010 -0.045 0.0026 0.0000 
EMSIZE6 0.106 0.098 0.032 -0.004 0.0035 0.0003 
CONSTANT 1.000 1.000 9.341 9.789 -0.4479 0.0000 
" The nonnal izing categories for sets of binary regressors are as follows: 
Race I Ethnici ty: WHITE: Detailed degree field: BIO: Carnegie class of school: RESCHU I : 
Degree-j ob relationship: OCEDHIGH: Occupation: PROSCIEN: Employer sector: PRIVATE: 
Employer industry: MEDIC: Employer region: PACIFIC: Employer size: EMSIZE7. 
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rable A2-6. Detailed li sting of component effects in the Oaxaca decomposition of the 
racial wage gaps3 • 
-
a riablc X-.h11e XminunC\ p"hllt Pm1norn' _ Wage , tructure Endo~men t_ 
• m1nont\ (J3"'hitt- Pminnrit~ ) P-.h11.(X,.h11<-Xm1nonl\) 
Whites versus Blacks: 
AGE 47.955 47.249 0.008 0.008 -0.0283 0 0055 
TENURE 11 .302 8.857 0.018 0 024 -0.0526 0.0441 
TENSOR 21 1.766 137.173 0.000 -0.001 0.0245 -0.0244 
MALE 0.772 0.649 0.121 0.057 0.0413 0.0148 
WKBEFDEG 0.104 0 118 -0.089 -0.128 0.0046 0.0013 
OJT 0.538 0.697 -0.024 0.007 -0.0219 0.0038 
PART 0.062 0.052 -0 457 -0.262 -0.0102 -0 0045 
MARRIED 0 792 0.652 0 049 0 038 0.0073 0 0069 
MARWTHCH 0.411 0 405 0 033 0 025 0.0034 0 0002 
DISABIL 0.064 0.053 -0 034 -0.012 -0.0012 -0 0004 
COMMA TH 0 061 0.043 0.063 0 101 -0.0017 0.0011 
PHYSCI 0.202 0.122 0 016 0 089 -0.0088 0.0013 
SOCSCI 0.312 0.474 -0 002 0.050 -0.0246 0 0003 
ENGi NRG 0.139 0.106 0 108 0 101 0.0007 0 0035 
OCEDMED 0.222 0.201 -0 031 -0.086 0.0110 -0.0007 
OCEDZERO 0.066 0.065 -0.085 -0.026 -0.0038 -0.0001 
ENGINEER 0.112 0.081 0.008 0.029 -0.0017 0.0002 
ADMIN 0.143 0.174 0.313 0.343 -0.0053 -0.0098 
SERVICES 0.041 0.065 -0 .100 -0.183 0.0054 0.0024 
SALETECH 0.017 0.008 -0 .082 -0.212 0.0011 -0 0007 
HLTHSERV 0.046 0.061 0.225 0.308 -0.0051 -0 0036 
POSTDOC 0.040 0.051 -0.413 -0.218 -0.0101 0.0048 
PUBLIC 0.111 0.112 -0.242 -0.311 0.0077 0 0002 
NON PR OFT 0.051 0.065 -0.212 -0.393 0.0118 0 0031 
SELFEMP 0.050 0.025 -0 007 0 093 -0.0025 -0 0002 
ACADEMIA 0.501 0 613 -0 356 -0 460 0 0638 0 0396 
NENGLAND 0.080 0 070 -0.029 -0 104 0.0052 -0 0003 
MATLANT 0.159 0.175 -0.013 0.015 -0.0049 0.0002 
ENCENTRL 0.141 0.116 -0.084 -0.088 0.0005 -0 0021 
WNCENTRL 0.068 0.030 -0.136 -0 160 0.0007 -0 0052 
SATLANT 0.186 0.298 -0.038 -0 036 -0.0006 0 0043 
ESCENTRL 0.046 0.071 -0.123 -0. 131 0.0006 0.0030 
WSCENTRL 0.076 0.088 -0 .112 -0. 172 0.0052 0.0013 
MOUNTAIN 0.071 0.030 -0 .089 -0.026 -0.0019 -0.0037 
EMSIZE1 0.094 0.060 -0.146 -0.153 0.0004 -0.0050 
EMSIZE2 0.022 0.016 -0 .116 0.077 -0.0031 -0 0007 
EMSIZE3 0.040 0.043 -0.094 -0. 140 0.0020 0.0002 
EMSIZE4 0.098 0.094 -0.087 -0.108 0.0019 -0 0003 
EMSIZE5 0.044 0 044 -0.024 -0 006 -0.0008 0 0000 
EMSIZE6 0.106 0.095 0 032 0.013 0.0018 0 0003 
CONSTANT 1.000 1.000 10.723 10.727 -0.0038 0 0000 
Whites versus Hisganics: 
AGE 47.955 45.559 0.008 0 010 -0.1229 0 0185 
TENURE 11 302 9 407 0 018 0.025 -0 0643 0 0342 
TENSOR 211 766 155.072 0.000 -0.001 0.0321 -0.0185 
MALE 0.772 0.717 0.121 0 119 0.0011 0.0067 
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Table A?.-6. (continued) 
ariable x .. h ... X minurif) ~~hilt Pminuru~ _ Wage tru cturc EndOU'.JTICnt _ 
Xmrnont~ (J3"h11c-Pm111onl) ) [3,.h1re(X .. h11t-Xmonorh}) 
WKBEFDEG 0.104 0.122 -0.089 -0.153 0.0078 0.0017 
OJT 0.538 0.596 -0.024 0.012 -0.0215 0.0014 
PART 0.062 0.048 -0.457 -0.340 -0.0056 -0.0064 
MARRIED 0.792 0.753 0.049 0.044 0.0034 0.0019 
MARWTHCH 0.411 0.452 0.033 0.047 -0.0063 -0 0014 
DISABIL 0.064 0.054 -0.034 -0.024 -0.0006 -0.0003 
COMMA TH 0.061 0.063 0.063 0.064 -0.0001 -0.0002 
PHY SCI 0.202 0.184 0.016 0.065 -0.0089 0.0003 
SOCSCI 0.312 0.354 -0.002 0.016 -0.0064 0.0001 
ENGi NRG 0.139 0.141 0.108 0.095 0.0018 -0.0002 
OCEDMED 0.222 0.196 -0.031 -0.045 0.0026 -0.0008 
OCEDZERO 0.066 0.047 -0.085 0.061 -0 .0069 -0.0016 
ENGINEER 0.112 0.118 0.008 -0.044 0.0061 -0.0001 
ADMIN 0.143 0.123 0.313 0.217 0.01 18 0.0063 
SERVICES 0.041 0.045 -0.100 -0.371 0.0121 0.0004 
SALETECH 0.017 0.013 -0.082 -0.038 -0.0006 -0.0004 
HLTHSERV 0.046 0.036 0.225 0.217 0.0003 0.0022 
POST DOC 0.040 0.067 -0.413 -0.351 -0.0042 0.0114 
PUBLIC 0.111 0.095 -0.242 -0.260 0.0017 -0.0040 
NONPROFT 0.051 0.042 -0.212 -0.175 -0.0016 -0.001 7 
SELFEMP 0.050 0.039 -0.007 -0.121 0.0045 -0.0001 
ACADEMIA 0.501 0.580 -0.356 -0.425 0.0398 0.0281 
NENGLAND 0.080 0.070 -0.029 0.176 -0.01 44 -0.0003 
MATLANT 0.159 0.148 -0.013 0.152 -0.0243 -0 0001 
ENCENTRL 0.141 0.108 -0.084 0.013 -0 0105 -0.0028 
WNCENTRL 0.068 0.042 -0.136 -0.033 -0 0043 -0.0035 
SATLANT 0.186 0.181 -0.038 0.023 -0.0111 -0.0002 
ESCENTRL 0.046 0.038 -0.123 -0.108 -0.0005 -0.0011 
WSCENTRL 0.076 0.109 -0.112 0.054 -0.0181 0.0037 
MOUNTAIN 0.071 0.075 -0 .089 -0.041 -0.0036 0.0003 
EMSIZE1 0.094 0.075 -0 .146 -0.202 0.0042 -0.0028 
EMSIZE2 0.022 0.016 -0.116 0. 125 -0.0039 -0.0006 
EMSIZE3 0.040 0.031 -0.094 -0.226 0.0041 -0.0009 
EMSIZE4 0.098 0.080 -0.087 -0.140 0.0042 -0.0015 
EM SIZES 0.044 0.046 -0.024 0.007 -0 0015 0.0001 
EMSIZE6 0.106 0.104 0.032 0.080 -0 0050 0 0000 
CONSTANT 1.000 1.000 10.723 10.503 0.2201 0.0000 
Whites versus Asians: 
AGE 47.955 43.317 0.008 0.005 0.1105 0.0359 
TENURE 11 .302 7.641 0.018 0.018 -0.0008 0.0661 
TENSOR 211 .766 108.706 0.000 0.000 -0.0077 -0.0337 
MALE 0.772 0.820 0 121 0.066 0 0449 -0.0058 
WKBEFDEG 0.104 0.066 -0.089 -0.077 -0.0008 -0.0033 
OJT 0.538 0.544 -0.024 -0.005 -0.0105 0.0001 
PART 0.062 0.033 -0.457 -0.260 -0 .0065 -0 0134 
MARRIED 0.792 0.858 0.049 0.011 0.0320 -0.0032 
MARWTHCH 0.411 0.558 0.033 0.025 0.0047 -0.0049 
DISABIL 0.064 0.034 -0.034 0.016 -0.001 7 -0.0010 
COMMA TH 0.061 0.092 0.063 0.089 -0.0024 -0.0020 
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Table A2-6. (continued) 
Variable x .. hite Xnunorit~ ~\.\hil t P nunorH) _ Wage Structure Endowment_ 
Xm1noru~ (p\.\hiu~-Pminorit) ) ~whil.{X,. hile-Xmonoril i ) 
PHY SCI 0.202 0.217 0.016 0.041 -0.0054 -0.0002 
SOCSCI 0.312 0.096 -0.002 -0.026 0.0023 -0.0004 
ENGi NRG 0.139 0.365 0.108 0.108 -0.0001 -0.0244 
OCEDMED 0.222 0.277 -0.031 -0.041 0.0028 0.0017 
OCEDZERO 0.066 0.075 -0.085 -0.042 -0.0032 0.0008 
ENGINEER 0.112 0.275 0.008 0.034 -0.0071 -0.0013 
ADMIN 0.143 0.089 0.313 0.257 0.0050 0.0169 
SERVICES 0.041 0.020 -0.100 -0.047 -0.0011 -0.0021 
SALETECH 0.017 0.024 -0.082 0.027 -0.0026 0.0005 
HLTHSERV 0.046 0.034 0.225 0.208 0.0006 0.0025 
POST DOC 0.040 0.105 -0.413 -0.468 0.0057 0.0271 
PUBLIC 0 111 0.077 -0.242 -0.180 -0.0048 -0.0081 
NONPROFT 0.051 0.033 -0.212 -0.080 -0.0043 -0.0038 
SELFEMP 0.050 0.011 -0.007 0.081 -0.0009 -0.0003 
ACADEMIA 0.501 0.396 -0.356 -0.303 -0.0212 -0.0376 
NENGLAND 0.080 0.081 -0.029 -0 .036 0.0006 0.0000 
MATLANT 0.159 0.188 -0.013 0.027 -0.0074 0.0004 
ENCENTRL 0.141 0.144 -0.084 -0.058 -0.0038 0.0002 
WNCENTRL 0.068 0.053 -0.136 -0 .132 -0.0002 -0.0021 
SATLANT 0.186 0.152 -0.038 -0 .021 -0.0026 -0.0013 
ESCENTRL 0.046 0.028 -0.123 -0 .118 -0.0001 -0.0022 
WSCENTRL 0.076 0.079 -0.112 -0.107 -0.0004 0.0003 
MOUNTAIN 0.071 0.047 -0 .089 -0.037 -0.0024 -0.0022 
EMSIZE1 0.094 0.046 -0.146 -0.124 -0.0010 -0.0070 
EMSIZE2 0.022 0.026 -0 116 -0.084 -0.0008 0.0005 
EMSIZE3 0.040 0.045 -0.094 -0.059 -0.0016 0.0004 
EMSIZE4 0.098 0.089 -0.087 -0.095 0.0007 -0.0008 
EMSIZE5 0.044 0.046 -0.024 -0.027 0.0001 0.0000 
EMSIZE6 0.106 0.129 0.032 -0.012 0.0056 -0.0007 
CONSTANT 1.000 1.000 10.723 10.784 -0.0610 0.0000 
Whites versus Native Americans: 
AGE 47.955 50.676 0.008 0.004 0.1832 -0 .0211 
TENURE 11 .302 12.894 0.018 0.008 0.1325 -0 .0287 
TENSOR 211 .766 269.017 0.000 0.000 -0.0241 0.0187 
MALE 0.772 0.719 0.121 0.078 0.0310 0.0064 
WKBEFDEG 0.104 0.172 -0.089 0.035 -0.0214 0.0061 
OJT 0.538 0.758 -0.024 0.057 -0.0616 0 0053 
PART 0.062 0.049 -0.457 -0.291 -0.0082 -0.0058 
MARRIED 0.792 0.711 0.049 0.005 0.0311 0.0040 
MARWTHCH 0.411 0.365 0.033 0.006 0.0100 0.0016 
DISABIL 0.064 0.168 -0.034 -0 175 0.0238 0.0035 
COMMA TH 0.061 0.024 0.063 -0.327 0.0093 0.0023 
PHYSCI 0.202 0.162 0.016 -0.029 0.0073 0.0007 
SOCS Cl 0.312 0.471 -0.002 -0.172 0.0801 0.0003 
ENGi NRG 0.139 0.072 0.108 -0.061 0.0122 0.0072 
OCEDMED 0.222 0.153 -0.031 0.014 -0.0068 -0.0021 
OCEDZERO 0.066 0.075 -0.085 0.014 -0.0074 0.0008 
ENGINEER 0.112 0.072 0.008 0.061 -0.0039 0.0003 
ADMIN 0.143 0.156 0.313 0.246 0.0104 -0.0041 
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Table A2-6. (continued) 
Variable Xw11; .. Xminurll) P"hhc Pmiuorily _ Wage Structure Endowmen L 
Xminority(p¥>hiac~-Pminorit)) P n hi1e(Xwhite- X minority) 
SERVICES 0 041 0.060 -0.100 -0.193 0.0056 0.0019 
SALETECH 0.017 0.011 -0.082 -1 .084 0 0114 -0 .0005 
HLTHSERV 0.046 0.050 0 225 0.232 -0.0003 -0.0010 
POSTDOC 0.040 0.021 -0.413 -0.591 0.0038 -0.0076 
PUBLIC 0.111 0.128 -0.242 -0.406 0.0209 0.0040 
NONPROFT 0.051 0.022 -0.212 -0.379 0.0037 -0.0060 
SELFEMP 0.050 0.063 -0.007 -0.592 0.0370 0.0001 
ACADEMIA 0.501 0.597 -0.356 -0 399 0.0253 0.0339 
NENGLAND 0.080 0.019 -0.029 0.354 -0.0073 -0.0018 
MATLANT 0.159 0 075 -0.013 0.328 -0 0256 -0.0010 
ENCENTRL 0.141 0.134 -0.084 0.077 -0.0216 -0.0006 
WNCENTRL 0.068 0.067 -0.136 -0.161 0.0017 -0.0002 
SATLANT 0.186 0.119 -0.038 0. 145 -0.0218 -0.0025 
ESCENTRL 0.046 0.097 -0.123 -0.013 -0 .0106 0.0062 
WSCENTRL 0.076 0 166 -0.112 0.013 -0 .0208 0.0101 
MOUNTAIN 0.071 0.163 -0.089 0.041 -0 .0212 0.0082 
EMSIZE1 0.094 0.104 -0.146 0.300 -0.0462 0.0014 
EMSIZE2 0.022 0.047 -0.116 -0.328 0.0099 0.0029 
EMSIZE3 0.040 0.018 -0.094 -0.475 0.0069 -0.0021 
EMSIZE4 0.098 0.090 -0 .087 -0.147 0.0054 -0.0007 
EMSIZE5 0.044 0.032 -0 .024 0.544 -0.0185 -0.0003 
EMSIZE6 0. 106 0.044 0.032 -0. 134 0.0072 0.0020 
CONSTANT 1.000 1.000 10.723 10.990 -0.2666 0.0000 
•The normalizing categories for sers of binary regressors are as follows: 
Broad classificacion of degree field : LI FESCI 
Degree-job relacionship: OCEDH IGH 
Occupation: PROSCIEN 
Employer sector: PR IVATE 
Employer region: PACIFIC 
Employer s ize: EMSIZE7 
Table A2-7. Detailed listing of component effects in the Juhn et. al decomposition of sector differences in the gender wage gap3 • 
Variable ll X" llXprivort Pm'' Pmpri,·•te Obs. X Obs. P 69'' tl9"rivm Gm A Gm private Gap Eff. Unobs. P 
Dpubhc _ Dpn v31<: 
AGE 2.825 3.189 0.051 0.078 -0.0187 -0.0835 
AGESQR 276.196 307.489 0.000 -0.001 0.01 40 0.0933 
TENURE 3.482 1.660 0.003 0.007 0.0053 -0.0073 
TENSOR 106.741 47.093 0.000 0.000 0.0096 0.0128 
WKBEFDEG 0.000 0.004 -0.125 -0.041 0.0004 -0.0003 
OJT -0.107 -0.111 0.001 0.020 0.0000 0.0021 
PART -0.046 -0.099 -0.496 -0.382 -0.0263 0.0112 
HISPANIC -0.005 0.000 -0.006 0.033 0.0000 0.0000 
BLACK -0.035 -0.008 -0.029 -0.017 0.0008 0.0001 
ASIAN 0.009 0.030 -0.068 -0.072 0.0014 0.0001 
NATIVE -0.008 -0.001 -0.094 0.056 0.0006 0.0002 -N 
MARRIED 0.174 0.136 0.050 0.099 0.0019 -0.0067 0 
MARWTHCH 0.070 0.078 -0.023 -0.006 0.0002 -0 .0013 
DISABIL -0.008 0.015 -0.046 -0.015 0.0011 -0 .0005 
COMMA TH 0.011 0.015 0.200 0.171 -0.0008 0.0004 
PHYSCI 0.178 0.086 0.139 0.059 0 .0127 0.0069 
SOCSCI -0.218 -0.235 -0.010 0.079 -0.0002 0.0209 
ENGi NRG 0.11 7 0.225 0.208 0.133 -0.0225 0.0168 
OCEDMED 0.032 0.040 -0.058 -0.030 0 .0005 -0.0011 
OCEDZERO -0.018 0.026 -0.160 -0.063 0.0071 -0.0025 
ENGINEER 0.077 0.157 0.002 -0.023 -0.0002 0.0040 
ADMIN -0.002 0.044 0.203 0.258 -0 .0094 -0.0024 
SERVICES -0.008 -0.019 -0.145 -0.248 -0.0017 -0.0020 
SALETECH 0.000 0.027 -0.011 -0.119 0 .0003 0.0029 
HLTHSERV -0.015 -0.019 0.208 0.413 0 .0008 0.0039 
POSTDOC -0.036 -0.007 -0.328 -0.417 0 0097 -0.0006 
NENGLAND -0 .019 0.005 -0.072 -0.010 0.0017 -0 .0003 
MATLANT -0.001 -0.011 -0.066 0.009 -0.0006 0.0008 
Table A2-7. (continued) 
Variable 
ENCENTRL 0.013 0.000 
WNCENTRL 0.000 0.001 
SATLANT -0.036 -0.025 
ESCENTRL 0.002 0.002 
WSCENTRL 0.014 0.013 
MOUNTAIN 0.048 0.015 
CONSTANT 0.000 0.000 
Sum(Effects) 
Actual Gap 
o nonprofl _ opnvatc : 
AGE 2.743 3.189 
AGESQR 267.813 307.489 
TENURE 3.447 1.660 
TENSOR 91 .684 47.093 
WKBEFDEG 0.005 0.004 
OJT -0.109 -0.111 
PART -0.106 -0.099 
HISPANIC -0.002 0.000 
BLACK 0.001 -0.008 
ASIAN 0.024 0.030 
NATIVE -0.001 -0.001 
MARRIED 0.157 0.136 
MARWTHCH 0.079 0 .078 
DISABIL -0.010 0.015 
COMMA TH 0.027 0 .015 
PHYSCI 0.132 0 .086 
-0.057 -0.098 -0.0007 
-0 .166 -0.165 0.0002 
0.045 -0.065 -0.0005 
-0.027 -0.122 0.0000 
-0.110 -0.140 -0.0001 
-0.002 -0.135 -0.0001 
9.581 9.236 0.0000 
-0.0136 
0.082 0.078 -0.0364 
-0.001 -0.001 0.0305 
0.013 0.007 0.0231 
0.000 0.000 -0.0050 
-0 .071 -0.041 -0.0001 
-0.044 0.020 -0.0001 
-0 .461 -0.382 0 0036 
0.062 0.033 -0.0001 
-0 .169 -0.017 -0.0014 
0.016 -0.072 -0.0001 
-0.193 0.056 -0.0001 
0.001 0.099 0.0000 
0.046 -0.006 0.0001 
0.066 -0.015 -0.0017 
0.131 0.171 0.0015 
0.124 0.059 0.0056 
Obs. P 
0.0000 
0 0000 
-0.0028 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0020 
0.0000 
0.0679 1.712 21 .330 
-0.0769 
0 .0131 
-0.0060 
0.0093 
-0 0001 
-0 0001 
0.0071 
0.0078 
0.0000 
0.0012 
0.0026 
0.0004 
-0.0135 
0 0040 
0.0012 
-0.0006 
0.0056 
,\ 
O"m 
0.0072 
O"mprivate G:ip Eff. 
0.0067 -0.1403 
Unobs. P 
0 0091 
-~ -
Table A2-7. (continued) 
Variable ~XA 6 Xprh·u• ~mA PmP"\a•t Obs. X Obs. P ~9A epri\ ot• O'm.\ O'm privntt Gap Eff. Unobs. P 
SOCSCI -0.230 -0.235 -0.059 0.079 -0.0003 0.0325 
ENGi NRG 0.108 0.225 0.052 0.133 -0.0060 -0.0183 
OCEDMED 0.042 0.040 -0.085 -0.030 -0.0002 -0.0022 
OCEDZERO -0.024 0.026 -0.207 -0.063 0.0103 -0.0037 
ENGINEER 0.079 0.157 0.096 -0.023 -0.0075 0.0187 
ADMIN 0.035 0.044 0.317 0.258 -0.0027 0.0026 
SERVICES -0.014 -0.019 -0.110 -0.248 -0.0006 -0.0027 
SALETECH -0.003 0.027 0.121 -0. 119 -0.0036 0.0064 
HLTHSERV -0.048 -0.019 0.346 0.413 -0.0100 0.0013 
POST DOC -0.011 -0.007 -0.527 -0.417 0.0026 0.0007 
NENGLAND -0.011 0.005 0.081 -0.010 -0.0012 0.0004 -
N 
MATLANT -0.022 -0.011 0.018 0.009 -0.0002 -0.0001 ,..., 
ENCENTRL 0.001 0.000 -0.076 -0.098 -0.0001 0.0000 
WNCENTRL -0.01 7 0.001 -0.002 -0.165 0.0000 0.0002 
SATLANT 0.033 -0 .025 0.073 -0 065 0.0043 -0.0035 
ESCENTRL 0.005 0.002 -0.31 7 -0.122 -0.0011 -0 0004 
WSCENTRL -0.01 2 0.013 -0.086 -0.140 0.0022 0.0007 
MOUNTAIN 0.002 0.015 -0.098 -0.135 0.0012 0.0005 
CONSTANT 0.000 0.000 8 944 9.236 0.0000 0.0000 
Sum(Effects) 0.0065 0.0654 9.426 21.330 0.018 0.007 -0.2100 0.2326 
Actual GAP 0.0946 
o •d f• mp - o pm-at< : 
AGE 4.156 3.189 0.090 0.078 0.0873 0.0408 
AGESQR 418.318 307.489 -0.001 -0.001 -0.1003 -0.0477 
TENURE 0.549 1.660 0.036 0.007 -0.0396 0.0470 
TENSOR 12.483 47.093 -0.001 0.000 0.0215 -0.0239 
WKBEFDEG -0.037 0.004 0.129 -0.041 -0.0053 0.0006 
Table A2-7. (continued) 
Variable 
OJT -0.217 -0.111 
PART -0.161 -0.099 
HISPANIC -0.007 0.000 
BLACK -0.003 -0.008 
ASIAN 0.024 0.030 
NATIVE -0.001 -0.001 
MARRIED 0.131 0.136 
MARWTHCH -0 .018 0.078 
DISABIL 0.023 0.015 
COMMA TH 0.014 0.015 
PHY SCI 0.127 0.086 
SOCSCI -0.292 -0.235 
ENG I NRG 0.088 0.225 
OCEDMED 0.104 0.040 
OCEDZERO 0.092 0.026 
ENGINEER 0.058 0.157 
ADMIN 0.052 0.044 
SERVICES 0.029 -0.019 
SALETECH 0.023 0.027 
HLTHSERV 0.027 -0.019 
POST DOC -0.005 -0.007 
NENGLAND -0.003 0.005 
MATLANT 0.004 -0.011 
ENCENTRL 0.01 7 0.000 
WNCENTRL 0.010 0.001 
SATLANT -0.017 -0.025 
ESCENTRL 0 006 0.002 
-0.111 0.020 
-0.455 -0.382 
-0.129 0.033 
0.224 -0 .017 
-0.120 -0 .072 
-0.150 0.056 
0.122 0.099 
0 106 -0.006 
-0.129 -0.015 
-0.127 0.171 
-0 .084 0.059 
-0.037 0.079 
0 .048 0.133 
-0.065 -0.030 
-0.333 -0.063 
0.278 -0.023 
0.394 0.258 
-0.390 -0.248 
0.276 -0.119 
0.564 0.413 
-0.153 -0.417 
-0.108 -0.010 
-0.037 0 .009 
-0.050 -0.098 
-0.122 -0.165 
-0 041 -0.065 
-0 033 -0 .122 
0.0118 
0.0282 
0.0009 
0.0011 
0.0006 
0.0000 
-0.0006 
-0.0102 
-0.0010 
0.0001 
-0.0035 
0.0021 
-0.0066 
-0.0042 
-0 .0222 
-0.0276 
0.0033 
-0.0190 
-0.0010 
0.0260 
-0.0003 
0.0009 
-0.0006 
-0.0008 
-0.0011 
-0 .0003 
-0.0001 
Obs. P 
0.0145 
0.0072 
0.0000 
-0.0019 
-0.0014 
0.0003 
0.0031 
0.0087 
-0.0017 
-0 .0045 
-0.0124 
0 .0273 
-0.0191 
-0 .0014 
-0 .0069 
0.0473 
0 0059 
0.0028 
0 0106 
-0.0029 
-0.0017 
-0.0004 
0.0005 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-0.0006 
0.0002 
A 
CYm 
prh•:lle 
CYm Gap Eff. Unobs. P 
-
N ,_, 
Table A2-7. (continued) 
Variable 
WSCENTRL -0.019 0.013 
MOUNTAIN 0.009 0.015 
CONSTANT 0.000 0.000 
Sum(Effects) 
Actual Gap 
Dacadem1a -Dpnvatc: 
AGE 3.696 3.189 
AGESQR 363.248 307.489 
TENURE 4.750 1.660 
TENSOR 156.159 47.093 
WKBEFDEG -0.020 0.004 
OJT -0.131 -0.111 
PART -0.032 -0 .099 
HISPANIC -0.010 0 000 
BLACK -0 .017 -0 008 
ASIAN 0.013 0.030 
NATIVE 0.001 -0.001 
MARRIED 0.168 0.136 
MARWTHCH 0.074 0.078 
DISABIL 0 009 0.015 
COMMA TH 0.047 0.015 
PHYSCI 0.102 0.086 
SOCSCI -0.159 -0.235 
ENGi NRG 0.115 0.225 
OCEDMED -0.024 0.040 
OCEDZERO 0.001 0.026 
-0 .071 -0.140 0.0023 
-0 .098 -0.135 0.0005 
8.807 9 236 0.0000 
-0.0578 
0.039 0.078 0.0197 
0.000 -0.001 -0.0161 
0.016 0.007 0.0480 
0.000 0.000 -0.0303 
-0.091 -0.041 0.0021 
-0.044 0.020 0.0009 
-0.381 -0.382 -0.0255 
-0.030 0 033 0 .0003 
-0 .037 -0.017 0.0004 
-0.033 -0.072 0 .0006 
-0.151 0.056 -0.0004 
0.062 0.099 0.0020 
0.018 -0.006 -0.0001 
-0.044 -0.015 0 .0003 
-0.003 0.171 -0.0001 
-0.012 0.059 -0.0002 
-0.044 0.079 -0.0034 
0.103 0.133 -0.0114 
-0.029 -0.030 0.0018 
-0.065 -0.063 0.0016 
Obs. P 
0.0009 
0.0005 
0.0000 
0.0918 5.025 
0.0391 
-0.1234 
0.1418 
0.0137 
-0 .0078 
-0 .0002 
0.0072 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0002 
0.0012 
0.0003 
-0.0050 
0.0019 
-0.0004 
-0 .0026 
-0.0061 
0.0291 
-0.0066 
0.0000 
0.0000 
21 .330 
:\ 
CTm 
0.030 0 007 
Unobs. P 
-0.4820 0.4870 
-
N 
.I>-
Table A2-7. (continued) 
Varia ble liXA liXP"''" Pm" p prh'ale Obs. X Obs. P fi8A fi8pmote A pri\'ate Gap Eff. Unobs. P Ill crm crm 
ENGINEER 0.096 0.157 0.062 -0.023 -0.0038 0.0134 
ADMIN 0.013 0.044 0.384 0.258 -0.0116 0.0055 
SERVICES -0 .030 -0.019 -0.028 -0.248 0.0003 -0.0043 
SALETECH 0.001 0.027 -0.242 -0.119 0.0063 -0.0033 
HLTHSERV -0.077 -0.019 0.256 0.413 -0.0148 0.0030 
POSTDOC -0.039 -0.007 -0.398 -0.417 0.0127 -0.0001 
NENGLAND -0.008 0 005 -0.021 -0.010 0.0003 -0.0001 
MATLANT -0.033 -0.011 -0.001 0.009 0.0000 0.0001 
ENCENTRL 0.003 0.000 -0.055 , -0.098 -0.0001 0.0000 
WNCENTRL 0.018 0.001 -0.123 -0.165 -0.0020 0.0000 
SATLANT -0.006 -0.025 -0.052 -0.065 -0.0010 -0.0003 -Iv 
ESCENTRL 0.016 0.002 -0.139 -0 .122 -0.0019 0.0000 
,..,, 
WSCENTRL 0.019 0.013 -0.094 -0.140 -0.0005 0.0006 
MOUNTAIN 0.014 0 015 -0.069 -0 .135 0.0000 0.0010 
CONSTANT 0.000 0.000 9.703 9.236 0.0000 0.0000 
Sum( Effects) -0.0259 0.0584 27.448 21.330 0.004 0.007 0.0268 -0.0500 
Actual Gap 0.0094 
•The nomializing categories for sets of binary regressors are as follows. 
Broad classification of degree field : LIFESCI 
Degree-job relationship: OCEDHIGH 
Occupation: PROSCIEN 
Employer sector: PR.IV A TE 
Employer region: PACIFIC 
Employer size: EMSIZE7 
Effects may not sum due to rounding error. 
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Notes 
1 Iowa State Universil) .., 
- Recent I}. some non-academ ic institu11ons, panicu larl) pri\'ate !inns "orking on genetic . and certain 
government agencies. have initiated post-doctorates. 
j In fact the decomposit ion breaks down if we transform the coefficients. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the supply and demand moti\·ation of agents in a sector-
segmented labor market for doctorates, and the wage differentials between gender and racial 
groups. We found that males are more likely to be employed in the private and public sectors. 
and that females are more likely to be employed in academia. Minority doctorate. how 
panicular preference for academic ector employment compared to Whites. with the 
exception of Asians. They are more likely to be in the private sector compared to Whites. We 
fo und that engineering majors are 77 percentage points more likely than life science majors 
to be in the private sector. and 73 percentage points less likely to be in academia. Likewise. 
phys ical science majors are also prefer private sector employment to academic employment. 
Results from the Oaxaca gender gap decomposition show that most of the male-
female wage gap stems from the asymmetric aluation of gender specific general experience. 
although the magnitude of the wage structure effect of age greatl y depend on whether age 
enrer linearly or quadratically in the v age equations. Moreover. we discover that about 40% 
of the wage structure effect of age is due to a cohort effect in the female sub-sample. Older 
females tend to have flatter tenure profiles due to le s continuous tenures. while the younger 
generation of females are more career oriented and thus generate profiles that are more 
concave. Analysis using a pooled sample of older and younger females results in a large 
estimate of wage structure effect for age. Decomposition for race/ethnicity shows that most 
of the racial wage gaps stem from racial differences in sectors of employment and in 
occupation · held "'·ithin a given sector. 
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